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Throughout history philanthropy has provided vision and voice for supporting social and humanitarian 
needs, for emerging social movements ranging from civil rights to malaria research, and for preserving 
culture and the arts. The history of family enterprises and business families as well as the philanthropic 
literature suggest that philanthropy is often an important part of family enterprise continuity and of 
successful family firm entrepreneurship. Yet philanthropy is one of the least studied aspects of family 
enterprise. In general, the recognition in recent decades of the contribution by family enterprise to the 
world economy has led academics to significantly increase research on this form of business 
organizations. Family business literature has emerged as an independent body of knowledge from 
management and entrepreneurship research (Chirsman el al., 2008). However, there are important issues 
and topics that have only been marginally studied in family firms. One of those topics is family firm 
philanthropy (Feliu & Botero, forthcoming; Litz & Stewart, 2000). In fact, studies focusing on both 
family firm philanthropy and corporate philanthropy in current management literature are rare and offer 
mixed contributions to the field. The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it integrates the fragmented 
understanding of philanthropy in family enterprises and create a baseline to understand philanthropic 
process in them. Second, it wants to further our understanding of the governance of philanthropy in 
family enterprises. In particular, the decision-making process that entrepreneurial families undergo when 
engaging in philanthropy. This dissertation uses three projects to provide insights about theory and 
practice that pave the way for future research in the field of philanthropy in the family enterprise context. 
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Chapter 1: Introductory Chapter 
I have been engaged to the family enterprise field for the last sixteen years as a consultant to 
family corporations on corporate and family governance, continuity, and philanthropy. In addition, all my 
life I have been a family member of a successful small family business in the area of Barcelona. Being 
immersed in the world of entrepreneurial families and their businesses and also being part of a 
consultancy firm that works with a process consultation approach (Schein, 1999), I have always been 
eager to understand the dynamics behind individual or collective behaviors so that I could facilitate 
required change. Understanding the processes that our family clients undergo when making decisions that 
definitely impact their continuity, success and sometimes survival, is a professional and personal goal. 
As consultants we are always in the field. We learn and we professionally develop with our 
clients. As practitioners we study cases, we evaluate and analyze them and we create documented 
implementation data. When I moved into the strange world of academia, I confirmed how complementary 
was my work with well-designed studies and well-analyzed data. I am an advocate of the integration of 
practice with formal research and theory. I believe this is the best way to address the fascinating 
unknowns of family enterprise philanthropy and its governance. My colleagues and I have written about 
the benefits of this practice/research integration on many occasions:  “As we meet that need, it will help 
us to move beyond broadly-accepted ‘common knowledge’ about governance practice, and keep us 
focused on the core task at hand – discovering what is really true so that we can intervene in ways that are 
truly helpful” (Gersick & Feliu, 2014). 
Why choose philanthropy as a topic for my dissertation? Giving and helping others are values 
embedded in individuals and their communities across the globe (Clotfelter & Ehrlich, 1999). There are 
many ways to think about philanthropy and also many contexts in which to observe the phenomena. 
Family enterprise is an interesting framework to explore. The history of entrepreneurial families suggests 
that their active engagement in philanthropy can be viewed as a reflection of the deep ties that family 
firms have with the communities in which they operate, and is an integral part of successful familial 
entrepreneurship. 
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Like every aspect of modern life, philanthropy has experienced revolutionary changes. The 
economic challenges faced around the world (e.g., widening imbalances between wealthy and the poor, 
the shrinking budgets of states devoted to the provision of vital social services and to support the culture 
and arts, crises of refugees fleeing war and escaping poverty, or the differences in development between 
the countries), and the expectations that those with great wealth need to help the less fortunate, have 
generated great interest in philanthropy in recent years. The actions of high-profile individuals, such as 
the Giving Pledge, a public statement of intent by Bill Gates and his peer philanthropist to donate half of 
their fortunes to charitable endeavors, have generated worldwide attention for the subject of philanthropy. 
However, despite the recognition of the importance of family philanthropy and its social 
contributions (Astrachan, 1988; National Philanthropic Trust, 2013; Pharoah, 2008; Pharoah, 2009; 
Pharoah et al., 2014; Sanborn & Portocarrero, 2003), there are still important gaps in the field (Feliu & 
Botero, forthcoming; NCFP, 2006). The review of both practitioner and academic literature illustrates that 
the family enterprise field includes many themes that have not been investigated on this topic. For 
example, there is not a clear understanding of the motivations and outcomes linked to the practice of 
philanthropy in family enterprises. Similarly, there is not clear understanding of how philanthropy is 
practiced or how entrepreneurial families govern their philanthropic efforts. This is problematic because 
family enterprises are expressing more interest in this practice. More clients ask for advice on this area 
from their family business consultants, and more philanthropy presentations are included in Family Firm 
conferences (i.e., see conference programs for The Family Firm Institute, the International Family 
Business Network, Business Families Foundations, and the regional chapters of these institutions). 
Entrepreneurial families, who have traditionally concentrated their efforts in the business arena, are now 
more than ever wanting to foster their innovative and entrepreneurial spirit in the philanthropy field. 
Thus, it is necessary and important to explore the role of philanthropy in family enterprises and the 
decision making process around it, from the first emergence of the “family philanthropic Dream” to the 
selection of governance bodies for each philanthropic project pursued by the family, and the assessment 
of the impact of those projects on the family, the enterprise, and also on society. 
 2 
In an effort to address these gaps, this project was designed with three objectives in mind. First, I 
wanted to review the literature in Philanthropy to have a better understanding of what is currently known 
in this area. Second, I wanted to understand the governance in family enterprises and how this knowledge 
could provide insights into the governance of philanthropic efforts. And, third, I wanted to understand the 
factors that influence the governance and decision-making structures and process of philanthropy in 
family enterprises. With these objectives in mind, I decided to approach the study of family enterprise 
philanthropy in three stages. The first stage included a review of the literature in philanthropy in family 
enterprises. The objective of this review was to provide a thorough analysis of the literature to develop an 
understanding of family enterprise philanthropy in four areas: 
(1) The conceptualization of philanthropy in the family business literature 
(2) The motivations for philanthropy  
(3) The vehicles through which philanthropy is practiced 
(4) The outcomes associated with philanthropy in family enterprises  
This review offers a distinctive contribution, which is the combination of knowledge that is 
family-centered, business-centered, practitioner-driven and academically-driven to provide an 
examination of the topic. In addition, the study presents a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the 
topic of philanthropy in family enterprises that I needed before starting on the in-depth analysis of the 
governance literature. The review is a essential part of the dissertation as it sets the stage with a big-
picture perspective and it lays the foundation for the later part of this dissertation. 
A full perspective on family enterprise governance was also required before inquiring about the 
governance of philanthropy by entrepreneurial families and their businesses. This is pursued in the second 
research paper. The paper on family firm governance integrates formal research and theory with 
documented implementation experience to build an integrated presentation of what we know in relation to 
governance. The paper is inclusive as it addresses the domain of governance in the business, ownership 
and family circle, as the means of stewarding the multigenerational family organization and overseeing all 
the collaborative operations of the family, including wealth management, philanthropy, and human 
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development (Gersick, et al., 1997; Goldbart & DeFuria, 2009; Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Lansberg, 1999; 
Mustakallio et al., 2002). And, finally, the third part of the dissertation focuses on the governance of the 
practice of philanthropy across different formats. This last study of the dissertation explores relevant 
themes in the overall governance of philanthropy by entrepreneurial families and on the interplay between 
family dynamics and philanthropy governance. It also contributes by identifying relevant future avenues 
for research in which to advance in the family firm field. In order to succeed, the study adapts a 
qualitative approach (i.e., a case study). According to Creswell:  
“... a qualitative approach is one in which the inquirer often makes knowledge claims based 
primarily on constructivist perspectives (i.e., the multiple meanings of individual experiences, 
meanings socially and historically constructed with an intent of developing a theory or pattern) 
or advocacy/participatory perspectives (i.e., political, issue-oriented, collaborative or change 
oriented) or both. It also uses strategies of inquiry such as narratives, phenomenologies, 
ethnographies, grounded theory studies, or case studies. The researcher collects open-ended, 
emerging data with the primary intent of developing themes from the data” (2003, 18). 
Qualitative research questions are likely to begin with “what” or “how” to convey an open and nascent 
design, exploring the way in which people interpret their experiences in their natural environments 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). This facilitates understanding the phenomena from an individual’s point 
of view instead of the researcher’s perspective. This approach seemed well aligned with the phenomena 
of the governance of philanthropy and the objectives of my research. 
As a researcher and consultant, I was attentive to Bloomberg and Volpe’s words about producing 
an ethical research design as well as an intellectually coherent and compelling one (Bloomberg & Volpe, 
2008). I was aware that “most social research involves interventions in some aspects of social life” 
(Blaikie, 2007, 19). Given this, I took advantage of the fact that I already had a relationship with the cases 
as consultant, and that interventions designed to enhance the philanthropic engagement of the family and 
their governance were in place. In order to maximize the validity of the qualitative data, while 
maintaining an ethical relationship with the participants, I decided to employ both the elements of 
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anonymity and confidentiality. Anonymity protected the identity of both specific individuals and of the 
family enterprises that participated in the case study. Confidentiality referred to the process of keeping the 
information gathered from individuals private. 
Finally, it was essential in the case study part of the dissertation to be aware of the risk of 
personal bias. In my view, philanthropy is crucial in our society and I am certain of the unique role that 
entrepreneurial families and family business actually play and can potentially play as providers of 
innovative resources to the field. Thus, I proceed with the study with an open spirit of inquiry and 
prepared to address any biases that could emerge. 
As a result of my experience in this research, I have concluded that it would be very beneficial for 
practitioners and academics to enhance their commitment to integrate this kind of qualitative analysis 
with quantitative data-gathering efforts. As I will point out later in the study and in the conclusion of the 
dissertation, the propositions that are supported in practice by family business consultants, require 
empirical testing to lessen the knowing-doing gap (Astrachan, 2009; Sharma, 2010). 
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the researcher purposes to accomplish this work. It 
provides an introduction to the world of philanthropy and the rationale that is behind the three articles that 
compose the dissertation. It introduces the methodology followed in the different articles and some 
methodological concerns from the author. 
Chapter 2 is the article Philanthropy in Family Enterprises: A Review of Literature. This 
article has been accepted for publication in the Family Business Review 1st Review Issue, in March 2016. 
It is now available online. The review of literature of philanthropy in family enterprises contributes to the 
field with a description of the drivers of the philanthropic behavior, the vehicles used to practice it, and 
the outcomes tied to the practice of philanthropy in family enterprises. The study identifies gaps in our 
understanding and provides ideas for future research. 
Chapter 3 presents the study: Governing the Family Enterprise: Practices, Performance and 
Research. This article consolidates existing empirical studies and integrates them with what has been 
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learned from experience. The purpose of this work was to build a knowledge base on family enterprise 
governance that simultaneously considered the business, ownership and family systems. Within the 
family system, the governance of philanthropy is addressed. This article aims to serve both practitioners 
as they consider paradigms for offering their advice to families, and researchers by presenting a 
comprehensive agenda for future research. 
Chapter 4 is a multi-case study titled Governing Philanthropy in Family Enterprises. The 
study offers a new perspective on family enterprise philanthropy by exploring the governance of 
philanthropy through the analysis of two cases. The article furthers our understanding of the practice and 
governance of philanthropic efforts of entrepreneurial families. The study provides detailed opportunities 
for future research.  
Final Section: Conclusions section. The dissertation concludes with an overarching summary of 






Chapter 2: Philanthropy in Family Enterprises: A Review of Literature 
 
Abstract 
Philanthropy in family enterprises operates at the crossroads of family, business, and society. Most of the 
research in this area is approached from the business or the individual level; thus, we have a fragmented 
understanding of philanthropy in family enterprises. This paper presents a systematic review of the 
literature on the subject. Based on 55 sources published between 1988 and 2014, we explain the drivers of 
this behavior, the vehicles used to practice it, and the outcomes tied to the practice of philanthropy in 
family enterprises. We identify gaps in our understanding and provide ideas for future research. 
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Philanthropy in Family Enterprises: A Review of Literature 
In its most general sense, philanthropy encompasses behaviors and actions that are manifestations 
of a voluntary commitment to the wellbeing of others (Schuyt, 2010). Philanthropy is rooted in cultural 
and religious teachings regarding the responsibilities that those more fortunate have towards others who 
are less fortunate or are going through a hard time (Rey-Garcia & Puig-Raposo, 2013; Schuyt, 2013). As 
important actors in their communities, family enterprises have always been at the forefront of 
philanthropic efforts (Astrachan, 1988; Sanborn & Portocarrero, 2003), and represent an important 
percentage of the monetary contributions towards the wellbeing of their communities. For example, in the 
United States (US) donations from corporations and foundations, many who are family owned, represent 
over $67 billion per year (National Philanthropic Trust, 2013). In the United Kingdom (UK), the top 100 
family foundations and corporations contribute £908 million per year to societal causes (Pharoah, 2008). 
In Italy, family foundations contribute about €90 million and in Germany they contribute an estimate of 
€490 million per year to societal improvements (Pharoah, 2009; Pharoah et al., 2014)1. Therefore, the 
philanthropic efforts of family enterprises provide valuable economic resources for social services, 
education, health, arts, and humanities around the world. 
In family enterprises, philanthropic activities also affect the donor business and the owning 
family. On the business side, philanthropy serves as a mechanism to demonstrate commitment to long-
term goals (Campopiano et al., 2014); to develop social and reputational capital (Cruz et al., 2014); and to 
enhance the commitment and involvement of family and non-family employees towards the firm (Muller 
et al., 2014). On the family side, engaging in philanthropy helps educate family stakeholders on issues 
about family legacy, wealth (i.e., management and responsibilities) and the practice of professional skills 
required in the business world (Breeze, 2009; Eichenberger & Johnson, 2013; Ward 2009). Philanthropy 
can also help families transfer social capital between generations by allowing different generations to 
interact and work towards a common goal (Breeze, 2009; Schwass & Leif, 2008). Given the important 
1 Donations data in US Dollar as of August 17th 2015 are $67 billion per year in the US; $1,422.00 million per year 
in UK; $99.4 million per year in Italy; and $ 541.5 million per year in Germany. 
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role that family enterprise philanthropy plays for the entrepreneurial family and the business, it is 
important to have a baseline understanding of the philanthropic process. This knowledge can help 
academics and practitioners understand how philanthropy in the family enterprise works and how it is 
used as a tool for the transfer of knowledge, resources, and ideas between and across generations. 
Philanthropy in family enterprises is interesting because it can be practiced and governed from 
either the business or the family domains. This dual nature has led to a fragmented understanding of the 
topic that is rooted in three characteristics of research in philanthropy and family enterprise. First, 
philanthropy has been conceptualized in different ways (Gautier & Pache, 2015). For example, some 
argue that it is a responsibility that businesses or business families have towards society, while others 
suggest that it is a purely altruistic behavior (Liket & Simaens, 2015; Saiia et al., 2003; Sulek, 2010). As a 
result, determining what to include and exclude under the concept of philanthropy is difficult. Second, 
there is a divide in family enterprise research between work that focuses primarily on the family system 
and on the business system, with very few researchers integrating these two approaches (Michael-Tsabari 
et al., 2014). Third, research in family enterprise shows little integration between practitioner and 
academically driven work (Gersick & Feliu, 2014). This causes difficulty in understanding philanthropy 
because academically driven work tends to focus exclusively on the business component of the enterprise 
whereas practitioners will focus on the family component (Michael-Tsabari et al., 2014).  
To address these issues, this paper provides a comprehensive review of the literature to develop 
an understanding of philanthropy in the family enterprise and identify gaps for future research. This 
review focuses on four questions in the context of family enterprises: (1) how is philanthropy 
conceptualized? (2) what are the motivations for philanthropy? (3) how is philanthropy practiced? And, 
(4) what are the outcomes associated with philanthropy? The unique contribution of our review lies in the 
combination of knowledge that is family-centered, business-centered, practitioner-driven and 
academically-driven to provide an examination of the topic. The following sections present the scope of 
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this review, general observations about this research, findings in each of the four research questions, 
general conclusions and directions for future research. 
Scope of The Review and Coding of Information 
 Databases from business and social sciences (i.e., EBSCO, JSTOR, Springer Link, Emerald, 
Science Direct, Wiley, SAGE Publications, ProQuest, and Google scholar) were used to identify 
academic and practitioner publications for this review. Sources were identified using a combination of the 
following terms in the title, the abstract, and/or the keywords for each database: philanthropy, 
philanthropic, philanthropic giving, and charity with family business, family firm, family enterprise, 
business family, and family. Initially there were 130 distinct sources. After reading each abstract and 
eliminating irrelevant entries, 48 articles and one book chapter were retained. Five reports that provided 
information on surveys conducted with family business owners regarding philanthropic practices and 
motives [The Institute for Family Business (UK), the Centre for Charity Effectiveness (UK), Credit 
Suisse (US), Center for Charitable Giving and Philanthropy and the Philanthropic Initiative (UK)] were 
also identified. Finally, one book that focused on philanthropy in family enterprises was also included. In 
total, this review is based on information obtained from 55 publications2 (See appendix A for list of 
sources). 
Once publications were identified, we coded information in five areas. First, the general 
information about the publication was identified. This included: publication year, author, journal, type of 
article (i.e., academically vs. practice driven), unit of analysis (i.e., family, business, or both), origin of 
information (US vs. Other countries), focus of research (i.e., comparison of FF vs. NFF, or FF), research 
question, and general results or observations. Second, the definition (if any) and the measurement metric 
for philanthropy used in each study were coded. Third, the reasons given for why family enterprises 
engage in philanthropy were identified. This section also identified which theoretical explanations (if any) 
were used to describe these motivations. Fourth, the specific practices employed by family enterprises to 
2 Although there was one book, one book chapter, five reports, and 48 articles, all of these are referred to as 
publications. 
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engage in philanthropy, and the level (individual, family, and/or business) through which philanthropy 
was practiced were identified. And, fifth, the empirical findings about predictors and outcomes associated 
with philanthropy were coded. To ensure consistency in the coding of information, the two authors 
independently coded each article. The codings were then compared. When inconsistencies arose, the 
coders discussed the information, resolved their differences and made a joint determination about which 
coding to use. 
What do we know about research on philanthropy in family enterprises? 
The first paper that emerged from our literature search appeared in 1988 (Atkinson & 
Galaskiewicz, 1988). During the 1990s there were ten papers that explored the subject. This included a 
special issue in Family Business Review that examined family foundations (seven papers). Since 2004 the 
interest in philanthropy in the family business context has grown steadily, mirroring the increased interest 
in corporate philanthropy (Gautier & Pache, 2015). The focus in the exploration of philanthropy has been 
balanced between family (N = 25) and business (N = 24) contexts with a small number of publications 
focusing on both (N = 6). Information about philanthropy seems to be equally driven by academic (N = 
28) and practice-oriented knowledge (N = 27). Thirty-four publications in this review were empirical 
studies. The methodological approaches to collect empirical information included the use of secondary 
data (N = 11), survey research (N = 9), case studies (N = 8), in-depth interviews (N = 4), and focus 
groups (N = 2). Finally, only 33% of the publications provided information about philanthropy from 
outside the US. 
While coding for definitions, we analyzed how philanthropy was measured. Nineteen of the 
sources discussed the metrics for assessment of philanthropic activities, which included: (1) monetary 
contribution (N = 8), (2) other forms of support or involvement in the community (N = 5), (3) dummy 
variable (i.e., asking whether the family enterprise practiced philanthropy; N = 3), and (4) using scores 
from databases (i.e., KDL and CSRHub, N = 3). Only four of the practice driven forces directly measured 
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philanthropy. One measured it as a form of support while the other three measured it as monetary 
contribution. 
Defining Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
There are many conceptual and empirical debates about what constitutes philanthropy (Gautier & 
Pache, 2015; Liket & Simaens, 2015). The source of these debates is closely linked to changes in the 
definition of philanthropy over time and the interpretations that individuals have of what constitutes a 
philanthropic act (Sulek, 2010). Before the 20th century, the terms philanthropy and charity were used 
interchangeably to signify the voluntary act of financial giving to support those who had fallen on hard 
times (Schuyt, 2013). This traditional view focused on helping the less fortunate and making sure that 
their basic needs were met (Schuyt, 2013). Early in the 20th century, as wealthy entrepreneurs in the US 
started donating to a variety of causes that went beyond welfare and relief for the poor, the view of 
philanthropy shifted in at least three ways (Harvey et al., 2011, Rey-Garcia & Puig-Raposo, 2013). First, 
the types of causes supported by philanthropic efforts changed from a focus on basic physical and 
material needs (e.g., food, clothing and shelter) to a wider spectrum of causes such as health care, 
environment, education, and the arts (Schuyt, 2013). Second, philanthropic efforts were no longer focused 
exclusively on reducing the consequences of social problems such as hunger or disease; instead they 
looked at ways to alleviate the symptoms of these problems including the lack of education or of skills, or 
a culture of poverty (Sulek, 2010). And, third, there was a change in the motives that guided philanthropy. 
Early in the 1900s, publicists like Ivy Lee advised customers to engage in actions that the public would 
perceive as good and beneficial for society so they would be seen in a positive light (Gruning & Hunt, 
1984). This shifted the motives of philanthropy from purely altruistic (i.e., selfless concern for the well-
being of others) to a desire for “return on investment” in the form of public approval from philanthropic 
actions or in changes in society (Cutlip, 1994).  Thus, conceptualizations of philanthropy today go beyond 
the act of charity to include a wider range of activities (e.g., donating money to social welfare, to 
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education or the arts) and purposes for the philanthropic act (Aguilera et al., 2007; Barnett, 2007; Porter 
& Kramer, 1999).  
Table 1.1 Sample Definitions of Philanthropy (pp. 135) 
Table 1.1 provides sample definitions that we found in this review. A total of ten practitioner-
focused and 23 academic publications provided a definition of philanthropy in the text. All of the 
definitions described philanthropy as a form of giving that could include financial gifts, volunteering, or 
any other resource that the family enterprise possessed. The 33 definitions explicitly or implicitly 
indicated that the primary purpose of philanthropy was to help others. Only five definitions explicitly 
stated a direct benefit to the family enterprise.  
The work of Gautier and Pache (2015) identifies three general types of corporate philanthropy. 
The “commitment to the common good” (CTCG) approach views philanthropy as a voluntary and selfless 
act of the organization. The “community investment” (CI) approach encompasses philanthropic actions 
that can result in some form of long-term benefit for the firm. Finally, the “marketing” (MKT) approach 
views philanthropy as a commercial tool for the organization. We used this typology to code how 
philanthropy has been defined in the context of family enterprises. Our observations indicate that 13 
publications described philanthropy as focusing exclusively on a CTCG, five described philanthropy as 
using the CI exclusively, and no definitions used the MKT approach. In addition, 15 publications used 
blended definitions of philanthropy. Thirteen of those publications defined philanthropy using 
components of both the CTCG and CI approaches and two sources combined the CI and MKT 
approaches. When comparing academic (N = 23) and practice (N = 10) driven sources, we found that 
practice-driven definitions were more likely to describe philanthropy using primarily one approach 
(CTCG = 60%, CI = 20%) in comparison to academic oriented sources (CTCG = 30%, CI = 13%). 
Further, academic driven sources were more likely to use blended definitions of philanthropy (57%) in 
comparison to practice-oriented sources (20%).  Sixteen of these publications described philanthropy as a 
component of corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
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Based on the studies we reviewed and to capture the range of conceptualizations found in the FB 
literature, we define philanthropy as the voluntary donation of resources (i.e., time, money, effort, or 
knowledge) to support causes that are primarily intended to promote the betterment of society with no 
direct expectation of economic returns. Thus, we believe that the main goal of philanthropy is to serve 
society. We also acknowledge that individuals and organizations can have secondary goals when 
engaging in philanthropic efforts. The next section identifies these secondary motivations. 
Motivations for Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
Twenty-five practice-oriented and 25 academic publications were coded to explore the motives 
that guide philanthropic activities in family enterprises. We focused on two aspects of the literature. First, 
the conceptual reasons that have been related to the practice of philanthropy. Second, the theoretical 
approaches, when provided, that have been used to explain why family enterprises engage in 
philanthropy. The two sections below provide the summary of our findings. 
Motives that Guide Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
To identify the motives of philanthropy we created a list of all the reasons presented in each 
source for why family enterprises engaged in philanthropy, and grouped the items in this list into 
categories. There were three general categories: family-oriented motives, business-oriented motives, and 
dual motives (See table 1.2). 
Table 1.2 Motives for Philanthropic Efforts in Family Enterprises (pp. 136) 
Family-Oriented Motives. Twenty practice-oriented and 10 academic publications provided 
information for this section. Fourteen publications support the family identity motive and suggest that 
philanthropy provides a vehicle through which families can work on family unity (Breeze, 2009; 
Snowdon-Blanchard, 2008), family cohesion (Schwass & Leif, 2008), family harmony (Zellweger & 
Nason, 2008), family values (Cruz et al., 2014; Dou et al., 2014; Hoy & Rosplock, 2014; Winer, 2012), 
connection between generations (Eichenberger & Johnson, 2011, 2013), and effective family processes 
(Gallo, 2007; Gersick, 2006; Gersick et al., 1990; Robinson, 2008). In this area there was only one 
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empirical study that found a relationship between family identity and the practice of philanthropy. In her 
work with family business owners in the UK, Breeze (2009) found that owners say they engage in 
philanthropic efforts because doing so is consistent with the values of the family. 
Fourteen publications highlighted legacy factors as important motives. These articles suggest that 
family enterprises are interested in philanthropy because it provides a vehicle to learn about what the 
family has done in the past (Credit Suisse, 2010; Eichenberger & Johnson, 2013; Prince et al., 1993), and 
can facilitate the involvement and knowledge exchange between members from multiple generations 
(Bingham et al., 2011; Eichenberger & Johnson, 2011; Hansen, 1990; Hoy & Rosplock, 2014; Lerner, 
2011; Ward, 2009). The work of Litz and Stewart (2000), Breeze (2009), and Eichenberger and Johnson 
(2013) provides empirical support for the legacy motive. These studies found that family businesses want 
to leave a mark in the communities in which they operate and one of the ways of doing this is by 
engaging in philanthropy. Thus, the family’s desire to build a legacy is one of the drivers for the practice 
of philanthropy in family enterprises. 
Thirteen publications highlighted that family enterprises have a desire to practice philanthropy 
because by doing so families can accrue wealth benefits (Bronfman, 2009; Gray, 2008; Hayes & Adams, 
1990; Hersch, 2004; Hoy & Rosplock, 2014; Rey-Garcia 2012). The only study that provides empirical 
support for this claim is the work of File and colleagues (1995) who found that one of the reasons family 
business owners practice philanthropy is the tax benefits they obtain. Rey-Garcia and Puig-Raposo (2010, 
2013) qualify this claim stating that the civil law tradition of the country in which the family engages in 
philanthropy can affect the tax and wealth benefits to individuals and organizations.  
Business-Oriented Motives. Three practice-driven and 14 academic publications were used to 
identify the different business motives. Eleven publications focused on business strategic reasons for 
engaging in philanthropy. These motives suggest that donations help increase sales (File & Prince, 1998), 
increase performance (Fernando & Alameida, 2012; Fitzgerald et al., 2010), and could bring tax benefits 
(Zellweger & Nason, 2008), or financial returns for the business (Lähdesmäki & Takala, 2012; Madden et 
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al., 2006; Niehm et al., 2008). Three publications provide empirical support for this motive (File & 
Prince, 1998; Lähdesmäki & Takala, 2012; Niehm et al., 2008). Political reasons represent the second 
business motive explored. Four publications discussed political reasons to practice philanthropy. In the 
Chinese context, having political connections is positively related to the practice of philanthropy in family 
enterprises (Zhang et al., 2012). Chinese family enterprises also engaged in philanthropy to divert 
attention from environmental misconduct (Du, 2014). In the US, Atkinson and Galaskiewicz (1988) also 
found that the connections that CEOs have to the philanthropic elite would influence to whom the 
company decides to donate to and how much they donate. Finally, Pharoah and colleagues (2011) found 
that the personal contacts of business owners play a role in the practice of philanthropy by family firms. 
Ten publications (Practice N = 3, Academic N = 7) suggest that the expectations of others matter 
when deciding to engage in philanthropy. Even though philanthropy is not a legal, economic, or ethical 
obligation of the organization (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003), there are social expectations for a business to 
engage in some form of philanthropic activity. Doing so shows the organization’s commitment and 
responsibility towards their community (Gautier & Pache, 2015). In line with these expectations, 
researchers suggests that family enterprises perceive pressures from society (Danco & Ward, 1990), 
stakeholders of the firm (Prince et al., 1993), the community (Campopiano et al., 2014), and/or peer 
organizations (Breeze, 2009; Madden et al., 2006) to engage in philanthropy. The only study that provides 
some empirical support for this relationship is Breeze (2009). She found that peer pressure was a 
prominent explanation business owners gave for doing philanthropy in family enterprises.  
Dual Motives. Fourteen practice-driven and 20 academic publications discussed dual motives as a 
reason for why family enterprises practice philanthropy. Thirteen publications support reputational 
reasons to practice philanthropy (Breeze, 2009; Campopiano et al., 2014, Cruz et al., 2014; Dyer & 
Whetten, 2006; Harvey et al., 2011; Rey-Garcia & Puig-Raposo, 2010). These researchers argue that 
when family enterprises are involved in philanthropy they are seen as a positive influence in the 
community, and these positive perceptions can translate into opportunities and sources of reputational 
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capital (Bingham et al., 2010; Hoy & Rosplock, 2014; Schwass & Leif, 2008; Uhlaner et al., 2004). The 
empirical support for reputational motives is limited. Findings indicate that family enterprises whose 
name is associated with the business are more likely to have concern for the reputation of the family and 
are more likely to engage in philanthropy (Breeze, 2009; Uhlander et al., 2004). Similarly, studies suggest 
that business owners perceive that philanthropy provides visibility to the family and the business (Breeze, 
2009; Pharoah et al., 2011). Therefore, family business owners are more motivated to practice some form 
of philanthropy. However, there is no systematic exploration of the importance of reputation when 
making decisions about philanthropy. 
Twenty-two publications provide information about moral motives guiding the practice of 
philanthropy. This research indicates that family firms are more likely to practice philanthropy because 
they are more concerned with helping their communities (Kranenburg & Zoet-Wissink, 2012; Uhlander et 
al., 2004), contributing to their welfare (Lähdesmäki & Takala, 2012), benefiting society (Rey-Garcia, 
2012), giving back to the community (Winer, 2012), impacting social change (Eichenberger & Johnson, 
2013), making a mark in the community where the business is located (Litz & Stewart, 2000), and solving 
social problems (Deniz-Deniz & Cabrera-Suarez, 2005). However, there is no empirical research that 
directly linked moral motives with the decision to engage in philanthropy.  
Finally, eight publications suggest that philanthropic activities provide educational benefits for 
the family and the business. These sources indicate that philanthropic entities can offer a context in which 
family members learn how to manage their wealth (Gallo, 2007; Gray, 2008), develop and practice 
management and business skills (Credit Suisse, 2010; Hoy & Rosplock, 2014; Schwass & Lief, 2008), 
and where junior generations are educated about issues that are important for the family and the business 
(Breeze, 2009; Hoy & Rosplock, 2014). We did not find empirical publications that explored education as 
a motive to practice philanthropy. 
Table 1.3 Theoretical Approaches used to Explain Motivations for Philanthropy (pp. 137) 
 
 17 
Using Theory to Explain Motivations 
The second part of understanding motives focused on the theoretical lenses used to explain why 
family enterprises engage in philanthropy. There were 13 academic publications that employed theoretical 
frameworks to explain the drivers of philanthropy. These approaches are summarized in Table 1.3.  
There are two general observations about the use of theory in research on this subject. First, 
although early publications relied on one theory to explain the motives for philanthropy, advances in the 
study of family enterprises have led authors to combine theories to better explain the multiple motivations 
towards philanthropy (Pharoah, 2008). For example, Cruz and colleagues (2014) combine organizational 
identity, stakeholder theory and socio-emotional wealth frameworks to suggest that family enterprises 
behave differently towards external and internal stakeholders. They argue that family enterprises are 
responsive to the claims of external stakeholders, and are likely to initiate actions that will help them 
respond to external stakeholder needs. At the same time, family enterprises want to act in ways that 
reflect their own self-professed desires (i.e., their identity), with Socio-Emotional Wealth (SEW) 
representing an important element of the identity of the family enterprise. In this case philanthropy is seen 
as a practice that is directed to external stakeholders and helps the family express their identity to the 
community, show their concern for others, and be connected to the community. Therefore, different 
theories are necessary to explain why family enterprises may have multiple motives when engaging in 
philanthropy.   
Second, our review indicates that theoretical work provides a rationale that is most consistent 
with business driven motives (See Table 1.3). There are at least two reasons for this focus. First, the 
research that uses theoretical frameworks is conducted primarily in academia. This academic focus results 
in explorations that are conducted through the lens of entrepreneurship or business strategy (Michael-
Tsabari et al., 2014). In these disciplines, the unit of analysis is typically the business and not the family. 
Second, data about philanthropy from the organizational perspective may be more accessible than data 
from the family or individual side. Consequently, we should expect that as interest for family enterprises 
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research grows in other disciplines (i.e., family studies, psychology, sociology, or other social sciences) 
theoretical works that emphasize family and dual motives are more likely to emerge. 
Moderators in the Relationship Between Motives and Practices 
In the process of coding for motives we identified two practice-driven and 16 academic 
publications that explored characteristics that moderated whether a family enterprise would engage in 
philanthropy. The primary moderators influencing whether family enterprises practice philanthropy were 
the perception of having sufficient excess financial resources (Fitzgerald et al., 2010; Harvey et al., 2011; 
US Trust, 2013) and sales (Campopiano et al., 2014; Deniz-Deniz & Cabrera-Suarez, 2005; Dou et al., 
2014; Madden et al., 2006; Ward, 2009). Other factors that were linked to differences in the practice of 
philanthropy included the generation of the family in charge of the business (Lähdesmäki & Takala, 2012; 
Uhlander et al., 2004), the dispersion of family ownership among family members (Campopiano et al., 
2014), the size of the business (Deniz-Deniz & Cabrera-Suarez, 2005; Litz & Stewart, 2000; Niehm et al., 
2008; Zhang et al., 2012), the age of the business (Deniz-Deniz & Cabrera-Suarez, 2005), the percentage 
of family ownership (Deniz-Deniz & Cabrera-Suarez, 2005), the degree of interest by business owners in 
helping the community (Fitzgerald et al., 2010; Lähdesmäki & Takala, 2012), and the level of 
involvement of family members in the business (Bingham et al., 2010; Litz & Stewart, 2000).  
The industry in which the business operates also affects engagement in philanthropy. Companies 
in industries that promote a higher sense of social responsibility are more likely to practice philanthropy 
(Madden et al., 2006; Zhang 2012). The country where the company operates can also be considered a 
moderator of why companies feel that they need to engage in philanthropy (Rey- Garcia & Puig-Raposo, 
2010, 2013). Companies in countries with laws that promote tax benefits for giving are more likely to 
engage in philanthropy. Finally, size of the community influences the motive to engage in philanthropy 
(Uhlander et al., 2004). Being in a smaller community may create a stronger sense of responsibility in 
comparison to larger communities. 
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Philanthropy Practices in Family Enterprises 
Philanthropy in family enterprises is a phenomenon at the intersection of family, business, and 
society. Because of this, a unique characteristic of philanthropy in this context is that it can be carried out 
through individual, family, and corporate activities, or a combination of practices from these levels. 
Building on this idea we explored the different vehicles used for philanthropy and the preferences that 
family enterprises had towards those vehicles. We relied on 15 practice-driven and 12 academic 
publications to explore these issues. Table 1.4 summarizes the different vehicles that family enterprises 
can use to practice philanthropy, based on our sources. 
Table 1.4 Types of Philanthropic Practices 
We found that family enterprises were less structured and more informal when engaging in 
philanthropy (Breeze, 2009; US Trust, 2013). In general, the degree of formality in practices varies 
depending on the extent to which the family business is already established; the number of family 
members involved in the business; the number of family members involved in philanthropy; the degree of 
interest in philanthropy shown by family members; the extent to which the business engages with 
consumers; the type of previous experiences with philanthropy; and the access to advice about 
philanthropic giving (Breeze, 2009; US Trust, 2013). For instance, Australian and US small family 
business owners prefer to support local causes in their community and avoid cash donations (Fitzgerald et 
al., 2010; Madden et al., 2006). Business owners in small communities prefer to make contributions in 
kind (i.e., technical help, volunteering in the community) and are more likely to make these contributions 
when community is economically vulnerable. 
Although informal practices are more prevalent in the practice of philanthropy, it is important to 
note that the majority of practices detailed in table 1.4 involve foundations, which are considered formal 
organizations for the practice of philanthropy. In this review, 18 out of the 27 publications investigated 
foundations. Given the significance of this vehicle in the practice of philanthropy, the section below 
summarizes what we found about foundations in our review. 
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Foundations as important vehicles for practicing philanthropy    
Foundations are non-profit entities established with the purpose of making grants to unrelated 
organizations, institutions, or individuals for scientific, educational, cultural, religious or other charitable 
purposes (Moody et al., 2011; Rey-Garcia, 2012). Family foundations are those in which a family or 
some of its members endow and play a significant role in its governance and /or management (Brody & 
Strauch, 1990; Gersick, 2006). Although family foundations are closely associated with family business 
owners, it is not just family business owners who utilize family foundations. Individuals and families who 
obtained their fortune in other ways also use foundations as a vehicle to manage their wealth. 
Family foundations have different purposes. Some argue that family foundations are created with 
a focus on social impact and family unity (Credit Suisse, 2010; Gersick et al., 1990; Pharoah, 2008; 
Snowdon-Blanchard, 2008). Others argue that family foundations are platforms developed to educate the 
next generation (Hansen, 1990) or to obtain tax exemption (Hayes & Adams, 1990; Ottinger, 2008; Rey-
Garcia, & Puig-Raposo, 2010). As a result, the purpose of a foundation varies depending on the 
motivation of the family and/or the laws of country in which the foundation is located. 
Several models differentiate between types of family foundations. A classification presented by 
Rey-Garcia and Puig-Raposo (2010, 2013) suggests that family foundations can be described based on 
two models commonly used by entrepreneurial families. The non-controlling model is a family 
foundation whose main goal is to channel the philanthropic activities of the family enterprise in a tax 
efficient way. The controlling model describes foundations that are primarily used by the founder as a 
vehicle for maintaining control over one or several family firms. Another classification suggests that there 
are three models that are relevant in foundations linked to family enterprises (Credit Suisse, 2010, Rey-
Garcia 2012; Rey-Garcia & Puig-Raposo, 2010). The pure family model includes those funded, governed 
and managed by the family, without any connection to the business. The pure corporate model includes 
foundations that are created by the family firm as a separate entity from the business, and are funded 
through the company. The hybrid model groups foundations that combine the components of the family 
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and corporate models. Current research indicates that the pure family model is most prevalent in countries 
such as the US and the UK, while the pure corporate model is most prevalent in Latin America (Credit 
Suisse, 2010). However, there is a limited ability to generalize from these results because the reporting on 
foundations is not mandatory in all countries and, as a result, data about foundations is not always 
available (Rey-Garcia & Puig-Raposo, 2010).  
Some of the work we reviewed focused on the differences between family and non-family 
foundations. Authors argue that the main difference between these two types of foundations is the degree 
of family control and the influence that families can have over the management and allocation of 
resources (Gersick et al, 1990; Gersick, 2006). Research from Brody and Strauch (1990) found that 
family foundations have smaller boards, with about half of the board comprised of family members, and 
more female board members. They also found that boards in family foundations have fewer limits to 
terms and services, and board members spend more time in management roles. Lungeanu and Ward 
(2012) complement these findings suggesting that the generational stage of the family and the level of 
family control on the board is likely to affect the grant-making strategy (i.e., diversification or focus of 
the foundation). In their research, they find that the extent of diversification of the family foundation is 
positively related to board size and the involvement of more generations on the board.  
A final topic discussed in the articles was the importance that foundations have for family 
enterprises and family systems. Foundations create a place in which the family can learn and grow 
together through involvement in multiple capacities (Breeze, 2009; Hansen, 1990). This is particularly 
true when foundations are more structured in their giving and are strategic in their approach. These two 
factors create more opportunities for the learning and development of family members (Hansen, 1990). 
Foundations also provide space to work on the relationships between family members (Breeze, 2009; 




Outcomes Associated with Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
The final research question in this review explored the outcomes associated with philanthropy. 
Although there are many claims that family enterprises can benefit from engaging in philanthropy (i.e., 
have better reputation, better relationships with the community, better performance), only four practice-
driven and four academic publications focused on the outcomes of philanthropy. Findings indicate that 
practicing philanthropy results in enhanced family dynamics (Breeze, 2009). Three studies examined the 
business outcomes associated and found that family businesses that engage in philanthropy have better 
performance (Niehm et al., 2008), increased reputations (Fernando & Almeida, 2012), and higher stock 
valuations (Zhang et al., 2012). Other studies found that engaging in philanthropy resulted in positive 
perceptions about the family (Breeze, 2009; File & Prince, 1998), opportunities to educate and involve 
family members who were not part of the business (Pharoah, 2008; Pharoah et al., 2011), and 
opportunities to encourage charitable giving by the next generation (US Trust, 2013).  
Figure 1.1 Motives and Outcomes of engaging in Philanthropic Efforts in the context of Family 
Enterprises (pp. 133) 
Discussion and Directions for Future Research 
This paper reviews the literature on philanthropy in family enterprises over the last 26 years 
(1988-2014). Our primary purpose was to create a baseline understanding of the motivations that underlie 
philanthropic practices and outcomes in family enterprises by focusing on four general research questions. 
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of what we found based on this review. The following sections 
discuss our findings, the gaps in our understanding of the topic, and provide directions for future research. 
Defining Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
In family enterprises, conceptualizations of what constitutes philanthropy vary from traditional 
approaches (i.e., philanthropy = charity) to more strategic approaches (i.e., philanthropy has a purpose 
and should produce some form of return on investment; Gautier & Pache, 2015; Liket & Simaens, 2015; 
Saiia et al., 2003). Our review shows that, conceptually, researchers in family enterprises use a range of 
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definitions, but that most of them highlight two important components of philanthropy: (1) voluntary 
action, and (2) the long-term benefits that these actions should have for the family enterprise. 
Nevertheless, there was little agreement in the definitions as to what actions were considered 
philanthropic in nature.  
The lack of definitional consensus presents problems in three areas. First, it makes it difficult to 
demarcate what constitutes a philanthropic act. Not having a clear definition leads to questions such as: 
are all donations philanthropic acts? And, what types of donations would be philanthropic in nature? 
Second, not having a clear definition makes it difficult to determine the underlying characteristics of this 
behavior. For example, earlier in the text we mentioned that one of the main characteristics of 
philanthropy is that it represents a voluntary act. One of the social expectations of society today is to be “a 
responsible citizen”.  Part of this social responsibility involves volunteering and donating time and efforts 
to others. In this sense, many actions are a result of social pressures instead of voluntary actions. This 
changes the characteristic of the philanthropic act from being voluntary to being obligatory. This raises 
questions such as: does something that I believe I have to do constitute a philanthropic act? The third 
aspect that is problematic about the lack of definitional consensus relates to the measurement of the 
construct. Even when the conceptual definition is clearly stated and appropriately multi-dimensional, 
philanthropy has most often been measured very simplistically (i.e., monetary contribution, dummy 
variables, or CSR database scores). This simplistic assessment does not fully capture the complexity of 
the philanthropy construct. For example, if we define philanthropy as the voluntary donation of resources 
(i.e., time, money, effort, or knowledge) to support causes that are primarily intended to promote the 
betterment of society with no direct expectation of economic returns, our measurement needs to at least 
include the assessment of: (1) what was donated? (2) were donations perceived as voluntary? And, (3) 
how did individuals expect that their actions would benefit society? These three areas represent the 
different facets of the definition. Therefore, given the problems that are evident based on the lack of 
clarity in the definition of philanthropy, future research should endeavor to clearly define what is 
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philanthropy, and make sure that the conceptual definition is reflected in the measurement of the 
construct. 
This review also shows that academics, in some cases, tend to view philanthropy as a component 
of CSR. This raises two interesting questions. First, if philanthropy is defined as CSR, what happens 
when family enterprises engage in philanthropy through family and not business vehicles? Does this 
translate into family businesses being less “socially responsible”? Second, it raises the question of 
whether philanthropy is an expected behavior for family enterprises. Although Carroll (1979) suggests 
that philanthropy is a discretionary component of social responsibility, stakeholders believe that part of 
the obligation of organizations is to engage in corporate responsible actions like philanthropy (Gautier & 
Pache, 2015). Thus, if philanthropy is a component of CSR, doesn’t it also become an expected behavior 
of family enterprise? And, if philanthropy is expected, does this not contradict the voluntary nature of it? 
Given this, we need to clarify the relationship between philanthropy and social responsibility so that 
researchers can investigate whether it is a discretionary or an expected behavior of the family enterprise. 
The need for a clear definition of philanthropy is also relevant to differentiate philanthropy from other 
approaches such as social entrepreneurship, impact investing, or impact capitalism, which include 
financial motives and profit expectations.  
Motivations for Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
The understanding of motives is the most common topic of research in family enterprise 
philanthropy. As seen in table 1.2, there are nine motives offered in the literature to understand 
philanthropic behavior. Family enterprises are likely to use combinations of these motives when making 
decisions about philanthropy. One aspect that it is not addressed by the existing literature is how the 
different motives interact with each other to explain why family enterprises engage in philanthropy. For 
example, what motives are more prevalent? What happens when family and business motives are 
incompatible? Based on these questions, future research should explore how business, family, and dual 
motives combine to determine the ways in which family enterprises practice philanthropy. 
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Part of the work on motivation has highlighted the different theories of why family enterprises are 
interested in philanthropy. Table 1.3 shows that most of these theories focus on business-oriented motives 
to explain the reasons for this engagement. This emphasis on business indicates that future research can 
benefit from the inclusion of family-oriented theories to explain the behavior of family enterprises. Future 
studies should also continue to explore how different theoretical approaches could be combined to 
acknowledge that family enterprises have multiple motives. For example, it would be interesting to 
explore how the importance of the different components of socio-emotional wealth to a family could 
moderate the relationship between motives and how family enterprises practice philanthropy. In a similar 
way, it would be interesting to explore how the importance that families give to their image in society can 
moderate the extent to which reputational motives may drive involvement in philanthropy. Future 
research can build on work that combines multiple theoretical approaches to understand the nuances in 
the family enterprise context (see: Campopiano et al., 2014; Cruz et al., 2014; Dou et al; 2014; Zhang et 
al., 2012; Zellweger & Nason, 2008). 
Philanthropy Practices in Family Enterprises 
To date, research has focused on formal practices of philanthropy. However, our review of the 
literature suggests that there is a preference for informality when engaging in philanthropy in family 
enterprises (Breeze, 2008). This raises important questions. For example, what are the different informal 
vehicles that family enterprises use? When do family enterprises shift to formal practices? How do family 
enterprises combine informal and formal vehicles to carry out their philanthropy? What factors determine 
whether a family enterprise will use a formal or an informal vehicle to practice philanthropy? How do 
family enterprises decide from which context (i.e., family, business, or ownership) they will practice 
philanthropy? Building on this, the field could benefit from descriptive work that can help us better 
understand the variety of practices used as vehicles for philanthropy, and what factors affect the shift 
from the use of informal to formal practices. Empirical work can also help understand the family and 
business factors that influence the choice of practices and the factors that may influence changes in these 
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preferences.  
Based on our observations, an underlying assumption of the research exploring philanthropy is 
that family enterprises generally represent one family and one business. However, family enterprises can 
be complex systems with multiple constituencies and sub-components (Chrisman et al., 2005; 
Sudaramurthy & Kreitner, 2008; Michael-Tsabari et. al., 2014). These ideas have important implications 
in understanding how family enterprises practice philanthropy and how these practices evolve over time 
and across generations. Entrepreneurial families3 can carry out their philanthropy simultaneously through 
different vehicles at the individual, family, and business level. Consequently, one important area for 
future research is to understand how family enterprises with multiple businesses engage in philanthropy.  
Our review suggests that the study of foundations has dominated our understanding of how 
philanthropy is carried out in family firms. Although this research has been informative, literature on 
philanthropic foundations needs to be better integrated into our understanding of how philanthropy is 
carried out in family enterprises. This includes understanding the prevalence of the different types of 
foundations (pure-family, pure business, or hybrid models). The models by Rey-Garcia and Puig-Raposo 
provide a very promising framework for exploring the international prevalence of different types of 
foundations. Further work in this area could provide insights into how different legal, economic, and 
political contexts around the world can influence how philanthropy is carried out. Another area that would 
be interesting to explore is the process that family enterprise foundations use to make decisions about how 
to fund their philanthropic endeavors and how to govern their practices. As philanthropic organizations 
move towards an understanding of their impact in society (Maas & Liket, 2010), it becomes necessary to 
examine the processes that they use in their decision-making and governance that could influence their 
impact. 
Outcomes Associated to the Practice of Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
Observations from our review indicate that the majority of our sources focused on the drivers 
3Entrepreneurial families are those that have multiple businesses that are related to the family system, being the 
family the driving force of entrepreneurial behavior (Michael-Tabari et al., 2014) 
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instead of the outcomes of philanthropy. Thus, philanthropy was more likely to be viewed as an 
dependent instead of an independent variable. This is interesting given that many of the arguments for 
studying philanthropy are based on wanting to understand the impact of these actions for individuals, 
families, businesses or society. Given this focus, a gap in our understanding is the limited knowledge that 
we have about outcomes associated with philanthropy. For example, at the family level, it would be 
interesting to explore whether practicing philanthropy as a family affects the relationships and dynamics 
between family members and how or when this occurs. The work of Breeze (2009) found that family 
business owners felt that doing philanthropy as a family had a positive effect on family relationships, but 
we do not know what dynamics are affected or when and how these dynamics are impacted. Other aspects 
that need exploration include understanding whether practicing philanthropy helps the family 
manage/transfer wealth between and within generations, and how philanthropic practices affect the 
creation and transmission of the family legacy. 
At the business level, future research needs to continue exploring the effect that philanthropy may 
have on the performance of the firm. This review shows that family enterprises need to perceive that they 
have a surplus of financial resources available to invest in their philanthropic endeavors (Fitzgerald et al., 
2010; Harvey et al., 2011; US Trust, 2013). We also know that family firms that engage in philanthropy 
have better performance (Niehm et al., 2008). However, the directionality of this effect is not clear. 
Therefore, we need to better understand when does practicing philanthropy result in increased 
performance, and how performance of the firm affects the practice of philanthropy? Other issues that 
require further consideration at the business level are the impact of philanthropic practices on the level of 
political influence that family enterprises have in a community, and the level of trust that external and 
internal stakeholders develop towards these firms. All of these issues could help us better understand the 
benefits and costs associated with philanthropic practices. 
The study of outcomes should also focus on the perceptions that external stakeholders have about 
the family and the business, and whether these perceptions can act as sources of competitive advantage. 
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Researchers argue that stakeholder perceptions are important because they can impact the legitimacy, 
financial performance, and moral capital of the firm (Barnett, 2007; Chiu & Sharfman, 2011; Godfrey, 
2005). Therefore, future work could explore whether and how engaging in philanthropy results in 
positive, neutral, or negative reputations for the family enterprise. Other areas to explore include whether, 
how, and when the practice of philanthropy helps next generation family members develop professional 
skills and capabilities, and the relationship between the vehicle through which philanthropy is practiced 
and the different outcomes.  
Methodological Considerations 
Our review suggests three methodological considerations when developing future research about 
philanthropy. In their work, Everet and colleagues (2015) highlight the importance of considering 
multilevel relationships when exploring family firms. Building on this, we believe that future researchers 
can benefit from multilevel considerations when exploring philanthropy. For example, we could study 
how antecedents at different levels combine to affect the practice of philanthropy, as well as the different 
outcomes associated with philanthropy. A second methodological consideration is the lack of discussion 
of the combined effects of both family and business motives or outcomes when studying philanthropy. 
Although practitioners and academics both suggest that philanthropic activity can be motivated by 
multiple family and business motives, there is no systematic exploration of how the combination of these 
motives work. 
One characteristic that is generally overlooked across all the areas of existing literature is the 
importance of the cultural context to understand philanthropy. Research about philanthropy in family 
enterprises has been dominated by studies conducted in the US. A reason for this is that philanthropy has 
a longer history in the US where there are legal, political, and economic policies that promote 
philanthropic behavior (Rey-Garcia & Puig-Raposo, 2013). Because policies vary across countries, these 
findings may not be generalizable to other cultural contexts. This is evident when comparing studies 
conducted in China (Du, 2014; Zhang et al., 2012) with those conducted in Italy (Campopiano et al., 
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2014) and in other areas of Europe (Cruz et al., 2014) or the US (Bingham et al., 2011; Dyer & Whetten, 
2006). Therefore, an important methodological issue for future research is the role of cultural context in 
interpreting the motives, practices, moderators and outcomes associated with philanthropy. 
Other Important Topics in Philanthropy 
A topic that has interested family business scholars is the comparison between family and non-
family firms. Family firms are said to have unique competitive advantages and characteristics that make 
them act differently than non-family businesses (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). An interesting observation about 
research in philanthropy is that only six studies compare family and non-family firms, and four of them 
find no differences between the extent to which ownership affects the practice of philanthropy (Atkinson 
& Galaskiewicz, 1988; Cruz et al., 2014; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Niehm et al., 2008). One of the reasons 
for the lack of differences may be that these studies measured philanthropy using CSR databases, which 
make it difficult to precisely assess philanthropic practices and donations. It would be interesting for 
future research to continue to explore this area and see whether there are differences between family and 
non-family businesses based on firm size and how philanthropy is measured. 
Another understudied aspect is how philanthropy is funded. In the context of family enterprises, 
financial resources can come directly from the business, from the dividends to the family (and other 
shareholders), or from financial resources of family members. We believe that the way philanthropy is 
financed can have important implications for what vehicle is used to practice philanthropy, how 
philanthropy is governed, and which motives and goals have priority when making philanthropic 
decisions. It may be that when the funding source is the family member, family driven motives will be 
more relevant. On the other hand, when funding comes exclusively from financial resources of the 
business, business-related motives may be more prevalent. In each of the cases, the governance and the 
involvement of family in governance issues may be different. Therefore, future research needs to explore 
the financial aspect of philanthropy in family enterprises.  Governance (i.e., the process and structures 
used to manage and direct the business affairs and accountability of philanthropic endeavors; Gersick & 
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Feliu, 2014) of philanthropic activities is another topic that is understudied. None of the sources in this 
review talked about governance issues in philanthropy outside of the family foundation. Given the 
important role of governance, future research should explore the different mechanisms that family 
enterprises use to govern their philanthropy, and how these governance structures affect the decision 
about philanthropy. This could benefit practitioners who work with entrepreneurial families in developing 
their philanthropic practices. 
Concluding Remarks 
Our review comes at a time when there is an increased interest in the socially responsible actions 
of individuals, families and businesses. As family enterprises are more involved in philanthropy, scholars 
and practitioners have a great opportunity to conduct research in this area. This review synthesizes the 
current knowledge of philanthropic practices from both the academic and the practitioner points of view 
to capitalize on the unique knowledge these two areas of research bring to our understanding of family 
enterprises. We summarize how philanthropy is defined, the motives that drive it, how it is practiced by 
family enterprises, and the outcomes associated with philanthropy in family enterprises. Despite the 
important contributions of the literature in the last twenty-six years, there are gaps in our understanding 
that need further exploration. We have written this review to provide a roadmap for future research and 
we hope that it will spur more interest in a phenomenon that lies at the crossroads of family, business, and 
society. For academics, the exploration of philanthropy can provide understanding about alternative 
vehicles that can help in the preparation of future generations, in the creation and transmission of legacy 
between generations, and in the relationship between family members. For practitioners, a better 
understanding of philanthropy can help when assisting entrepreneurial families that are concerned about 
their legacy, the education of future generations, and creating spaces for the family to work together.
 31 
References  
* References with asterisk are the sources for this review.  
Aguilera, R. V., Rupp, D. E., Williams, C. A., & Ganapathi, J. (2007). Putting the S back in Corporate 
Social Responsibility. Academy of Management Review, 32(3), 836-863. 
Astrachan, J.H. (1988) Family Firm and Community Culture. Family Business Review, 1(2), 165-189. 
*Atkinson, L., & Galaskiewiz, J. (1988) Stock Ownership and Company Contributions to Charity, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(1), 82-100. 
Barnett, M. L. (2007) Stakeholder influence capacity and the variability of financial returns to corporate 
social responsibility. Academy of Management Review, 32 (3), 794-816. 
*Bingham, J.B., Gibb Dyer, W., Smith, I. & Adams, G.L. (2011). A stakeholder Identity Orientation 
Approach to Corporate Social Performance in Family Firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 99, 565-
585. 
*Breeze, B. (2009). Natural Philanthropists: Findings of the Family Business Philanthropy and Social 
Responsibility Inquiry. Institute for Family Business. 
*Brody, D., & Strauch, C. (1990). Who are the family foundations? Findings from the foundation 
management survey. Family Business Review, 3 (4), 337-346. 
*Bronfman, M.C. (2009). The Art of Resilient Capital Planning for Executive Compensation, Estate 
Planning, and Philanthropy. Journal of Financial Planning, July. 
Carroll, A. B. (1979) A three-dimensional conceptual of corporate performance. Academy of Management 
Review, 4(4), 497-505. 
*Campopiano, G., De Massis, A. & Chirico, F. (2014). Firm Philanthropy in Small-and Medium-Sized 
Family Firms: The Effects of Family Involvement in Ownership and Management. Family 
Business Review, 27(3), 244-258. 
*Chenier, C. Y. (2009). Estate planning and the business of family philanthropy. Estates, Trusts, & 
Pensions Journal, 28(4), 317-331. 
Chiu, S.C. & Sharfman, M. (2011).  Legitimacy, Visibility, and the Antecedents of Corporate Social 
Performance: An Investigation of the Instrumental Perspective  . Journal of Management, 37(6) 
1558-1585. 
*Credit Suisse (2010). Funding as a Family: Engaging the Next generation in Family Philanthropy. White 
Paper 02. 
*Cruz, C., Larraza-Kintana, M., Garcés-Galdeano, L. & Berrone, P. (2014) Are family firms really more 
socially responsible? Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 38(6), 1295-1316. 
Cutlip, S. M. (1994). The unseen power: Public relations. A history. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
*Danco, L. A., & Ward, J. L. (1990). Beyond success: The continuing contribution of the family 
foundation. Family Business Review, 3(4), 347-355. 
*Déniz Déniz M. and Cabrera Suárez, M. K. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility and Family 
Business in Spain. Journal of Business Ethics, 56 (2), 127 - 141. 
*Dou, J., Zhang, Z., Su, E. (2014). Does family involvement make firms donate more? Empirical 
evidence from Chinese private firms. Family Business Review, 27(3), 259-274. 
 32 
*Du, X. (2014) Is corporate philanthropy used as environmental misconduct dressing? Evidence from 
Chinese family-owned firms. Journal of Business Ethics, published on-line first, 1-21. 
*Dyer, W. G. & Whetten, D.A. (2006) Family Firms and Social Responsibility: Preliminary evidence 
from S&P500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(6), 785-802. 
*Eichenberger, E. & Johnson, J. (2011) Evolving the Vision. Step Journal, June-July. Retrieve from: 
http://www.stepjournal.org/journal_archive/2011/step_journal_june_july_2011_fi/evolving_the_v
ision.aspx  
*Eichenberger, E. & Johnson, J. (2013). Philanthropy: What it provides to families in business. Tharawat 
Magazine, 10. 
Evert, R.E., Martin, J.A., McLeod, M.S., & Payne, G.T. (2015). Empirics in family business research: 
Progress, challenges, and the path ahead. Family Business Review, on-line first. 
*Fernando, M. & Almeida, A. (2012). The organizational virtuousness of strategic corporate social 
responsibility: A case study of the Sri Lankan family owned enterprise MAS holdings. European 
Management Journal, 30, 564-576.  
*File, K. M., & Prince, A.R. (1995) Cause related marketing, philanthropy and the arts. Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, 5(3), 249-260. 
*File, K. M., & Prince, A.R. (1998) Cause related marketing and corporate philanthropy in the privately 
held enterprise. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(14), 1529-1539. 
*Fitzgerald, M.A., Haynes, G. W., Schrank, H. L., & Danes, S. M. (2010). Socially responsible processes 
of small family business owners: Exploratory evidence from the national family business survey. 
Journal of Small Business Management, 48(4), 524-551. 
*Gallo, E. (2007). Getting the kids involved in the family money. Journal of Financial Planning, 
October, 48- 51. 
Gautier, A., & Pache A-C. (2015) Research on corporate philanthropy: A review and assessment. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 126(3), 343-369. 
*Gersick, K. E. (2006) Generations of Giving: Leadership and Continuity. Lexington Books. 
*Gersick, K. E., Lansberg, I., & Davis, J. A. (1990). The impact of family dynamics on structure and 
process in family foundations. Family Business Review, 3(4), 357-374. 
Gersick, K. E., & Feliu, N. (2014). Governing the family enterprise: Practices, performance, and research. 
In L. Melin, M. Nordqvist, & P. Sharma (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Family Business (pp. 196-
225). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Godfrey, P. C. (2005) The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder wealth: A risk 
management perspective. Academy of Management Review, 30(4), 777-788. 
*Gray, L. (2008) The three forms of governance: A new approach to family wealth transfer and asset 
protection Part  II. The Journal of Wealth Management, Fall, 7-18. 
Gruning, J. E., & Hunt, T. (1984). Managing Public Relations. Harcourt College Publishers. 
*Hansen, R. W. (1990) Continuity in the family foundation. Family Business Review, 3(4), 405-408. 
*Harvey. C. Maclean, M., Gordon, J., & Shaw, E. (2011). Andrew Carnegie and the foundations of 
contemporary entrepreneurial philanthropy. Business History, 53(3), 425-450. 
*Hayes, J. T., & Adams, R. M. (1990). Taxation and statutory considerations in the formation of family 
foundations. Family Business Review, 3(4), 383-394. 
 33 
*Hersch, W. S. (2004). Enhance business succession. National Underwriter, December, 12-13. 
*Hoy, F., & Rosplock, K. (2014) Issues in multigeneration family companies. In: M. L. Taylor, R. J. 
Strom, & D. O. Renz (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Entrepreneurs’ Engagement in 
Philanthropy (pp. 115-147). United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
*Kranenburg, H. V., & Zoet-Wissink, E. (2012). SMEs’ motives for international corporate giving-The 
case of international aid and development programmes support. Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 
47, 9-26. 
*Lähdesmäki, M. & Takala, T. (2012). Altruism in business – an empirical study of philanthropy in the 
small business context. Social Responsibility Journal, 8 (3), 373 – 388. 
*Lerner, S. (2011). Next-Generation Philanthropy: Examining a next-generation Jewish philanthropic 
network. Foundation Review, 3(4), 82-95. 
Liket, K., & Simaens, A. (2015). Battling the devolution in the research on corporate philanthropy. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 126(2), 285-308. 
*Litz, R. A., & Stewart, A. C. (2000) Charity begins at home: Family Firms and patterns of community 
involvement. Nonprofit Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(1), 131-148. 
*Lungeanu, R & Ward, J.L. (2012). A Governance-Based Typology of Family Foundations: The Effect of 
Generation Stage and Governance Structure on Family Philanthropic Activities . Family 
Business Review, 25(4), 409-424. 
Maas, K., & Liket, K. (2010). Talk the Walk: Measuring the Impact of Strategic Philanthropy. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 100, 445-464. 
*Madden, K., Scaife, K., & Crissman, K. (2006). How and why small to medium size enterprises SMEs) 
engage with their communities: An Australian study. International Journal of Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Marketing, 11 (1), 49-60. 
Michael-Tsabari, N., Labaki, R., & Zachary, R. K. (2014). Toward a cluster model: The family firm’s 
entrepreneurial behavior over generations. Family Business Review, 27(2), 161-185. 
*Moody, M., Knapp, A. L., & Corrado, M. (2011) What is a Family Foundation? The Foundation 
Review, 3(4), 47-61. 
Muller, A.R., Pfarrer, M. D., & Little, L. D. (2014) A Theory of Collective Empathy in Corporate 
Philanthropy Decisions. Academy of Management Review, 39(1), 1-29. 
National Philanthropic Trust (2013) – Charitable giving statistics retrieved from: http://www.nptrust. 
org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/  
*Niehm, L. S., Swinnney, J., & Miller, N.J. (2008). Community social responsibility and its consequences 
for family business performance. Journal of Small Business Management, 46(3), 331-350. 
*Ottinger, R.J. (2008) Left Brain Right Heart: How Leading Financial and Legal Firms Are Deploying 
Best Philanthropic and Family Wealth Practices to Become Legacy Advisory Firms of the Future.  
Journal of Practical Estate Planning, June-July, 31-38,51. 
*Pharoah, C. (2008) Family Foundation Philanthropy. Retrieved from: http://www.cassknowledge.com 
/research/article/family-foundation-philanthropy-report-2008 
Pharoah, C. (2009) Family foundation philanthropy 2009 – UK, Germany, Italy, US. Retrieved from: 
https://depts.washington.edu/uwadv/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ Family Foundations 
Philanthropy2009.pdf 
 34 
Pharoah, C., Jenkins, R., & Goddard, K. (2014). Giving trends top 300 foundations 2014 report. Retrieved 
from: http://www.acf.org.uk/uploadedFiles/Foundation_Giving_Trends_2014.pdf 
*Pharoah, C., Keidan, C., & Gordon, J. (2011) Family Foundations Giving Trends. Retrieved from: 
http://www.cgap.org.uk/uploads/reports/FFGT_2011.pdf 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (1999). Philanthropy’s new agenda: Creating value. Harvard Business 
Review, 77(6), 121-130. 
*Prince, R. A., File, K.M. & Gillespie, J.E. (1993) Philanthropic Styles. Nonprofit management and 
leadership, 3(3), 255-268. 
*Rey-Garcia, M. (2012). Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Foundations and Global Retailers. 
Working paper – Universidad de Oviedo – Fundacion Ramon Areces. DOC 06-2012 
*Rey-Garcia, M. & Puig-Raposo, N. (2010). Understanding the organized philanthropic activity of 
entrepreneurial families. Paper presented at the Business History Conference. 
*Rey-Garcia, M. & Puig-Raposo, N. (2013). Globalization and the organization of family philanthropy: A 
case of Isomorphisim? Business History, 55(6), 1019-1046. 
*Robinson, G. (2008). Fulfilling legacies. CA Magazine. May, 45-46. 
Saiia, D.H., Carroll, A.B., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2003) Philanthropy as strategy: When corporate charity 
begins at home. Business and Society, 42(2), 169-201. 
Sanborn, C. A., & Portocarrero, F. (2003). La filantropia “realmente existe” en America Latina. Paper 
presented at Seminario Internacional Fundacion PROhumana y Fundacion Ford, Santiago de 
Chile, November. 
Schuyt, T. N. M. (2010). Philanthropy in European welfare states: A challenging promise? International 
Review of Administrative Sciences, 76(4), 774-789. 
Schuyt, T. N. M. (2013) Philanthropy and the philanthropy sector: An introduction. England: Ashgate. 
Schwartz, M. S., & Carroll A. B. (2003) Corporate social responsibility: A three-domain approach. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(4) 503-530. 
*Schwass, J., & Leif, C. (2008). About family, business, and philanthropy. Perspectives for managers 
(IMD) 165. 
*Snowdon-Blanchard, A. (2008). Strategic Philanthropy: Maximizing Family Engagement and Social 
Impact. Passages. National Center for Family Philanthropy. 
Sudaramurthy, C., & Kreiner, G. (2008). Governing by managing identity boundaries: The case of family 
businesses. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32(3), 415-436. 
Sulek, M. (2010). On the modern meaning of philanthropy. Non-Profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 
39(2), 193-212. 
*US Trust (2013). The U.S. Trust Study of the Philanthropic Conversation: Understanding advisor 
approaches and client expectations. U.S. Trust and The Philanthropic Initiative 
*Uhlaner, L. M., van Goor-Balk, H.J.M., Masurel, E. (2004). Family business and corporate social 
responsibility in a sample of Dutch firms. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 
11(2), 186-194. 
* Von Lossberg, A. (1990). The role of the nonfamily administrator in family foundations. Family 
Business Review, 3(4), 375-382. 
 35 
*Ward, J. (2009). The ten hidden arts of successful business families, Family Business Magazine, 
Autumn, 49-52. 
*Winer, S. (2012). Philanthropy is good business. Family Business, May/June. 
*Ylvisaker, P. N. (1990). Family foundations: High risk, high reward. Family Business Review, 3(4), 331-
335. 
*Zellweger, T.M. & Nason, R.S. (2008). A Stakeholder Perspective on Family Firm Performance. Family 
Business Review, 21 (3), 203- 216. 
*Zhang, J., Yang, B., Wang, F., & Wang, P. (2012). Corporate philanthropic giving: Active responsibility 
of passive integration? Evidence from Chinese family-controlled listed companies. The Journal of 
Applied Business Research, 28(3), 427-439.  
 36 
 
Chapter 3: Governing the Family Enterprise: Practices, Performance and Research 
Authors:  
Kelin Gersick, PhD 
Senior Partner 
LansbergGersick & Associates LLC 






Senior Associate  
LansbergGersick & Associates LLC 





Gersick, K. E., & Feliu, N. (2014). Governing the family enterprise: Practices, performance, and 
research. In L. Melin, M. Nordqvist, & P. Sharma (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Family Business (pp. 
196-225). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
  
   37 
 
Chapter 4: Governing Philanthropy in Family Enterprises.  
INTRODUCTION 
Organizational researchers are increasingly drawn to family businesses because they 
illuminate so many important models and theories: family dynamics and human development, theory 
of the firm, agency theory, economic development, labor market theory, social capital theory and 
many others. Consultants and professional service providers are also attracted to family enterprises as 
clients. In fact, over the recent decades, there have been many more professionals working with 
family firms than studying them. As a field, our best opportunity to maximize our understanding of 
family businesses is to utilize both of these sources of data on family firms; that is, to integrate formal 
research and theory with documented implementation experience to build a platform for future 
development. 
This is critically important in the area of governance. Research on corporate governance has 
proliferated in recent decades, generating a huge literature on the legal, financial, and strategic control 
of organizations. But a very small part of that research has taken into account family ownership and 
the special nature of family firm governance over time and across generations (LeBreton-Miller and 
Miller, 2009). In particular, only a few researchers have looked at governance systems as they are 
actually implemented in family firms, assessing their successes and failures in overseeing such core 
outcomes as ownership continuity, business performance, stakeholder benefits and satisfaction, 
emotional ownership, leadership development in sequential generations, and entrepreneurship. 
Similarly, the primary interventions by consultants in the family business field over the past 
three decades have been in governance: family councils, family assemblies, boards of directors, 
family offices, family foundations, shareholders agreements, and financial planning tools such as 
trusts and limited family partnerships. However, publications based on that body of work very rarely 
go beyond the descriptive, and sometimes prescriptive. Consultants offer advice based on their 
experience, and rely on logic and common sense to persuade potential clients that they see the 
problem accurately and the solution clearly. Where there is research evidence some advisors make use 
of it, but many of our often-repeated "best practices" are supported by face validity rather than 
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empirical assessments. We have come to a moment of challenge to our understanding of governance 
in the field. If we are to move forward we need to consolidate the existing empirical work and 
integrate it with what has been learned from experience, to generate both a confident basis for our 
advice to families, and a comprehensive agenda for future research. 
In this chapter we review the existing literature on governance implementation in family 
enterprise. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the domain of governance, first in 
corporations in general, and then in family business in particular. Then we review the literature on 
governance implementation in the business, ownership, and family circles, sampling both the 
academic research literature and the reports of professionals in the trade and general press. We 
reviewed more than 400 articles and books, and have included over 200 in the bibliography, but this is 
only a sample. In making choices about which publications to include, we considered direct relevance 
in the practitioner articles, and research design, contribution, and cites by others for the academic 
papers. We have also relied heavily on our own professional experience with hundreds of business 
families over the past 30 years, which undoubtedly shapes our interpretations of the body of research 
and our proposals for filling gaps. Each section ends with suggestions about the most promising areas 
for future work, and the most interesting dilemmas for the continuing evolution of our research canon. 
DEFINITIONS AND DOMAIN OF FAMILY BUSINESS GOVERNANCE 
Pieper's (2003) excellent review reaches the conclusion that there is no consensus on the 
definition of governance, either in corporations in general or in family enterprise. Keasey et al. 
provide one often-quoted definition for corporate governance in general: ‘Corporate governance is the 
process and structure used to direct and manage the business affairs of the company towards 
enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing 
long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interest of other stakeholders’ (1197: 288). 
This is a somewhat different focus from the perspective of researchers in economics or finance:  
‘Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment’ (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997: 737), or the law:  
‘Corporate governance refers to the monitoring and control over how the firm's resources are 
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allocated, and how relations within the firm are structured and managed’ (McCahery and Vermeulen, 
2006:1). 
In these professions, governance refers to ownership of business organizations (in fact, 
governance and ownership are often treated as synonymous) (Carney, 2005). In two ways, that is too 
limited for our purposes. First, ownership is a financial and legal reality; governance is an 
organizational one (Uhlaner et al., 2007: 227), including both structural and process components. In 
this review of governance practices in family enterprise, we are not only interested in ownership 
rights, but rather in how oversight and control are exercised, and in how governance contributes to 
firm performance. 
Secondly, we are using governance in reference to all of the sub-sectors of a family 
enterprise, not just the business ownership, because what is being governed is the family capital in all 
its forms: financial, human, intellectual, social, and organizational (Hughes, 2004; Sharma, 2008). 
Family enterprise governance oversees all the collaborative operations of the family, including wealth 
management, philanthropy, and human development (Gersick, et al., 1997; Neubauer and Lank, 1998; 
Lansberg, 1999; Mustakallio et al., 2002). Goldbart and DeFuria give an example of a very different 
definition of governance, appropriate particularly for family business: ‘Governance is the means of 
stewarding the multigenerational family organization...[It] establishes the processes whereby:  
strategic goals are set, key relationships are maintained, the health of the family is safeguarded, 
accountability is maintained, and achievement and performance are recognized’ (2009: 7). This 
chapter uses this broader definition as its domain for governance implementation, reviewing the 
research and professional literature on the practice of governance in family enterprises. 
THEORETICAL MODELS FOR GOVERNING THE FAMILY ENTERPRISE 
In contemporary organizational studies, the dominant theoretical foundation for research on 
corporate governance is agency theory (For a full discussion of agency theory in family business 
governance see Goel et al. in this volume). Agency theory focuses on the differentiated needs of two 
categories of stakeholders:  principals (the owners) and agents (their employed managers) (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). The goals of 
principals and agents are inherently different, and since the prime purpose of the corporation is to 
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serve the economic interests of the owners, it falls upon them to design mechanisms (governance) to 
control the behavior of their agents so that the organization operates in service of the owners' 
interests. However, those control mechanisms come with costs. Minimizing agency costs is therefore 
an important contributor to organizational success, and a useful measure of governance 
implementation and effectiveness1. 
However, the agency model is more complex in family-controlled companies with the 
addition of a third key stakeholder -- the family -- which creates additional demands for appropriately 
balanced and coordinated governance procedures (Corbetta et al., 2002; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; 
Braun and Sharma, 2007; Lambrecht and Lievens, 2008). With this elaboration, agency theory merges 
with the dominant conceptual model for family business, the Three-Circle Model. This model, first 
articulated by Tagiuri and Davis (1996) and elaborated into a three-dimensional developmental model 
by Gersick et al. (1997), conceptualizes family enterprise as a Venn diagram of three subsystems -- 
the owners, the business (or other operating organization[s]), and the family -- each with its 
distinctive membership, agenda, and developmental processes. The Three-Circle Model helps clarify 
the tasks and purposes of governance in reference to each of the key subsystems -- the essential work 
that governance must accomplish if the family enterprise is to succeed -- and therefore the basis for 
evaluating governance implementation in research and practice. 
In the ownership circle, the governance system must serve the actual equity owners of the 
enterprise (individual, partners, and/or shareholders). Its goals and obligations in this circle are to 
protect both the security of the asset base and the return on those assets. The specific tasks of 
governance include establishing and monitoring the structures that actually hold the owners' equity, 
guaranteeing compliance with all legal and accounting requirements, setting risk and return 
parameters and tracking all of the data on performance, generating capital from whatever sources are 
most advantageous, communicating effectively with current (and sometimes prospective) owners to 
minimize the cost of capital, determining the amounts and formats of distributions, and all other tasks 
that serve the owners as investors. These tasks are most often carried out by a board of directors, but 
that depends on the legal form of the organization -- they can also be assigned to partners, trustees, or 
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the sole or controlling owner as an individual. Governance failure in this circle risks loss of capital if 
owners lose confidence in the enterprise as an investment. 
In the business circle, the governance system must serve the operating company, most often 
through its executives and managerial leadership. Here governance adds value by determining and 
enforcing standards for executive performance; articulating the core values and cultural norms that the 
governors expect managers to rely on in making choices and decisions; defining short- and long-term 
strategies; overseeing human resource management; and all other tasks of selection, supervision, 
assessment and development of the senior operational executives that maximizes their performance in 
line with the overall objectives of the owners. Especially in closely-held businesses, well-functioning 
governance also helps to avoid destructive interference by individual owners into the domain of 
management, which if unchecked can undermine professional management as much as neglect. Once 
again, these tasks are most often assigned to a board of directors2, but the structure may vary.  
Governance failure here carries the risk of loss of competitiveness. 
Those first two sets of governance tasks are generic to all corporations. It is the governance 
tasks in the family circle that are distinctive in family enterprise. Here the effectiveness of 
governance depends on its ability to serve the needs the family, extending beyond current 
shareholders to include all those who are related by blood, adoption, or marriage and share a 
psychological sense of enterprise ownership -- past, present, and future. The purposes of governance 
in this circle are to clarify the demands and rewards of family membership in relation to the business, 
to define and communicate the opportunities for involvement in all of the family's collaborative 
ventures, to facilitate information flow in ways that maximizes trust and minimizes manipulation, to 
establish and oversee the non-business/non-financial aspects of the enterprise (often including 
philanthropy), and most of all to enhance a sense of belonging throughout the extended family, across 
the subcategories of branch and generation. When governance in the family circle is working well, it 
nurtures the emergence of the family's shared dream (Lansberg, 1999; Gersick et al., 1997), and then 
it structures the operationalization of that dream in organizational practice. Governance failure in this 
circle risks loss of commitment and, as a result, loss of continuity. 
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It is the effort to balance the agendas of these three classes of stakeholders -- owners, 
managers and employees [agents], and family -- that sets the agenda for governance, and the criteria 
against which research on governance implementation can be assessed. Therefore, we have organized 
this chapter around the Three-Circle Model, dealing in turn with governance implementation in 
ownership and the business, and then in the family. 
 
RESEARCH ON GOVERNANCE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE OWNERSHIP AND 
BUSINESS CIRCLES 
Although the purposes of governance are different when serving the needs of owners and 
managers, the structures for governance implementation are the same in these two circles. Therefore, 
to avoid duplication in reviewing the body of research, we have combined the literature review for 
those two circles. We review the core research literature on boards of directors first, and then cover 
the much smaller body of work on other governance mechanisms: blockholding, dual stock classes, 
CEO/Chair duality, shareholder agreements, shareholder assemblies, and trusts. 
Boards of Directors 
In contemporary private-enterprise economies, nearly all legal systems specify some kind of 
board of directors as the ultimate governance authority in a corporation (Mintzberg, 1983; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Cadbury, 1992, 1999; Monks and Minow, 1996; Gomez and Moore, 2009). The 
literature on boards in general is large; the literature on boards in family businesses is still very small 
(Bettinelli's review concludes: ‘Research on family business boards is almost nonexistent’ 2011: 152). 
Furthermore, most of the research on boards that does exist draws samples primarily from family-
controlled, publicly-traded companies, rather than from the much larger group of privately-held 
family companies, despite the prevalent advice from practitioners that they too benefit from well-
functioning boards (Teksten et al., 2005; Voordeckers et al., 2007). 
Board Structure: A high percentage of the general organizational literature on boards of 
directors looks at the basic demographics and formal structure of the board, primarily the number and 
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type of directors and the makeup of board committees. Some of the research is purely descriptive, 
while other studies look for associations between various characteristics and firm performance. 
Board Size: The earliest and still most common research topic on boards of directors concerns 
the number of directors. Finegold and Lawler, in a recent survey of a sample of Fortune 1000 
company directors, concluded that board size has been relatively stable in recent years, averaging just 
over 10 members, including the CEO and one or two other insiders (2009). The consensus is that 
smaller boards are more efficient, but in the extreme may limit the available range of skills and 
expertise among directors (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Lane et al. (2006) summarize a group of studies 
and conclude that the optimal range for public, non-family firms is 5-9 directors, and 7-12 for family 
controlled companies. There is some discussion of the special advantages of larger boards in family 
controlled companies, in part to satisfy representational dynamics among family shareholder blocks 
(usually family branches) and in part because the concentrated authority of founders and large family 
blockholders is less dangerous within a larger group of directors. However, researchers in Europe 
have reported samples of family businesses with smaller boards than their non-family counterparts 
(Navarro and Ansón, 2009). We found many suggestions from practitioners on the preferred size of a 
family business board (Ward, 1989, 1991), but no empirical findings on the consequences of board 
size for board performance in family firms. 
Categories of Directors: No topic in the general governance literature has generated more 
heated debate than the optimal mix of directors from management, ownership, and outside the 
company (for example, Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Raheja, 2005). 
Practitioner and academic authors have traditionally favored strong, independent boards (Johnson, 
1990; Pendergast et al., 2011), especially following the high-profile governance failures of the past 
decade, and the legislative responses such as Sarbanes-Oxley. In one of the few empirical studies, 
Millstein and MacAvoy review the recent history of boards from the legal perspective, and then test 
two measures of board professionalism, concluding that there is ‘a statistically significant relationship 
between an active, independent board and superior corporate performance as measured by earnings in 
excess of costs of capital over the industry average’ (1998: 1318). They also offer some hypotheses 
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about why most research produces mixed results on the link between board structure and firm 
performance (complexity of the causal links, environmental events, and non-transparency). 
In the family business literature, academics and practitioners alike have been nearly 
unanimous in endorsing the value of a strong board of directors with a presence, and often a majority, 
of independent outside directors (Zall, 2004; Brenes et al., 2011; Pendergast et al., 2011). This is one 
of the most frequently recommended governance ‘upgrades’ for family firms of all sizes, from small 
privately-held ventures to large traded firms (Jaffe and Lane, 2004). Sir Adrian Cadbury, commenting 
on the application of his influential report on family enterprise in the United Kingdom to family firms, 
summed up his conclusions with, ‘the continuing success of a family firm is best assured if it is 
headed by an effective Board...One with competent, independent-minded, outside directors on it’ 
(Cadbury, 2000: 33). The most consistent and articulate academic voice for this view has been John 
Ward, who along with his colleagues, in numerous articles and presentations and more than a dozen 
books, has made the case for independent family business boards (Ward, 1988, 1991; Ward and 
Handy, 1988).  Ward's recommendations are always well argued, and he has probably had more 
influence on the field's normative consensus on governance structure in family businesses than 
anyone else. 
But the support for independent boards in the family business literature has not been 
unanimous. Ford (1988, 1989) raised a challenge to the assumption that outside directors add benefit: 
‘Unfortunately, there is a noticeable lack of empirical data to support the notion that outside directors 
actually make a difference on the boards of directors of privately-owned firms’ (1988: 50). Ward's 
rejoinder was that, while the data on firm performance and board composition in family firms was 
still scarce, a purely financial assessment of the impact of non-family directors is only part of the 
story (1989). He and others argued that there are corollary benefits from a professional board that may 
not be picked up by traditional secondary analyses or surveys (most of which have extremely low 
return rates). The existence of a board, especially if it includes directors who are not employees or 
advisors of the controlling owners, leads to more transparency, more objective decision-making, more 
data-based evaluations and career oversight for family employees, more efficient use of executive 
time and meetings to accomplish governance tasks, and as an overall result, a higher probability of 
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continuity. Reporting on the results from 360 responses to their Family Business Board Survey, 
Pendergast and his colleagues found that only 48 per cent of those family companies self-define as 
having a ‘functional board’; 67 per cent consider their board ‘effective’ or ‘highly effective’ with a 
steep curve from 54 per cent among those who have a family-only board, 83 per cent of those who 
have two or more independents, and 96 per cent of those who have a majority of independent 
directors (2011: 252). The self-report data is strong, and the data on board task activities and business 
performance may follow. 
However, in both public and closely-held companies, whether or not family-owned, the 
research findings to date on independent directors are mixed. In the general corporate governance 
literature, research on the impact of independent directors on firm performance, share value, strategy, 
and operations most often finds little or negative impact (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Coles et al., 
2001; Daily et al., 2003; Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Gordon, 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009), 
and in some cases a decrease in firm performance when the percentage of independent directors goes 
up (Schulze et al., 2001). Other studies have reported a positive effect of independent boards under 
certain conditions (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Filatotchev et al., 2005; Han and Celly, 2011), usually 
later in the firm's life cycle. Some studies, especially in non-US economies, find a positive impact of 
an independent board on firm value or lower cost of capital, while not measuring firm performance 
(for example Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). Earlier work by Yeh and colleagues (Yeh et al., 2001) found 
that, in a Taiwanese sample, the combination associated with the highest firm performance was high 
family ownership and low family representation on the board -- an intriguing finding that suggests 
important follow-up research to test its cultural specificity. Overall, for public corporations as a 
whole, the record is inconclusive.  As Gordon (2007) put it, ‘Independent directors -- that is the 
answer, but what is the question?’. 
For large family-controlled corporations, the strongest data on this topic are the extraordinary 
findings of Anderson and Reeb (2003, 2004) on family control in S&P 500 firms. These researchers 
are best known for documenting that family-controlled publicly traded companies outperform their 
non-family counterparts on a variety of profitability and market measures. However, they also looked 
deeper into the ownership and governance mechanisms that may lead to that advantage, and found a 
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strong positive effect on firm performance in those family firms with greater board independence 
(they found no similar benefit from independent directors in non-family firms.) Going further, they 
found a curvilinear relationship between board structure and firm performance. 
 At low levels of family board representation relative to independent director representation, 
increases in the presence of family directors exhibit a positive relation to firm performance.  
But after the ratio of family board representation to independent director representation 
exceeds 0.50 (one family director to two independent directors), firm performance 
deteriorates.  At higher levels of family representation relative to independent directors 
(beyond one to one), firm performance deteriorates even further (Anderson and Reeb, 2004: 
224) 
They conclude that independent directors provide direct benefit in ‘tempering agency 
problems between founding-family owners and outside shareholders’ leading to ‘performance 
premiums for family firms with greater levels of board independence relative to non-family firms or 
family firms with insider-dominated boards’ (2004: 231). They do acknowledge that they are making 
causal inferences from correlational data, so they call for more detailed follow-up research on board 
structures, committees, nominating procedures, and the implications of these findings for smaller 
firms. 
In both the general corporate governance literature and the work on family companies in 
particular, after several decades of inconclusive results looking at different percentages of directors 
from each category measured against a wide range of performance indicators, the tone of the research 
is changing. More authors are moving away from a blanket endorsement (or critique) of independent-
director-dominated boards for all family businesses, and advocating the need to be situational, 
concluding that not one board style fits all (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Lane et al., 2006). They call 
for much more specific research linking board configurations to company lifecycle, industry, history, 
and particular task responsibilities (Sharma et al., 1997; Nicholson et al., 2009). For example, R&D 
firms may need more insiders who know the technology and the players; larger, diversified firms need 
a broader range of expertise, and therefore a larger board (Coles et al., 2001, 2008). Additionally, 
some authors suggest a transitional stage of an advisory board, to help overcome family fears about 
   47 
 
losing control. Lambrecht and Lievens (2008) see this structure as a way to introduce outsiders in a 
“safe mode,” as it has no legal status (the power remains in the hands of the owners) and it is easily 
dissolved.  
There are also calls for clarifying the role of outside director in the family business board. 
Some writers suggest that for family companies, purely independent directors may not be as important 
as ‘affiliate’ directors, who are not family members or managers, but who come to the board with a 
prior business connection, professional service history, or investment link to the family or the 
company. Jones et al. (2008) for example, found that directors of this type have valuable information 
and familiarity with the family firm, and more at stake, than unaffiliated independents, and therefore 
offer specific value in encouraging product diversification, overcoming a family-firm bias toward 
persistence with over-mature product arrays. Practitioners are also calling for more specific guidance 
from outcome research to that they can design board development interventions and better orientation 
for new directors, helping them ‘fulfill the functions they are uniquely positioned to serve within 
family companies that have public shareholders’ (DeMott, 2008:825). 
In particular, it is vital to further investigate the suggestion from several key studies of a 
curvilinear relationship between family engagement in governance and performance (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003). These studies suggest that for the first generation of entrepreneurial firms, focused on 
survival and growth, more family involvement is better, aiding capital retention, lowered costs of 
labor, and high energy and commitment. But as the firm matures, especially after the departure of the 
founder, less family involvement on the board may be correlated with better financial performance, 
more appropriately aggressive risk-taking and growth, and more accurate assessment of successor 
family managers. If those findings hold up across a variety of situations, it would be extremely 
valuable to practitioners as a guide to their advisory work with families on evolving the structure and 
membership of the board across time. 
In addition, for the more complex family enterprises, the questions of board structure, 
composition, and size need to take into account the overall organizational structure (Jara-Bertin et al., 
2008). Which board? Serving what governance purpose? For example, the owners/investors may form 
a holding company, a family partnership, or a private trust company, each requiring a separate 
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governing board to oversee their asset-management and asset-allocation functions. At the same time, 
in the business circle each operating company may have its own board, also with governance 
responsibilities but for a different set of constituents, with very different demands. 
Actually, the list of potential boards in the complex, later-generation family enterprise is 
longer, including the family office board, the family foundation board, the boards of subsidiaries and 
joint ventures, and the ‘pseudo-board’ created by interlocking groups of trustees. As a result, the 
questions of insider/outsider representation, or optimal number of directors and frequency of 
meetings, or transparency and information flow, have no general answer. The relationships among all 
of these family business boards within the same family enterprise raise many interesting questions 
about appropriate representation, optimal number and category of directors, legal and tax beneficial 
structures, required expertise, goal setting for return on assets, and liquidity and exit provisions. 
Finally, regarding board structure, there are also interesting researchable questions about 
different skill sets required for directors at different levels, and the critical issue of the allocation of 
the family's human capital across governance roles in these organizational hierarchies. Is it beneficial 
for family members to follow a maturational progression from divisional board to operating company 
board to holding company board? Does it serve the family's interest for that to be an automatic 
sequence based on age or years of service, without consideration of competencies? What about branch 
representation on boards -- is branch equality more relevant, or more tenacious, at one level than 
another, and with what consequence for both the financial and interpersonal well-being of the 
extended family? To date there is no broad-sample empirical data reported in the literature about the 
structure, function, or impact of these networks of boards in the increasingly complex structures of 
family-controlled enterprises. 
Board Process: The literature on boards has been dominated by studies of board structure and 
demographics, with much less attention to board process and functioning (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
Ricart et al., 1999; Carver and Oliver, 2002). Zahra and Pearce in their excellent literature review 
conclude: ‘There is a wide gap between the normative literature's recognition of these board roles and 
empirical documentation of the extent to which each is performed in reality...There are countless lists 
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of what boards should do. Yet, evidence on what boards actually do is not well documented’ (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989: 304, 325). 
Some critics argue that, regardless of their makeup, boards are ill-equipped to accomplish the 
governance tasks that have been assigned to them, because of lack of time (corporate boards meet an 
average of 18 hours per year), lack of specific information (due to sheer volume and to willful 
withholding by managers), and lack of the full range of skills that are required  (Eisenberg, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Baird and Rasmussen, 2007). It has been suggested that the gap between 
implementation and effective performance is even larger in family firms than in corporations in 
general, as the owners' ambivalence about board-dominated governance in general leads them to 
create boards and then ignore or circumvent them (Corbetta et al., 2002). 
Forbes and Milliken studied boards as decision-making groups. They express a general 
negative view of the potential for boards, describing them as large, elite, and episodic decision-
making groups -- the kind of groups particularly vulnerable to ‘process losses...It is often difficult for 
the board to do these [control and service tasks], …and on many boards the quantity and quality of 
substantive interaction are, in fact, minimal’ (1999:490). They posited that board functioning depends 
both on board demographics and on board processes such as conflict management, norms on levels of 
effort, and level of cohesiveness on the board. They offer a set of testable hypotheses about the direct 
and indirect impact of board process on firm performance. James (1999a) discusses the purposes and 
constraints on reciprocal relationships in governance, comparing family-based informal ties with 
formal contractual relationships. He generates hypotheses about the conditions that make one or the 
other more appropriate and effective, particularly in the extended time horizon of family continuity 
(James 1999b). Neither set of hypotheses has been tested. 
The interpersonal process in family business boards in particular has generated a very small 
literature, despite the opportunity to test many family dynamics models and theories in the working 
context of business governance (e.g., family lifecycle models, Bowenian theory, structural family 
analysis, psychodynamic theories). Johnson (2004) presents a conceptual analysis of a case study, but 
few other articles go beyond pure description, with an emphasis on the drama of conflict. There is to 
date no significant empirical study relating board process (task clarity, conflict management, team 
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development, leadership style, generational and branch collaboration and competition) to governance 
effectiveness (financial oversight, strategy formation and implementation, succession planning) in 
family companies. 
Board Tasks of Special Importance in Family Business Governance: One of the board's tasks 
that has special meaning in family companies is determining appropriate distributions to owners 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Farinha, 2003). Distributions are an important governance responsibility in all 
corporations, affecting capital-raising and shareholder behavior in general, but in family-owned 
companies they take on special financial, lifestyle, and symbolic importance. Setting dividends serves 
the purpose of maintaining investor commitment and defusing anxiety about insider expropriation, 
even though in economic terms dividends are often a low-efficiency method for providing return on 
investment, particularly when they are paired with raising capital through debt (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010). 
Some agency theorists argue that one of the purposes of dividends is to reduce the amount of 
free cash under the control of managers, in order to reduce Type 1 (owner-manager) agency risks and 
costs (Gugler, 2003). It is also hypothesized that dividends reduce Type 2 (owner-owner) agency 
costs by ‘leveling the playing field’ between insider shareholders (who may have a number of 
different financial perquisites and benefits that are not available to minority and non-managerial 
owners) and the shareholder group at large (Faccio et al., 2001; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009:864). Given 
the importance of financial rewards, it is surprising that there is not much literature on the particular 
meaning of dividends in family companies, particularly the impact of percent ownership, generation 
in control, family branch involvement in management, geography, and liquidity needs of the family 
members. There is also no empirical research exploring whether or not there are typically different 
levels of dividends between wholly-owned or closely held family companies and family-controlled 
publicly-traded companies. 
A second board governance task of particular importance to family businesses is succession 
planning. There is an extensive family business literature on succession planning; in fact, it is the 
most written-about topic in the field (Sharma et al., 1997; Chrisman et al., 2003). However, most of 
that research is on development and selection procedures, and the incumbent-successor relationship. 
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Only a small number of studies address the governance aspects of succession: the organizational 
location of control over the succession process, the role of the board, and the performance outcomes 
of different succession procedures (Handler, 1994). One recent paper by Phan et al. (2005) offers an 
excellent review of the governance dynamics in succession planning. They find only one empirical 
study of ‘the link between succession and firm performance’. That study (Morris, 1997) found that 
while the succession process can be enhanced through successor preparation, clarity on the decision-
making procedures, and open communication, the relationship between the process and firm 
performance was mixed. Phan also found a negative correlation between the stakeholder satisfaction 
with the succession plan, and revenue growth; that is, the more the family liked the succession process 
and outcome, the less well the company performed after the transition. This is a provocative early 
finding on a very specific governance-succession dynamic, representing the great opportunity for 
interesting research on this topic. 
In summary, there is no area of family business research more promising or consequential 
than empirical investigations of the governance performance of boards of directors in family-
controlled companies. The descriptive practitioner literature is extensive, but outcome research is 
scarce. Huse (2000) identifies four seminal review papers on board performance and impact (not 
specifically on family company boards, but on SME boards, which overlaps significantly but not 
completely with the family-controlled territory): Zahra and Pearce (1989), Pettigrew (1992), Johnson 
et al. (1996), and Forbes and Milliken (1999). All four reviews suggest detailed and well-considered 
research agendas. More recent review articles have continued the call (Daily et al., 2003; Uhlaner et 
al., 2007). Most of the authors offer theoretical models or extensions of classical theory such as 
agency, stewardship, stakeholder analysis, behavioral economics, and all end their presentations of 
hypotheses and propositions with a call for empirical research. It is time for the field to catch up. 
Other Mechanisms of Governance in the Ownership and Business Circles 
In publicly traded companies, families have other techniques in addition to board membership 
to exercise ownership control. Research on these ownership features has for the most part not been 
reported in the family business literature, even though the research samples heavily represent family-
controlled, publicly-traded companies. We are including these ownership vehicles and processes in 
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this review of the research on governance implementation, because they have a major impact on 
governance and are particularly important in family-controlled businesses. 
1. Blockholding: This term refers to the concentration of ownership in the hands of 
individuals and voting blocks. The general rule is that any shareholder who owns directly or controls 
5% or more of the voting shares of a corporation is a "blockholder." This ownership concentration is 
the classic characteristic of family-controlled firms. In the general organizational literature, there are 
many warnings that this kind of concentrated ownership is a threat to rational governance, but in the 
growing number of published studies on the impact of organizational blockholders, the results are 
unremarkable. For example, Bozek and Laurin (2008) found that firm performance may be negatively 
affected when a blockholder has the incentive and opportunity to expropriate resources from minority 
shareholders, but that special voting rights, as in many family firms, does not itself lead to poorer 
performance. La Porta and his colleagues (La Porta et al., 1999, 2000) analyze large samples of 
international data on ownership dispersal, generally finding that the weak regulatory and judicial 
conditions that exist in most non-US economies favor family consolidation of governance authority3. 
A fair summary of this literature would be that there is no strong evidence of a general detrimental 
impact of blockholding (Holderness, 2003; Ben-Amar and Andre, 2006), particularly in economies 
like the U.S. where there are strong legal and normative protections for the rights of minority 
shareholders (Burkart et al., 2003). Nevertheless, there is a need for more study of the power 
dynamics among large and small blockholders in family firms (Jara-Bertin et al., 2008), and in 
particular the governance consequences of various representation solutions. 
2. Dual Stock Class Systems: This is the second control mechanism often used by families at 
the point when they seek outside capital, and transition from a privately held to a traded company. In 
these companies one class of stock, widely traded or at least transferable, holds the majority of the 
equity of the firm; a second class of stock, very closely held (in these cases most often within the 
family, or even in one sector or generation of the family) controls the governance (voting) rights 
(Masulis et al., 2008). The most common ratio is 1:10; that is, each supershare carries 10 votes 
(Gompers et al., 2007). It is estimated that 5-8 per cent of U.S. publicly-traded corporations have 
more than one class of common stock. Economists who study corporate finance have suggested a 
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negative impact of supershares on the ability to attract investment capital, and hypothesized Type II 
agency costs of expropriation of minority shareholder rights and benefits by the controlling elite 
(Harris and Raviv, 1988; Bebchuk et al. 1999; Bozec and Laurin, 2008). But other studies have found 
no overall detrimental effect in family companies (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Barontini and Caprio, 
2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2008). The consensus is that dual-class stock structures are very effective 
at warding off potential hostile takeovers, and while they definitely carry some cost in the capital 
markets, that is often seen as worth it to insiders (Gompers et al., 2007). DeMott (2008) suggests that 
some wealthy owners will gladly sacrifice a marginal portion of share value to secure continued 
control. Nevertheless, there are situations where single-class, one-share-one-vote rules appear to lead 
to better choices and more merit-based decisions, particularly when assessing the performance of 
managers (Harris and Raviv, 1988). Studies on the impact of dual-classes of stock on generational 
dynamics among family branches, board performance, and succession planning in family firms has 
not been reported. 
3. Chair/CEO Role Duality: One aspect of corporate structure that has generated some 
empirical research concerns the advantages or disadvantages of the same individual serving as board 
Chair and CEO (duality). The U.S. tradition has been to emphasize efficiency and alignment, leading 
to more frequent duality. In Europe and the old British Commonwealth, with a stronger tradition of 
checks and balances, the roles are rarely combined. But the situation may be different in family firms. 
Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, for example, found that family firms in an Australian sample were four 
times more likely than non-family public firms to have one individual as CEO and Chair (2006); 
Navarro and Ansón (2009) found that 55 per cent of their sample of Spanish family businesses had 
one person serving in both roles. Kor (2006) found a similar percentage in Asian family firms. 
For publicly traded corporations in general, there are numerous studies testing the impact of 
duality vs. separation on performance, operations, strategy, conflict, liquidity, cost of capital, 
reputation in the market, and human resource management. However, as in the other topics of 
governance assessment, no conclusion seems to be very strongly supported. The trend in the US over 
the past two decades has clearly been toward separation of the roles, as endorsed by the Sarbanes-
Oxley requirements for publicly traded companies (Braun and Sharma, 2007). However, there are a 
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growing number of studies challenging the empirical justification for opposing duality in family firms 
(Boyd, 1995; Baliga et al., 1996; Coles et al., 2001; Daily et al., 2003; Kor, 2006; Braun and Sharma, 
2007). For example, Braun and Latham (2009) found that in a recession, dual leadership companies 
recovered faster. Daily and Dollinger's early work (1992) on owner-managed and professionally-
managed family companies found a small, non-significant advantage for duality. Westphal (1999) 
presents some interesting findings that even when the roles are split, strong social ties between CEOs 
and directors can actually improve board input in strategic decision-making, without an 
accompanying loss in board oversight. In contrast, there is a small literature on the entrenchment of 
owner-family CEOs in the face of poor performance. Hillier and McColgan (2004, 2009), for 
example, find that family CEOs are less likely to be fired after business downturns than non-family 
CEOs, independent of the CEO's personal shareholding. In addition, they report in a sample of UK 
listed companies (50 per cent with CEO/Chair duality) that stock prices, sales growth, and 
employment all climb following the departure of a family CEO, if the successor is not a family 
member (see also Pérez-González, 2001). It may be that in good times, duality fosters efficiency and 
lowers agency costs; in bad times, it insulates poor executive performance and slows needed change. 
There is clearly a need for more specific research on duality in family companies that takes into 
account industry, generation of the leader, board membership and activity, and capital structure. 
4. Shareholder Agreements: Shareholder agreements have been traditionally discussed in the 
literature as part of the legal and financial infrastructure of the business, but not as a governance tool. 
They are most often drafted to control the transfer of voting shares, in order to restrict dispersal, to 
retain desired balance among family branches through a sequence of rights of refusal for tendered 
shares, and/or to specify the process for valuation in an effort to reduce conflict in within-family 
transfers. The governance implications of these agreements are becoming better understood, alongside 
their tax and financial consequences (McCahery and Vermeulen, 2006), but the core governance 
questions have not yet been addressed. For example, what is the link between the terms of the share-
transfer provisions and the engagement of branches in the succession process? Do liquidity options 
available to minority family shareholders affect the engagement of family members and branches in 
governance, and if so, with what consequences for process (board-manager cooperation or conflict) 
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and outcomes (firm performance)? What difference does it make to governance if in-laws are 
permitted to be owners, either through inheritance, gift, or divorce? 
A special subcategory of shareholder agreements with particular relevance to family 
companies is prenuptial agreements. Like all forms of shareholder agreement, these are designed in 
part to control the dispersal of ownership shares, in this case as a result of (usually later-generation) 
marriage. Once again, there is a fairly broad descriptive literature about prenuptial agreements 
(Estess, 1996), and some informal literature by legal and other advisors either advocating or opposing 
them in principle (Griffiths, 2011), but no systematic empirical research on their impact on 
governance process, firm performance, and ownership continuity, or on their effect on the process of 
sibling partnerships and cousin consortiums (for example, are talented and appropriate in-laws still 
eligible for board service if a prenuptial prohibits them from inheriting shares, and if so, are they 
entitled to distributions that may be available to other directors?). 
5.  Shareholder Assemblies 
The shareholder assembly is typically described as an expansion of the company's annual 
meeting, a standard in corporate governance. Well-designed shareholder assemblies are usually 
organized so that owners hear from business leaders about company performance, interact with the 
board of directors, and ratify (sometimes with discussion or even debate) the overall strategy and 
financial plans of company leadership. The shareholder assembly also typically elects the family 
directors.  
Family business advisors have routinely advocated convening such meetings as high-
involvement, face-to-face events, rather than relying on the proxy-based rituals that are common in 
traditional public companies. Consultants have written about the benefits of integrating 
geographically-dispersed family branches; highlighting company accomplishments in an effort to 
sustain long-term financial commitment; motivating potential next-generation members to be willing 
to participate in governance by filling family-designated seats on boards, councils, and committees; 
demonstrating family engagement to employees, managers, outside directors, and current and 
potential investors; and explaining or justifying decisions about distributions (Elstrodt, 2003 ; Poza, 
2008). However, the impact of the design, attendance, and agenda of shareholder assemblies on the 
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board and managerial behavior that follows, on relationships among shareholders, or on company 
performance in family firms remains to be studied. 
Sometimes in the descriptive literature and in practice, shareholder assemblies are not clearly 
distinguished from family assemblies, which appropriately belong in a different circle with different 
membership, tasks, and sources of legitimacy. In first-generation controlling owner businesses, there 
may be no practical difference. However, as the company grows and there are both owners and non-
owners in the expanding family, the distinction has important governance implications. For example, 
especially in families who have a newly formalized governance structure, the shareholder assembly 
may elect the family council, which may be a practical convenience but actually is not a shareholder 
responsibility. Alternatively, sometimes family assemblies take in upon themselves to select family 
directors, also a blurring of the circles unless the shareholders have formally delegated that task to the 
council. In either direction, this crossover can be a transitional step, when the family is too large for 
all members to participate actively in governance, but not large enough to support separate gatherings 
of current shareholders and the extended family. This illustrates a core gap in the governance 
implementation literature. Research on the optimal timing of a separation of ownership and family 
governance, and the performance and continuity consequences of being either "too early" or "too 
late," would be a significant contribution to the literature. 
6. Trusts, Private Trust Companies, Estate Planning, and other Wealth Transfer Structures and 
Mechanisms 
Even further from the mainstream of governance research are the systems that families put in 
place to preserve and transfer wealth. These structures are discussed in the legal, financial, and 
business literature as financial entities, but they also have serious governance implications, both 
obvious and hidden. The use of trusts as estate planning tools, primarily to shield large inheritances 
from taxes, exploded in the second half of the 20th century. As state and federal laws permitted and 
encouraged a wide range of trust structures, clients turned to their legal advisors to suggest best 
practices. Hughes (2004) was one of the first voices to point out that the criteria that attorneys used to 
choose trustees and frame their roles -- financial expertise, credibility, and dependability -- were 
ignoring a critical part of the role. Trustees are governors. During the settlor's lifetime, they have 
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ready access to his/her judgment and priorities. But what about subsequently? Trustees fulfill their 
fiduciary responsibility to the beneficiaries by making critical investment choices, and in many cases 
those choices have profound impact on strategy, financial structure and risk profiles, and viability of 
the companies  -- which often come to be owned not by the family descendants of founders, but by the 
trusts themselves. Some of the newer structures, such as private trust companies, may add even 
further to the governance complexity. 
Professionals have begun to think and write more about the governance aspects of wealth 
transfer in families. However, a significant, formal research literature has yet to emerge testing the 
effectiveness of various solutions, such as the impact of the particular kind of trust (for example 
revocable, irrevocable, GRATs, GRITs, generation-skipping, beneficiary-controlled) on performance 
in the owned companies. This is a great opportunity for legal scholars and family-business researchers 
to collaborate on investigating the consequences beyond tax minimization of trust design: for 
example, the policies for the selection of initial and successor trustees, the trustee-director 
relationship, the role and membership of private trust company boards, differences in the behavior of 
successor generations depending on whether they are outright inheriting owners or trust beneficiaries, 
consequences of the age at which the beneficiary has access to trust capital, and the impact on 
governance and strategy of different kinds of trustees (such as institutional trustees, family trustees, 
and private trust companies). The number of significant family-controlled enterprises that will 
become trust-controlled in the coming decades greatly increases the urgency of generating good data 
and analyses as soon as possible. 
Summary of Governance Implementation in the Ownership and Business Circles 
A very high proportion of the published literature on governance concerns boards of directors. 
The practice literature is strongly supportive of independent boards for family enterprise. The research 
literature lags behind (true for non-family businesses as well). Correlational data on the relationship 
between board structure and firm performance is beginning to accumulate; data on board process is 
still rare. 
We briefly summarized the literature on six other governance topics in the ownership and 
business circles that have particular importance for family enterprises: blockholding, dual class stock 
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systems, CEO/Chair duality, shareholder agreements, shareholder assemblies, and trusts. For all of 
these topics, there is some research on their design and operation in corporations in general. What 
remains to be developed is a broad literature on their particular implementation in family owned and 
controlled companies, and the integration of financial, legal, business, and family variables in 
assessing their impact on governance and continuity in family enterprise. 
GOVERNANCE IN THE FAMILY CIRCLE 
We are stretching the traditional definition of governance when we include the family circle, 
because there are no ‘owners’ in a family. Nevertheless, families need governing as well -- not only in 
the sense that all human systems may benefit from leadership and structure, but because business-
owing families have organizational work to do as families, and their ability to do that work efficiently 
and effectively has material consequence for business and financial operations, and for the 
preservation of family wealth. 
However, we are not proposing that all aspects of family process are usefully called 
governance. There is a difference between family relationships, harmony, or communication, and 
governance. Family governance is specifically concerned with enterprise goals. We consider the 
family to be engaged in governance only when they are attending to the financial and operational 
interdependence of family members in their businesses, foundations, offices, investment portfolios, 
and assets held in common. This distinction is important because it provides the justification for 
formalizing family governance, while freeing the family to think about its organizational control 
functions separately from its network of personal relationships. 
Governance in the family circle, as in the business and ownership, is enacted through one or 
more organizational settings and procedures. We will review the literature on implementation of 
governance in family councils, family assemblies, family mission statements, family offices, and 
family foundations. 
The Family Council 
The family council is the board of directors for the family circle (Poza, 2009). It can be an all-
inclusive, self-appointed, or elected workgroup of family members, whose main tasks are to make 
decisions about the business of the family and to educate families about the enterprise (Lansberg, 
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1999; Dickstein, 2003; Jaffe, 2005; Goldbart and DiFuria, 2009;). Gersick et al. define the family 
council as ‘a group who periodically come together to discuss issues arising from their family's 
involvement with a business. The fundamental purpose of a family council is to provide a forum in 
which family members can articulate their values, needs, and expectations vis-à-vis the company and 
develop policies that safeguard the long-term interests of the family’ (1997:237). 
Like boards of directors, family councils have been very widely advocated by family business 
advisors for decades (Ward, 1987; Lansberg, 1988, 1999, 2007; Herz-Brown, 1993; Aronoff and 
Ward, 1996; Gersick et al., 1997; Jaffe et al., 1998; BDO Center for Family Business, 2004; Jaffe, 
2005; De Visscher, reported in Cruz, 2008; Poza, 2008, 2009; Parada et al., 2010). Family Business 
Magazine archives include almost 200 articles describing family councils. Most of the professional 
literature focuses on the general benefit of the council for both the family and the firm (Gray, 2009), 
particularly in later stages of family firm development (sibling partnership and cousin consortiums) 
(Lansberg, 2007; Moore and Juenemann, 2008). Advocated functions of the family council include: 
• forging family consensus, and counteracting declining family bonds and low identification 
with the firm, as families grow and spontaneous social contacts among family members 
decrease (Kets de Vries, 1993; Mustakallio et al., 2002) 
• articulating a family strategy for business and wealth management (Goldbart and DiFuria, 
2009), including planning, rule setting, and collaborative asset allocation, which are "not 
natural activities for families" (Dickstein, 2003) 
• limiting family conflicts that could negatively affect the business (Benson et al., 1990; 
McManus, 1990) 
• supporting succession planning (Handler, 1994; Leon-Guerrero et al., 1998; Lansberg, 1999), 
particularly in facilitating the family's exploration of their "collective dream of continuity " 
(Lansberg, 1997), and in conveying a policy-driven, stewardship culture and enthusiasm for 
the business (Aronoff and Ward, 1996) 
• educating and welcoming younger generations (Lansberg, 2007; Poza, 2009), as ‘a forum for 
lifelong learning’ (Aronoff and Ward, 1996:282) 
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Many articles include case stories. For example, Lamp presented the case of the first six years 
of the Eddy Family Council. The Eddy Family framed the role of the Family Council as the caretaker 
of ‘investors' relations’. They believe the family council has ‘clearly strengthened the business…and 
the family’ (2007:5). The author concludes that the critical conditions for the family council to 
accomplish its tasks are education and socialization of new family council members, and an 
independent budget for funding its activities. Daugherty (2009) illustrates a case of a family council 
that led a transition in both the management and ownership of a family firm. This case portrays the 
governance functions of the council, fostering and enhancing ties among family members, allowing it 
to frame the policies of restructuring and redesign. 
Nevertheless, after 25 years of both family firm research and extensive consulting 
interventions in business families, there is essentially no evaluative outcome research on family 
councils4. Many articles propose roles for the family council in key governance functions, and may 
provide case examples, but they do not present aggregate data on the councils' implementation or 
performance. As a result, there is no consensus as to the design details: the most effective size, 
composition, frequency of meetings, election process, roles, or specific tasks of the family council. 
And, most importantly, there is no longitudinal, controlled research to actually test the effectiveness 
of family councils at achieving their objectives. 
Looking forward, a first step might be the creation of typologies, which will allow testing the 
impact of the different legal, financial, and organizational forms that family councils take. The 
interesting work will be in the details: Who pays for them? How are their budgets managed? Where 
does the membership come from -- election, appointment, volunteerism, or some other process? For 
elected councils, are they at large or representative, and if the latter, representing what constituencies? 
What tasks tend to lead to experiences of success for council members, and what other tasks are 
experienced as frustrating or failed efforts?. 
Second, research on the impact on council structure and process of specific family 
characteristics such as marital stability, variance in number of offspring across generations and 
branches, emigration and geographic mobility, traditions of inheritance, and gender dynamics, would 
add to our understanding of their governance functions. Researchers can also explore the impact of 
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culture, geography, and ethnicity on council design (for example, Brenes et al. (2011) found that Latin 
American business families use Family Councils as communication facilitators, not governance 
tools). 
Then, the most pressing need is for basic performance metrics for family councils. We need 
to build a body of research on the four main outcomes most commonly sought by family councils: 1) 
finding the family's "common ground" on business values, business culture, philanthropy and wealth 
management; 2) educating family members, particularly the rising generations, about the family 
enterprise; 3) facilitating communication between the extended family and the leaders in the 
ownership and business circles; and, as a result of the other three tasks, 4) enhancing the family's 
commitment to the enterprise. Impact studies are always difficult, requiring inspired selection of 
dependent measures, and most often multi-method longitudinal data gathering. But considering the 
extensive endorsement of this governance solution, it is clearly one of the topics most deserving of the 
effort. 
Other Family Circle Governance structures: 
Family Assemblies 
Family assemblies are the periodic (typically annual) gathering of an extended family. These 
events often include formal meetings where information is shared about investments and operating 
companies, speakers and facilitated discussions, and other recreational activities that are common in 
family reunions. Ward argues that ‘the best practice” that is most important to long-term family 
business growth is the process of holding family meetings’ (1997: 335). Other advisors suggest that 
family meetings can help families achieve consensus regarding family mission, family values, and the 
raison d’être for the sustainability of the family business over generations (Vilaseca, 2002; Jaffe and 
Lane, 2004; Montemerlo, 2005 and Gimeno et al., 2006). Family Assemblies are often recommended 
as particularly useful in large family groups with broad geographic dispersal, highly diffused 
ownership, and a desire to sustain economic interdependence through subsequent cousin generations. 
It is a reasonable hypothesis that shared experiences with the extended family will facilitate 
governance implementation: selection of directors, trustee-beneficiary relationships, capital retention, 
and broad support for investment and distribution policies. However, as for family councils, the 
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overall impact of family assemblies, as well as specific operational questions such as the 
differentiation between family assemblies and shareholder assemblies, and the most effective 
frequency, agenda, and choices about who gets invited, are interesting and as yet unexplored research 
topics. 
Family Constitutions, Protocols, and Mission Statements  
Many advisors work with families on creating mission statements or family constitutions and 
protocols, beyond the shareholder agreements that govern ownership. The recent increase in interest 
in family constitutions may be in response to the maturation of a large cohort of entrepreneurial post-
World War II nuclear families through sibling and multi-generational partnerships to complex, 
geographically-dispersed family networks (Gersick, 2002a, 2002b). In addition, popular culture 
presents young adults in these extended families with an unlimited array of alternative value systems 
and lifestyles. Senior generation leaders who are concerned about the continuity of the enterprise in 
this 'competitive market' for the family's attention, may use a constitution to articulate their values and 
culture, to formalize the ‘rules of engagement’, and to emphasize the obligations and requirements for 
participation in the benefits of future ownership. 
Family constitutions have been seen as a nice-to-have accessory in the U.S., and more of a 
first-choice governance option in Latin America and parts of Europe. Brenes et al. (2011) found them 
to be very popular in concept in Latin America, although often not implemented or adhered to. In the 
U.S., they received a flurry of attention after Covey identified mission statements as a habit of 
successful individuals and families (Covey, 1989; McClain, 2006). 
So far the literature on family mission statements and constitutions is primarily descriptive; 
the value is seen as self-evident by the professionals who advocate them (for example, Hauser, 2003; 
Coombes and Wong, 2004). Some case studies conclude a benefit of formal statements (Lewine, 
2006). Other authors discuss the value of protocols to promote particular outcomes, such as ‘fair 
process’ (Van der Heyden et al., 2005; Blondel et al., 2001), or the avoidance of later problems such 
as ‘reputation exposure, wealth entropy, family division and legal costs’ (Griffiths, 2011). We could 
not identify any formal study aggregating governance provisions from a large sample of family 
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constitutions, or assessing the impact or specific benefit of family mission statements on governance 
or family firm performance. 
Family Offices 
The term ‘family office’ is used to cover a very wide range of service centers, investment 
oversight functions, back office operations, and other support services for family members (Murray et 
al., 2002). Some family offices are closely linked to operating businesses, using company staff to 
provide financial and legal support for family members. Other family offices are actually just one 
individual or a collection of independent contractors from various professions, designed primarily to 
enhance coordination among investment, legal, insurance, and tax advisors. However, a growing 
number of families have created something much more formal: an independent partnership or 
corporation with a significant budget and staff who operate the business of the overseeing the family's 
private wealth. Professionals estimate that there are 3,000 family offices of this type in the US, and 
the number is growing annually. The concept of governance is clearly relevant for these 
organizations. 
Once again, most of the literature on family office governance is advice-giving from 
experienced professionals, and case examples (for example Hauser, 2001; Families in Business, 2003 
[brief articles by Maslinki, Youngman, Stern, Beyer and Brown, Patterson, and Ward]; Jaffe and 
Lane, 2004; Griffiths, 2011). Lansky and Pendergast (2010) offer some interesting observations that 
generate testable research hypotheses, such as that wealth management does not provide the same 
‘glue’ for extended families as governing an operating company, that individual rights are more 
relevant in family office governance, and that the wide range of services make family office 
governance more complicated. Additional questions that are raised in case studies include: What 
constituencies have a legitimate right to governance authority in a family office: investor-funders, 
clients for services, or the entire family? What governance mechanisms work to integrate and balance 
the goals of these stakeholders? Can family councils effectively act as boards of directors for family 
offices, and if not, what structure is most effective? 
The family office industry has matured well beyond its former preoccupation with service 
menus and the selection of money managers, and some aggregate data are emerging. The Wharton 
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Global Family Alliance publishes results of their research program on family offices, concluding that 
‘family governance is key’ (Amit et al., 2008: 31; see also Knowledge at Wharton, 2008; Amit and 
Liechtenstein, 2009). Their survey and interview data summarize both operational practices and 
governance structures. 
However, family office research highlights one of the special features of the family business 
field:  a significant amount of the research that is conducted is proprietary, available only to clients or 
members and subscribers of private associations. For example, the Family Office Exchange  
(www.familyoffice.com) publishes a number of survey reports, case studies, and papers by 
practitioners about family offices, but they are not published in the academic literature. They are 
available to fee-paying members or, in some cases, for purchase by the public. This blending of fee-
for-service products with knowledge generation is complicated for the field. It is not peer reviewed 
like journal articles, but the work may represent the insightful conclusions of experienced 
professionals. For example, FOX publishes 50 Best Practices for an Enduring Family Enterprise, 
described as ‘a comprehensive guide to the proven strategies and approaches family offices have used 
to improve nearly all aspects of their operations. It highlights proven governance and operational 
practices your management team and governing board can use’ (Family Office Exchange, September 
2008:  List price, $4500); or How Wealth Owners Measure Value: Evaluating the Performance of 
Your Wealth Advisor or Family Office (Family Office Exchange, October 2010: List price, $1500). 
There are similar other sources. Campden (www.campdenresearch.com) publishes reports such as an 
annual European Family Office Survey (for 2011 entitled Beyond Uncertainty: Family Offices Adapt 
to Unpredictability. Price: $3140). The integration of valuable proprietary findings and data into the 
mainstream is a policy and professional challenge, discussed in more detail in the section on future 
research below.  
Family Foundations 
The research literature on family foundation governance is even more limited than the work 
on family businesses. There are estimated to be more than 40,000 private foundations in the US alone, 
and many more donor-advised funds and corporate giving programs in family-controlled companies. 
The Family Foundations division of the Council on Foundation has been that organization's fastest 
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growing sector over the past several decades. Philanthropy in general has benefitted from an 
enormous increase in attention to professionalism, transparency, fiscal accountability, strategic 
planning, impact assessment, and all aspects of organizational functioning. However, the focus of the 
literature in the field has been and continues to be on program -- the work of grant-making, analogous 
to operations in the family business -- with much less attention to governance. 
An early small-sample study of family foundations (Gersick et al., 1990) proposed a set of 
hypotheses for further study, but until very recently there had been few empirical studies of 
governance structure in family philanthropy. The publications that do address governance are almost 
exclusively case stories and best-practice suggestions written by experienced family participants in 
philanthropy or by professional advisors to foundations from a variety of disciplines (Esposito, 2002; 
Angus, 2004), or guides for regulation-compliant governance, written primarily by attorneys (McCoy 
and Miree, 2010). Examples of more formal research on family foundation governance include one 
study sponsored by the National Center for Family Philanthropy (Gersick et al., 2004), another by the 
Foundation Governance Project of the Center for Effective Philanthropy (CEP, 2004, 2005), and a 
forthcoming study on the effects of governance on grant-making strategy by Lungeanu and Ward. The 
Gersick et al. study of governance and continuity in multi-generational family foundations found a 
range of governance practices that evolved through successor generations, but in general an under-
investment in board structure and development, preparation of rising generations, and operational and 
financial oversight, when compared with grant-making activities. The CEP study is straightforward in 
acknowledging that, ‘given that there is no universal, comparable performance measure for 
foundations -- no analog to a company's stock price or profitability, for example -- it is difficult to 
connect governance practices to foundation performance’ (Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2005: 
2). As a ‘proxy’ for direct measures, they rely on CEO and trustee perceptions of foundation board 
effectiveness. 
Angus and Herz-Brown (2007) found in an online-based survey that most families are 
’informal’ in their governance structure and processes for philanthropy, and have not specifically 
discussed or chosen governance procedures. Nevertheless, most philanthropy consultants observe that 
family philanthropy has been dramatically professionalized in recent decades, and data on governance 
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needs to catch up. Most of the governance implementation issues described earlier for the business 
circle are relevant for family foundations, in particular: a) the correlates of governance behavior with 
foundation performance; and b) the differentiation and integration of the different vehicles for family 
philanthropy, including corporate philanthropy in family-owned firms, family foundations, and 
personal and branch giving within philanthropic families. How are each of the streams governed to 
collectively reflect the family's philanthropic values, and how are the family's human capital resources 
most optimally allocated among them? The professional literature estimates that up to $6 trillion will 
be transferred in the United States through philanthropy over the next few decades (Havens and 
Schervish, 1999; Journal of Gift Planning, 2006). The need for more quality research on governance 
in this sector is urgent. 
Summary:  Governance Implementation in the Family Circle 
There is a small but developing literature investigating more differentiated family governance 
roles across stages of development (Leon-Guerrero et al., 1998). In particular, governance can act as a 
counterbalance to the negative effects of increasing family and ownership complexity (Jaffe and Lane, 
2004) as the ownership governance system evolves from a controlling owner to a sibling partnership 
and further to a cousin consortium (Gersick et al., 1997; Lansberg, 1999; Steier, 2001). Some research 
addresses the consequences of increasing family complexity: decreases in entrepreneurship, capability 
development, business growth and family firm financial performance (Lambrecht and Lievens, 2008); 
a decline of family satisfaction regarding family-company relationships (Gimeno et al., 2006); a 
decrease in family interrelation and cohesiveness due to increasing differences in personal goals, 
values, and commitment to the business (Ward, 1997); and a rise in the agency cost of conflict 
(Schulze et al., 2001). These authors and others (Montemerlo, 2005; Vilaseca, 2002) conclude that 
family governance can diminish the de-stabilizing pressure of complexity and growth, and enhance 
the owing-family unity and commitment to the business by formalizing family-firm relationships and 
regulating the role of the family in the business. 
But this optimistic hypothesis, endorsed in practice by most family business consultants, 
needs empirical testing (Astrachan, 2009). Future research can articulate the criteria that distinguish 
effective family governance from ineffective efforts, and to apply those criteria to both case examples 
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and large samples to assess outcomes. This is a different task from the ownership and business 
governance circles, because in those cases there is an existing full literature on corporate governance, 
both theory and practice. The work in those arenas is to adapt, refine, and apply those theories and 
general hypotheses to family owned and controlled firms. In contrast, in the family circle, while there 
is plenty of work in print on family dynamics, relationships, roles, communication, and conflict, there 
is very little organizational literature on how those dynamics play out in family governance. The field 
is wide open for new empirical studies. 
Summary: A Research Agenda for Family Enterprise Governance 
New research over the past several decades on corporate governance in general, and the 
increasingly sophisticated studies on family business, are the foundation for a major leap forward in 
governance implementation research. The work of practitioners with family councils, boards of 
directors, family offices, succession planning, strategy, and corporate finance, has raised a clear and 
compelling set of hypotheses that need testing. In addition, leaders in the field are calling for research 
with practical implications -- relevant works that reduce the knowing-doing gap (Sharma, 2010). New 
web-based techniques for broad sample data gathering are widely available. A very large population 
of senior and junior generation family leaders have participated in executive education, joined family 
business forums, and been introduced to scholarship and theory in graduate programs. They 
understand the value of research, and are eager for normative data. There is also a growing cadre of 
students at all levels of graduate and professional education who are more aware of family enterprise, 
and looking for interesting and consequential research topics. The opportunity is there to return to the 
theories and models that have been presented by academics, and the prescriptions and experience of 
consultants, and to use rigorous sampling, data-gathering, and data-analytic tools to look at what is 
actually in place in family business governance and how it is working. We do have some exemplary 
beginnings. The 2012 FFI Best Quantitative Dissertation award was for Memili's work in just this 
area: an extensive investigation of the impact of governance mechanisms on firm performance, and 
the link between family involvement, corporate governance provisions, and profitability in publicly 
traded family firms (2011). Her complex analysis is a major contribution, and should be emulated. 
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In each of the sections above, on business, ownership, and family governance, we have 
summarized ideas for further research that are suggested in articles in the existing literature. In 
addition to these specific topics, there are a few major themes in research on governance 
implementation that deserve attention from multiple studies and approaches.  
1. The development of governance through stages of formalization and growth. As the level of 
expertise required to govern effectively increases, and the percentage of family members in each 
generation who can actively participate in corporate governance goes down, roles for family members 
must become differentiated. There is a pressing need for more research on the ways families govern 
over time (for example, how families evolve from selecting family directors as a symbolic or 
representational right of shareholding, toward choosing individuals who are prepared to be value-
adding contributors to the bottom-line performance of the enterprise). There is also an immediate 
need for research on the governance role of non-director family owners, particularly in family 
businesses owned by second, third, and later generations.  
2. After 30 years of intensive advice, education, and encouragement for governance implementation 
in family firms, how are families dealing with ‘governance fatigue’, later-generation leadership, and 
the threat of inadequate talent or interest in governance? Legal and financial advisors have done a 
powerful job in recent decades helping families secure their financial resources for current and future 
generations. Their success takes some of the pressure off rising generations to commit themselves to 
family governance, especially the most talented, who have other attractive and lucrative options. The 
family business is no longer the only, or even necessarily the best, game in town as it was for the 
founding generations. What rewards will be required to sustain governance implementation in the 
future? 
3. More cross-cultural and international research. The bulk of research on agency theory and 
corporate governance has been conducted on the largest US corporations. Now there is a growing 
body of studies from other countries, many of which highlight the dominant role of family enterprise 
in their economies5. Some of the articles point out particular features of the legal system, capital 
market, or cultural traditions that affect governance structures in different economies (for example, 
the two-tiered board system in Europe, discussed in Huse, 1998; Licht et al., 2001, 2007; Tabalujan, 
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2002; Pieper, 2003; Filatochev et al., 2005). Others test key hypotheses in new settings, such as the 
relationship between family control and organization performance in Europe (Barontini and Caprio, 
2005), or the effect of weak or strong legal protection for minority owners in various countries on the 
felt need of controlling shareholders to maintain voting control (Morck and Yeung, 2003). However, 
as in the US-focused writings, there is still very little empirical research on governance 
implementation that goes beyond case stories and general models. Many academics are calling for 
more focus on outcomes and for cross-cultural replication of promising research from one region to 
another (Uhlaner et al., 2007). 
4. Integrating research and practice. The combination of research and practitioner experience provides 
an excellent platform for the next stage of knowledge generation. This goal has been put forward by 
Sharma and Nordqvist (2008) in their article on value creation within family-owned business. Their 
study makes an elegant case for the uniqueness of family governance for each family enterprise based 
on the underlying values that each family holds. We suggest that researchers follow their initiative 
and look closely at family heterogeneity (Davis, 1982; Hollander, 1983; Ward, 1987; Lansberg, 
1988), identifying the core attributes of family business and relating them to different governance 
structures and designs. 
But the integration of formal academic research and practice reporting will not come easily. 
In the section above on family offices, we mentioned the extensive research on governance sponsored 
by professional associations. While some of their work is understandably aimed at advocating for 
their constituents, emphasizing accomplishments and successes rather than rigorously testing 
hypotheses, they also conduct studies that document the prevalence of governance structures, and in 
some cases the demographics, typical budgets, and activities of boards, family offices, and 
foundations6. Much of this research on governance implementation is in the form of case studies and 
aggregated experience; there is little outcome or impact research concerning governance. 
Nevertheless, their work provides a very promising platform for the academic researchers to build on, 
to the extent that it is available to them. 
The association-sponsored research issue is only a special case of a more general dilemma 
with two parts: constraints on sharing proprietary data, and on the best methods for investigating 
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complex phenomena. Throughout its relatively short history, family business has been a practitioner-
driven field. While the involvement of scholars from the relevant social and behavioral sciences has 
been accelerating, it is still primarily a guild of professionals delivering services to clients while 
building both a proprietary and a disseminated knowledge base. The bulk of our shared understanding 
at present about family enterprise governance has come from their careful observations, action 
research, case methods, and post-hoc analyses. 
However, as in all professional fields, competitive success among providers is based in part 
on knowing more, and having better answers, than others. It is natural for practicing professionals to 
be prescriptive rather than equivocal, and there is little incentive to engage in rigorous research that 
would highlight variability7, or commoditize best practices. In contrast, academics have institutional 
and career-advancing incentives to challenge common knowledge, and a tradition that until something 
is true at least 95 per cent of the time it cannot be considered to be anything but chance. But they have 
their constraints as well. The more complicated, quantitative/qualitative designs are expensive and 
take too long for most academics. Longitudinal, intensive, multi-method data gathering in large 
samples of operating family enterprises is a dream design that will always be rare. So in a field like 
family business, with complex phenomena and little guiding theory, the practitioners tend to rely on 
untested conclusions on big questions, and the researchers focus on rigorous detail for manageable 
small ones. 
We need to find a way to capitalize on and integrate the best of both approaches. More 
research needs to be addressed to the issues and fascinating unknowns of family enterprise 
governance in all three circles: the structure and process of boards; the fair, productive, and 
collaborative management of wealth; and the effective organization of families across time and 
generations. As that happens, we will all have to challenge well-accepted ‘common knowledge’ about 
governance practice and help each other keep focused on the core task at hand -- discovering what is 
really true so that we can intervene in ways that are truly helpful. 
 
Notes:  
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1. A huge body of literature has developed to explore the conditions that either create or reduce 
agency costs and risks. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that family businesses minimize agency 
costs, since ownership and management are unified in the same individuals, which creates a 
significant advantage for family companies in the marketplace. That conclusion was challenged by 
other researchers, who countered that while some kinds of agency costs might be ameliorated (owner-
manager costs, sometimes called Type I agency costs), a different set of costs (called Type II) were 
much higher --- the split between those owners in control (through majority holdings, executive roles, 
or both), and more peripheral and minority owners (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Morck, et. al, 2005; 
Burkart et. al., 2003). 
2. The assignment of the board of directors to either the ownership or the business circle is arbitrary, 
but it illustrates an ambiguity in the Three-Circle Model that may actually be the best evidence of that 
model's conceptual usefulness. In fact, the board of directors must reside in both circles. How a board 
sorts out its different (and sometimes misaligned) obligations to the ownership and business circles on 
such issues as dividends, debt, risk, expansion, compensation, and career development for owner-
employees, is exactly the kind of dilemma that the model illuminates. 
3. There is a very large literature in corporate economics on the relationship between the level of 
regulatory and judicial protection of investors and the sources and cost of capital across regions and 
countries. This work suggests one very interesting explanation of the global prevalence and 
persistence of family ownership (as a capital-protection mechanism in economies with weak or 
unenforceable public policy), but it falls outside the domain of this chapter. 
4. This may indicate that the professionals, associations, and scholars in the field have 
institutionalized the family council as a sign indicator that a family enterprise has been 
“professionalized,” without any requirement to assess its functioning or impact (Melin and Nordqvist, 
2007). A recent study on family firm governance practices from an institutional theory perspective 
(Parada et al., 2010), pointed out the influence of collective norms, such as those that emerge in 
professional associations, on the establishment of formalized family governance systems. Families 
model other families in business in their responses to the challenges they face as family enterprises 
(mimetic forces), and family firm associations and professionals have identified a loosely-constructed 
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set of best practices that are most frequently recommended to their clients (normative forces). 
Creating a family council is one of these practices. We agree with Parada et al. (2010) that 
institutional pressures help organizations evolve, but sometimes the structures are endorsed without 
attention to specific content, tasks, authority and functionally. 
5. Exemplary articles include: Australia (Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 
2009), Europe (Corbetta and Tomaselli, 1996; Huse, 1998; Ricart et al., 1999; Klein, 2000; Gubitta 
and Gianecchini, 2002; Van den Berghe and Carchon, 2002; Barontini and Caprio, 2005; Bennedsen 
et al., 2006; Voordeckers et al., 2007; Jara-Bertin et al., 2008; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008; Navarro 
and Ansón, 2009; Kowalewski, et al., 2010; Bettinelli, 2011), Ghana (Abor and Biekpe, 2007), 
Indonesia (Tabalujan, 2002), Japan (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010), Latin America (Brenes et al., 
2011), Lebanon (Fahed-Srieh, 2009), Malaysia (Amran and Ahmad, 2009) and Southeast Asia 
(Suehiro, 1993; Chang, 2003; Filatochev, et al., 2005; Peng and Jiang, 2010). 
As would be expected given the development of the world economy in recent decades, there is a 
particularly active literature about Asian family enterprise (Khan, 1999; Faccio et al., 2001; Yeh et al., 
2001; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Lee et al., 2008; Lee and Li, 2009; Shyu and Lee, 2009), with a focus 
on the cultural and economic characteristics of mainland and overseas Chinese family companies 
(Lawton, 1996; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2001; Filatotchev et al., 2005; Wu, 2006; Chen and Hsu, 
2009: Lansberg and Gersick, 2009) 
6. For example:  
• The National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) publishes white papers and booklet series 
on leadership and governance, addressing specific challenges facing boards and directors from both 
public corporations and private and family owned business.  
• The FFI Practitioner, an electronic journal edited by the Family Firm Institute, provides practical 
advice on governance practices and professional interventions, with a cross-disciplinary perspective 
(it is published in both English and Spanish). Articles in the Practitioner have covered such topics as 
compensation (Schneider, F.S and Schneider M, K., 2005), family member employment policies and 
procedures (Krasnow, 2005), innovation (Craig and Moores, 2009), wealth management (Greenberg, 
2006), and consulting challenges (Ginsburg and Saunders, 2011). 
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• The Family Office Exchange (FOX) Research Studies include numerous survey and data-based 
analyses of family office practices and wealth management activities of its member offices and, to 
some extent, of the broader population. While they have focused more on services than on 
governance, FOX Research Studies have addressed topics such as investment risk planning and 
management, wealth transfer, multi-family and family office sustainability and performance, selection 
and oversight of professional advisors, and development of successor generations.   
• In philanthropy, The Council on Foundations reports on governance and board composition in 
family foundations, and publishes case stories and common practice written by participants and 
professionals in family philanthropy (for example, Stone, 1993). Similarly, the Association of Small 
Foundations publishes The Essentials, a quarterly publication that includes practical articles on 
governance practices, grant-making processes, and the management of small foundations. The 
National Center for Family Philanthropy (NCFP) newsletter, Passages, often presents case examples, 
survey results, and references to research literature. The NCFP Pursuit of Excellence Project is a 
specific effort to gather and disseminate implementation data on governance and operations to a broad 
audience of family foundations, particularly those not large enough to hire consultants and engage in 
their own more elaborate research and benchmarking efforts. 
7. Researchers are happy to explain small percentages of the variance; clients expect a bit more. 
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Chapter 4: Governing Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
Abstract 
 
Building on two case studies and TPC Theory, this study explores the process through which two 
entrepreneurial families organize and govern their overall philanthropic activities. Both cases pursue 
their philanthropic goals via diverse vehicles in different systems. The study illustrates the different 
factors that can affect the configuration of the governance systems around the practice of 
philanthropy. The findings of the study offer important implications for theory and practice and lead 
the way for future research in the field of philanthropy in the family enterprise context. 
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Governing Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
The literature on family enterprise suggests that they are prevalent in economies worldwide 
and are important actors in the philanthropic sector (Breeze, 2009; Deniz-Deniz & Cabrera-Suarez, 
2005; File & Prince, 1995; Litz & Stewart, 2000). It has also been estimated that family businesses 
and business families account for close to 40% of all of the dollars donated to charitable organizations 
and charitable causes in different countries around the world (Breeze, 2009; Pharoah, 2008; US trust 
2013). The important role that family enterprises play in supporting economic and social challenges 
faced by society, and the positive outcomes that entrepreneurial families are experiencing because of 
their involvement in philanthropy have generated interest in this topic in the family enterprise field in 
recent years (Feliu & Botero, forthcoming; Hess et al., 2002). Most of the research on philanthropy in 
family firms has focused on family foundations as the primary vehicle to pursue the social interests of 
the family (Gersick, 2006; Lungeanu & Ward, 2012). The focus on foundations has narrowed the 
scope of the research and writing about the practice of philanthropy in family firms. An important 
characteristic of philanthropy in family enterprises is that it can be practiced using different types of 
vehicles (Feliu & Botero, forthcoming). For example, family members can choose to engage in 
philanthropy as separate individuals, as a family, through the company, or as a combination of any of 
these vehicles. Because of this, understanding how entrepreneurial families govern their philanthropic 
efforts can be challenging. 
In its most general form governance in family enterprises describes a set of structures and 
processes that are put in place to set strategic goals, maintain key relationships, safeguard the family, 
maintain accountability and achieve performance (Gersick & Feliu, 2014; Golbart & DiFuria, 2009; 
Uhlaner et al., 2007). In the context of family enterprises, research on governance has focused on the 
mechanisms used by the family and the business to determine formal structures, processes, policies 
and agreements that they should use to manage the relationship between the family and the business 
(Gersick, et al., 1997; Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Lansberg, 1999; Mustakallio et al., 2002). 
Governance is important because it can facilitate how entrepreneurial families achieve their 
philanthropic goals, and in the philanthropy domain in particular, governance is expected to support 
the unity among the owners and their commitment to the philanthropic project. Unfortunately, we 
   88 
 
know very little about how family enterprises and entrepreneurial families govern their overall 
philanthropic activities. To address this gap, the current study explores the different vehicles that 
entrepreneurial families use to practice philanthropy and the processes they follow to make decisions 
about governance to ensure that philanthropy meets the objectives of both the family and the business. 
This paper uses TPC Theory (Tichy, 1982; 1983) as the primary framework to explain how 
decisions about governance of philanthropy are made. TPC theory offers a theoretical lens to analyse 
the relationships among the motives and characteristics of the family and the business to determine 
what factors play a role when making decisions about governance in the philanthropic efforts of 
entrepreneurial families. Using a case study approach I argue that the “family philanthropic Dream” 
(i.e., the family’s motivation to engage in philanthropy), the philanthropic structures through which 
philanthropy is practiced, and the funding of these practices will affect which governance structures 
are used. The two cases presented illustrate different ways entrepreneurial families engage in 
philanthropy and the different factors that can affect the configuration of their governance systems 
around this practice. The families described were both facing a transition in governance and 
ownership of the firm at the time of the study. However, the cases vary in the generation of family 
that was in charge, the age of the firm, the country in which the enterprising family resided, and the 
industry of their primary business. I believe that the main contribution of this exploratory study is that 
it helps explain the different processes that two entrepreneurial families pursue to organize and govern 
their philanthropy when it is delivered across diverse organizational realms. It also reveals the impact 
of family and business dynamics on core decisions regarding the philanthropic effort. This approach 
can further our understanding of the philanthropic process in family enterprises and capture more 
effectively the diversity of mechanisms through which families impact the communities they serve. 
To achieve this goal, the article proceeds as follow. The first section provides a brief review 
of what is currently known about philanthropy in family enterprises. Second, the article summarizes 
the governance literature in family enterprises and presents the rationale for the connection between 
the “family philanthropic Dream”, the philanthropic vehicles, and the funding of philanthropy to 
determine the governance approach to philanthropy. Third, the methodology is presented. This is 
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followed by the description and analysis of two case studies. The article concludes with a summary of 
the main findings, contributions, implications for research and practice, and limitations of the project. 
Theoretical Framework and Research Questions Development 
Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
Philanthropy can be defined as “the voluntary donation of resources (i.e., time, money, effort, 
or knowledge) to support causes that are primarily intended to promote the betterment of society with 
no direct expectation of economic returns,” often by attacking an existing problem or seeking to 
address the needs of individuals or groups (Feliu & Botero, forthcoming). Philanthropy in family 
enterprises is distinctive because it has a dual nature: it can be practiced and governed from either the 
business or the family realm, or from both. Published literature has explored this topic either from the 
family or from the business system, with no studies integrating these two approaches.  
The Three-Circle Model is the dominant conceptual model for family business, first 
articulated by Tagiuri and Davis (1996) and elaborated into a three-dimensional developmental model 
by Gersick et al. (1997). The Three-Circle Model conceptualizes family enterprise as a Venn diagram 
of three subsystems -- the owners, the business (or other operating organization[s]), and the family -- 
each with its distinctive membership, agenda, and developmental processes. The Three-Circle Model 
offers clarification on the tasks and purposes of governance in reference to each of the key 
subsystems. The inclusion of philanthropic endeavours with the Family Firm system is an interesting 
challenge for the Three-Circle Model. First, philanthropy is an activity that can be led by each of the 
subsystems: the family, the firm, or ownership subsystem, and therefore carries potential governance 
tasks of each of the systems. It is likely that the configuration of the overall philanthropic project has 
different forms and functions for different families in different circumstances and contexts (as Carter 
& Ram, 2003 posits for entrepreneurial ventures). There is a gap in the literature regarding the 
application of the model to the non-operating aspects of the family enterprise (i.e. family office) or to 
the non-revenue-generating operations (i.e. family foundations, patronage projects, among other 
philanthropic ventures). For example, the definition of who are the “owners” is unresolved. The 
donors do not own the philanthropic vehicle, and particularly later generations may not even invest in 
it. For instance, in case the entrepreneurial family pursues philanthropy through a foundation, from 
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the moment of the initial gift, the funds are owned by the foundation and its board has the authority 
and responsibility over those assets. The entrepreneurial family becomes a stakeholder, and 
influencer, but not an owner. Although this research challenge is not directly relevant for this study, it 
is an important theme for future analysis. This lack of integration has lead to an incomplete 
understanding of philanthropy in the context of family firms. 
The recent review by Feliu and Botero indicates that most of the research on philanthropy in 
family firms has explored the motivations that family enterprises and entrepreneurial families have to 
engage in philanthropy. Although the primary goal may be the betterment of society, business 
families and family enterprises have secondary motives that also guide their involvement in 
philanthropy. These secondary motives can be grouped into three general categories. Family-oriented 
motives include factors such as the importance of family identity, legacy, and wealth benefits. 
Motives that are family oriented suggest that family enterprises engage in philanthropy because by 
doing so, the family can benefit in some way (Feliu & Botero, forthcoming). Business-oriented 
motives include the influence of strategic, political, and network factors on the practice of 
philanthropy. Feliu and Botero argue that in many cases family enterprises engage in philanthropy 
because it is part of their strategy, because it can help their political capital, or because others who are 
relevant in the industry have expectations for the business to engage in philanthropy. The third 
category represents dual-motives. From this perspective, family enterprises and business families 
engage in philanthropy because doing so helps the reputation of the family or the business, represents 
the moral characteristics of the business or the family, or because it can be a tool for learning inside 
the business or the family. Family enterprises use combinations of these motives when making 
decisions about philanthropy, in pursuit of the “family philanthropy Dream” (Gersick et al., 2004). 
The “Dream” is a concept defined by Levinson (1978) who argues that it represents a “vague 
sense of self-in-adult-world. It has the quality of a vision, an imagined possibility that generates 
excitement and vitality” (p. 91). The Dreams of individuals are the guiding light of their evolving 
lives and they are activated when a person is faced with critical choices. Within the area of 
philanthropy, the Dream informs an individual’s genuine interest in giving. At the family level, the 
viability of a group of relatives to engage in philanthropy together depends on the connection of 
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family members’ dreams, defining a collective family Dream for the family philanthropy (Gersick et 
al., 2004). The integration of the individual Dreams into a “shared Dream” help develop the collective 
vision of the future that inspires family members regarding what to do with their philanthropic 
endeavours. This shared Dream in a family structure comes from the “family’s fundamental values 
and aspirations” (Lansberg, 1999, 75-76). Additionally, it helps the family to explain why engaging in 
philanthropy is important to them. The “family philanthropy Dream” is the foundation of the mission 
of the philanthropic vehicles and projects that the family decides to pursue, as these are the places 
where the family aspirations regarding philanthropy can be lived out (Gersick et al, 2004). 
A second aspect that Feliu and Botero note is that family enterprises and entrepreneurial 
families can practice philanthropy at multiple levels and using multiple vehicles. They can practice 
philanthropy as individuals, as a family, as a company or as a combination of these. Although there 
are multiple vehicles that can be used, family firms and entrepreneurial families tend to be more 
unstructured and less formal in how they practice philanthropy (Breeze, 2009; US Trust, 2013). 
Research indicates that the degree of formality used in philanthropy depends on variables such the 
level of professionalization of the family enterprise, the number of family members involved in the 
philanthropy, previous experiences in the field, the access to professional advice, and the level of 
engagement of the business with external stakeholders (Breeze, 2009; US Trust, 2013). However, 
most of the literature focuses on foundations as a formal vehicle for philanthropy. This paper goes one 
step forward and aims to fill the gap by studying the integration of philanthropy in the firms discussed 
when this is pursued at different levels (i.e. holding company and business units) or in different areas 
(i.e. family and business). 
In the next section I introduce the concept of governance and what we currently know about 
the governance of philanthropy in family enterprises. 
The Governance of Philanthropy in Family Enterprises 
The focus of this study is the governance of the practice of philanthropy by entrepreneurial 
families independent of what subsystem (i.e., family, business, or ownership) is the primary driver of 
the family philanthropic Dream. Except from a few studies on family foundation governance (Gersick 
et al., 1990; Esposito, 2002; Angus, 2004; CEP, 2004, 2005; McCoy & Miree, 2010; Lungeanu & 
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Ward, 2012), the study of the governance of philanthropy in the context of business families is very 
limited. Snowdon-Blanchard (2008) suggests that although most families are “informal” in the 
governance structures and processes that they use in philanthropy, as a whole they are becoming more 
professionalized and more strategic in nature. 
In a recent review, Gersick and Feliu (2014) argue that in family enterprises each subsystem 
(i.e., family, business, and ownership) has a different governance structure that needs to work in 
coordination if the family enterprise is to succeed. As the family enterprises evolve so do their 
governance structures. Thus, governance in family enterprises is a complex process that involves 
decision-making and implementation of policies concerning the management of family concerns, 
business concerns and its ownership. 
In the context of philanthropy, research on governance has focused on family foundations as 
the primary vehicle to execute philanthropic endeavours (Feliu & Botero, forthcoming). Danco and 
Ward (1990) and Gersick el al. (1990) were the first to explore governance of foundations by focusing 
on the tasks of the board of directors. They argue that in a foundation the role of the board includes 
paying attention to fiduciary responsibilities of the foundation, ensuring compliance with the legal and 
tax regulations, ensuring stewardship of the founder’s vision, overseeing utilization and distribution of 
funds according to the foundation’s mission, providing advise to the foundation managers, and 
accountability and support in the planning of the succession and continuity of the family foundation. 
They suggest that in many cases board composition should include both family and non-family 
trustees appointed based on their qualifications. Other studies on the governance of foundations 
describe guidelines for compliant governance (McCoy & Miree, 2010) and best-practice 
recommendations pursued by professional advisors to foundations (Angus, 2004; CEP, 2004, 2005; 
Esposito, 2002; Gersick et al., 2004).  
Recently, Lungeanu and Ward (2012) presented a study on the effects of governance on the 
grant making strategy of a foundation. The authors analysed how the foundation’s board size and 
composition affect the decision-making and patterns of giving in independent family and non-family 
foundations. They conclude that the generation stage of the family and the level of family control of 
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the board influence grant making in family foundations. They also argue that diversification in grant 
making increases as the family includes new generations. 
On the whole, our knowledge about the governance of philanthropy in family enterprises is 
based on what we know about family foundations. But entrepreneurial families tend to pursue their 
philanthropic goals through diverse philanthropic vehicles in different systems as their pursue their 
entrepreneurial interests through diverse businesses (Michael-Tsabari et al., 2014). This study aims to 
explore this broader phenomenon, family philanthropy across delivery formats and the governance of 
the philanthropic activity all parts considered, and area mainly unexplored and at the leading edge of 
the practice.  
Theoretical Framework 
This paper uses Tichy’s TPC Theory (1982, 1983) to analyze the study cases because it 
provides insights into how family and ownership dynamics shape the governance of philanthropy. 
These dynamics, in turn, interact with the entrepreneurial pursuits of business families (Aldrich & 
Cliff, 2003). Our field has yet to grasp the full complexity of ways in which the dynamics of business 
families affect the structure and performance of the companies and philanthropic organizations they 
own and control (Zachary, 2011). Tichy looks at organizations as the interaction of three 
interdependent sub-systems: the technical, the political and the cultural systems1. He uses a rope 
metaphor to explain his theory (1983). He states that organizations are like loosely woven rope 
composed of technical, political, and cultural strands. While the strands can be dealt with individually, 
they are interdependent strength of the rope (that is, the sustainability of the organization) depends on 
the extent to which the activities associated with each strand are aligned with the others and pulling in 
the same direction. Moreover, Tichy’s key assertion is that effective organizational evolution (or 
managed change) must attend to the three strands. (Tichy, 1983b). 
1 It’s worth noting that Tichy’s conceptual formulation fits quite well with the Three-Circle Model 
advanced by Gersick et.al. (1997) for understanding family enterprises. The political system reflecting 
many of the dynamics associated with the exercise of influence in the ownership circle (the ultimate 
source of legitimized authority in family companies); the technical system reflecting the ways in 
which tasks and people organized in the performance driven systems of the business circle and, the 
cultural subsystem reflecting the many ways in which the values, norms and traditions of the family 
shape their organizations. 
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The political sub-system refers to the way in which power and authority are distributed in the 
organization and reflected in its various reward and resource allocation systems. The political sub-
system drives who gets to influence whom, and in what area. The dynamics of the political system 
reflect the needs and agendas of dominant groups in the system. Applied to the practice of 
philanthropy in entrepreneurial families, the political sub-system depicts who gets to define the 
mission and the vision of the family enterprise and how philanthropic priorities are defined and 
executed. The governance architecture and the distribution of power across functions, groups and 
roles are also a reflection of the political subsystem of the organization. The allocation of political 
power also drives such essential processes as the development and selection of successors and the 
timing and manner in which senior leaders depart. Most importantly, the funds that are ultimately 
allocated to philanthropy, the sources from where these funds are drawn as well as the strategic 
decision determining how they are spent are also an expression of how political influence is wheeled 
among the key players in the family enterprise. 
In some family enterprises philanthropy is viewed primarily as a family activity although, in 
fact, the ultimate decisions are made by the board of the enterprise or holding company because they 
control the distribution of funds necessary to sustain either the foundation or other philanthropic 
initiatives. Hence just looking at the foundation to explain how grant-making priorities are established 
would overlook the powerful influence that the business board may exert over the philanthropic 
choices that are made. Unlike the technical and cultural sub-systems, the political system operates in 
ways that are less formalized and manifest. In fact, many decisions that are ultimately determined by 
political factors are frequently justified retroactively in technical or cultural ways. For example, a 
family CEO looking to ingratiate himself with the local elites may push for a particular philanthropic 
initiative but justify it using the language and rationales that derive from the more explicit cultural or 
technical criteria used to describe the family’s foundation mission and methods. Organizations in 
general, including family firms, devote much time to the management of the political dynamics 
underlying the relationships among key stakeholders (Tichy, 1983). 
The technical system reflects the design of the organizational setting, how the technical 
resources (the tasks, technologies, organizational procedures, and also the resources available) that are 
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arranged to produce expected outcomes in the most efficient manner. In the case of philanthropy it 
would be the management of the philanthropic practices, including: the strategic plans that define 
fundamental priorities and tasks that derive from it, the management information and control systems 
that are used to track the way grant making is carried out, the methodologies such us the human 
resource systems for recruiting, developing, assessing and retaining employees; the processes used for 
designing job descriptions and task responsibilities and for fitting people to roles in the structure, and 
so forth. In short the organizational design of philanthropy that determines what managerial “best 
practices” are adopted and how efficiently and effectively these activities are carried out. Typically, 
the larger and more complex a family foundation is, the more emphasis is placed on the “production 
and bureaucratic” logic of its technical design. Once a family defines certain philanthropic objectives, 
then the system must organize itself in the way it feels would be most effective to attain those 
objectives. So while political agendas and the power dynamics among key stakeholders matter 
enormously, there are in fact better and worse ways for organizing the system to accomplish its 
philanthropic goals. If the technical elements of organizational design are totally subordinated to the 
politics of the system, philanthropic activities will not be sustainable. So while the technical elements 
in variably reflect the dynamics of the political system they also serve to constrain it in service of 
efficiency. For example if the selection process driving the choice of successor is oblivious to the 
technical requirements of the role and is allowed to be shaped purely by the power dynamics among 
the key players, the sustainability of the system is almost certainly compromised. Similarly, an 
extremely qualified successor is likely to fail if he or she does not have the support of the most 
powerful players in the system.  
The cultural system is what holds the organization together, its normative glue as expresses in 
its shared beliefs, traditions, values and norms. Culture provides meaning and the unique identity of 
the system by embodying a set of values that help to justify why certain behaviors are encouraged at 
the exclusion of others (Tichy, 1983). Culture, and the underlying values that define it, is especially 
important in family firms (Déniz-Déniz & Cabrera-Suárez, 2005; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; 
Lansberg, 1999; Dyer, 1988). Some cultures contribute to the success of the family enterprises, and 
others constitute a major stumbling block (Dyer, 1988). Culture plays an important role in the 
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decision-making process of family enterprises, and since the leaders mostly build and shape the 
cultural patterns of the family business, they must comprehend the effects of those cultures and take 
steps to warrant that they nurture the continuity of their enterprises and the well-being of their 
families. Values and in a broader sense, the family culture, have also been identified as motives – 
legacy, family identity and moral motives, for philanthropy (Feliu & Botero, forthcoming). As the 
political system, the cultural evolves informally and over time. 
As it pertains to philanthropy, Tichy’s theory informs about how the technical, political and 
cultural dynamics of the family enterprise, and the interplay among them, impacts the decisions 
concerning the practice of philanthropy and the processes that families pursue to make those 
decisions. Without an alignment of the mission of the philanthropy – “the family philanthropic 
Dream” defined by the dominant group – political sub-system, the vehicle or vehicles (and their 
organization) developed for managing the philanthropy – the technical sub-system, and the values and 
family culture in which decisions are based, the culture sub-system, the efficacy of the philanthropic 
endeavors can be jeopardized or the philanthropy can serve other motives beyond the “family 
philanthropic Dream”.  
This theory is also useful for analyzing how family and ownership dynamics impact business 
and ownership succession. According to Tichy, an effective organization is one in which there is good 
strategic alignment between the political, cultural, and technical systems of the organization. If 
change occurs these systems need to evolve simultaneously, otherwise effective change and evolution 
is undermined. In family enterprises generational transitions are the drivers of discontinuous change 
the effective management of which requires aligning the technical, the political and the cultural forces 
identified by Tichy. These transitions require a renegotiation of authority, power, responsibilities, 
roles, strategies and making adjustments to the culture of the family and its enterprises. Moreover, 
these changes don’t always happen simultaneously or at the same pace. In moments of uncertainty, 
like transitions and successions, a strategic look at the three systems is needed, so that the uncertainty 
can be reduced and the alignments between the systems figured out. 
The TPC theory highlights issues such as justice, equity, separation of powers, checks and 
balances, and the dynamics of decision-making that are key for understanding the complex 
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organizations such us family enterprises. Therefore, the case studies presented here will be analyzed 
through the lens of TPC theory, as it offers a framework for understanding the dilemmas that 
entrepreneurial families face when deciding on how to govern their philanthropy. 
Methodology 
This paper explores the governance of philanthropy within its real-life context and provides a 
vehicle to understand this phenomenon based on an in-depth multi-case approach. The benefit of a 
multi-case study is that it allows a certain replication of logic and observations between each case and 
provides the opportunity to compare insights and observations. This replication produces more precise 
and generalizable results compared to single case studies (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003). 
This project was developed while collaborating as a consultant with the two families to help 
them review their philanthropic efforts. The cases were selected because they illustrate the practice of 
philanthropy and decision-making in a naturally-occurring environment (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). The cases provide rich data in three ways. First, the two business families yield insights based 
on commonalities and differences emerging from comparison among them. Second, both cases 
exemplify the complexity of the practice of philanthropy in multigenerational business families that 
own holding companies through which they control a portfolio of operating companies. Both systems 
had formal and informal philanthropic practices in place, with at least one foundation. And, third, the 
two business-families were facing a transition in governance and ownership of the firm at the time of 
the study. 
It is important to note that these business families differed in the generation of family that was 
in charge, the age of the firm, the country in which the enterprising family resided and the industry of 
the original business that established the family’s wealth. Previous research indicates that these 
factors moderate the relationship between the motivations for philanthropy and how philanthropy is 
practiced in business families (Feliu & Botero, forthcoming). The names of the business families and 
some other information have been disguised for confidentiality reasons.  
Data Collection 
The data collection lasted approximately three months with each case, which allowed for 
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longitudinal observations and the opportunity to have several interviews with relevant actors from 
each family. Additionally, the author was able to follow up with these enterprising families a year 
after collecting the initial information. The data collection process was designed to capture the 
complexities of the cases, the interconnectedness of the philanthropic project with the family and the 
family enterprise, and also to bring into alignment the data, facts, records, and learning from each 
case. 
The sources of data for this study included three types of information. First, semi-structured 
interviews were used to collect data from family owners, family governors (i.e., family Board 
member), non owning family members who were not active in the business, and with non-family 
directors and relevant non-family executives from the enterprises and the foundations. The second 
source of data collection came from written documents. The final source of information was 
participation and observation in family council and family assembly meetings where philanthropy was 
the agenda. Obtaining information from different sources allowed for methodological triangulation of 
evidence and higher levels of confidence in the quality of data (Yin, 2003). 
Interviews were conducted individually with each participant. The average length for each 
interview was three hours. They were conducted in two parts. In the first part, open-ended questions 
were asked without telling the respondents about the particular phenomenon of interest in the study. 
This was done to avoid influencing their responses. During the first part, respondents had the 
opportunity to share their stories and views of how philanthropy started and evolved over time. 
During this phase of the interview, probing questions were posed to acquire details related to the 
stories. In the second part, structured questions were asked about the philanthropy practice, its 
governance process, its management, and the connection of philanthropy with other business family 
entities and their governance (e.g., Family Council, Holding Board, Owner’s Council, or Family 
Office). Appendix 2.1 (pp. 151) presents the interview guide. 
The written documents reviewed for this project included family council minutes, foundation 
board minutes, owners’ council minutes, annual data on the philanthropy budget, report on annual 
giving, the foundations’ annual report, and the foundations financial statements. Secondary written 
sources (i.e., newspapers, company press releases, company and foundations websites) were also 
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used. These written documents were reviewed to obtain background information about the family 
enterprise, the history of philanthropic projects, the history of family giving, the formalization of 
philanthropy practices, the funding procedures that the family followed, and the decision–making 
processes for philanthropic giving.  
Finally, the participation and direct observation of family council and family assembly 
meetings complemented the data gathered in the individual interviews. The researcher made 
observations of the business families’ approach to decision-making about their philanthropic projects 
and the integration of governance structures into their projects. This facilitated the analysis of data, 
enabling the researcher to understand each case thoroughly (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Although data for the two cases was collected in different years, the procedure followed to 
obtain the information was the same. The researcher first collected demographic information about 
the business family and the family business. This information is presented in table 3.1 (pp. 141). 
Following preliminary work, the interviews were conducted. The first interview was carried out with 
the contact person of each family. This person helped the researcher determine other relevant people 
within the family enterprise system to interview. Once the list of relevant others was determined, they 
were contacted and interviewed independently. 
Case Descriptions and Analysis 
Due to confidentiality, the names, locations and industries of the families have been changed, 
but the relevant data and information regarding the practices, governance structures and dynamics 
stay true to the reality. Table 3.1. (pp. 141) and Table 3.2.a. (pp. 142) for the first case, The Alfa 
Family, and Table 3.1 (pp. 141) and Table 3.2.b (pp. 144) for the second case, The Beta Family offer 
the demographic data and a summary of the relevant information regarding the research question that 
this study addresses, for clarity reasons as well as for facilitating the analysis and comparisons 
between cases. 
Case 1: The Alfa Family   
I interviewed 9 members from the Alfa Case. Six family members were interviewed, 
including the Chairman of the Family Council, the former CEO of the Alfa Holding Company, the 
Chairman of the Foundation, one family director, an in-law in this case, and two other family 
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members. The three non-family members included the Foundation CEO, one executive from the 
Foundation, and one independent director from the Holding Company. The Guide for the Interviews 
is in Appendix 2.1 (pp. 151). 
The Alfa Family is an interesting learning case as it has a long-term history as a 
multigenerational entrepreneurial family enterprise, one of the largest in Latin America. The case 
offers high overall complexity: sixth generation of the family as owners of a diversified and 
international family holding company with well-developed governance architecture. Along with the 
entrepreneurial business initiatives, the family has developed philanthropic endeavours in both the 
family and the business areas. The company is based in Chile. The family firm had just started to plan 
for the transition into the sixth generation when the interviews for the case study were done. The 
business was founded in 1904 by Rodrigo Alfa, in Valparaíso, at that time 53, and his two elder sons, 
Pablo, 23, and Jorge 20. Rodrigo had been a professor, politician and journalist before starting his 
own printing and publishing business. After his death his sons continued to run the business and 
expanded it into selling paper products and other office supplies and offset printing along with 
international operations. The family has deliberately maintained a low profile during Chile’s turbulent 
years. The family has placed a high premium on unity and educational achievement, resulting in many 
members of recent generations graduating from top-notch universities worldwide and securing 
positions with leading multinationals. At the heart of Alfa’s long-term success had been a vision, 
mission and set of values emphasizing both profitability and a deep commitment to enhancing social 
values in the communities in which they operate. The business is professionally governed and 
managed. “Doing things well” is the motto by which Alfa has become known throughout Chile. And 
“Alfa has to be reinvented every day…” is the rule that Pablo Alfa, former Alfa CEO lived by. 
Over the years, the governance of the Alfa Holding has evolved into a system composed by a 
nested hierarchy of boards -- the board of the holding company, and separate boards for each of the 
operating companies. A Nominating Committee leads the evaluation and selection of candidates to 
become board members, who are ultimately confirmed by the Shareholders Assembly. As part of the 
governance architecture, the family created in 1995 the “Alfa Family Protocol” with two broad 
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objectives. First, to preserve the integrity of the family business, increasing its equity while always 
respecting its stated values and principles. And second, to preserve family unity.  
For the Alfa family, the family, its philanthropy, and the business, with its own grant-making 
projects, are independent. They believe the philanthropy project, represented in their foundation, is 
the project that will endure over the years, keeping the family united and the family legacy alive. The 
Alfa Family thinks that the business will not have the same impact in terms of family identity and 
unity due to different reasons. One reason is that the family values translate into being more close to 
the philanthropic projects than to the business ones. Another reason is the dispersion of ownership 
among family members. The growing extended family cannot financially depend only on the business 
to financially support their lifestyles any more. A third reason is that there is a diminishing number of 
family members working in the business over generations. The Alfa family has been very successful 
in promoting education and professional development to the family, resulting in many family 
members pursuing their own professional dreams apart from the family business.  
The family has a Protocol that sets the guidelines for the family, the business and the 
foundation. The Protocol helps to distil the motivations that are the base of the family philanthropy:  
• Great commitment to the community.  “The owners of Alfa have always looked at the 
company as the most important economic asset, for the progress of the community 
and the family.” 
• The family moral and religious principles lived with gratefulness --“The family has 
donated a portion of the organization to The Alfa Foundation, and the foundation has 
made efficient social contributions in recognition of the blessings from God”  
•  The family core and shared values --“The family has a history of respecting its 
solidarity and harmony” and “The family will transmit to all generations a 
commitment to honor and preserve its legacy, values and Christian principles” 
These three themes are all bound together by a deep sense of respect and tradition that the family is 
committed to preserve. The family lives their values. As an example, the “social dividend” reflects 
family solidarity and harmony. The Alfa Family set an investmentment company that mirrors the 
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shareholder’s structure of the holding company to maintain and grow a pool of funds that could be 
used to pay dividends to shareholders when the company could not but also to ensure that all family 
members, regardless of ownership percentage, enjoy a minimum standard of living in the matter of 
housing, healthcare, education and other basic needs. Interviewees defined the “family philanthropic 
Dream” as “Giving back to the vulnerable community by supporting them and their individuals to 
develop so that they can prosper”. The Dream remains important in the 6th generation, as the “ shared 
Dream” is a reflection of the family values -- social responsibility, solidarity, self-improvement, 
personal development, integrity; respect, trust and modesty. They pursue this Dream mainly through 
the family foundation, but also through their direct giving activity. The foundation was created in 
1955 and the family define it as “an organization of social justice and Christian charity, and an 
expression of solidarity.” At that time, the family was enjoying a good life. The company performed 
well and had a prosperous future, but not the community. The family shared the idea that a certain 
amount of welfare-comfort was sufficient and aimed to return to society what the society has given 
them with the prosperity of the business. They decided to help the people in their communities. The 
family considered that the company had its own corporate social responsibility programs that focused 
on the company’s collaborators, so the focus of the foundation would be the responsibility towards the 
community. The foundation focuses on “vulnerable communities” carrying on four different programs 
on education and culture, family and social capital development, inclusive business and housing. A 
common theme in all the four programs is the development of individual leadership, entrepreneurship, 
and working capacities in community members.  
The family donated 40 per cent of the company’s shares to the foundation. The decision was 
unanimous among the second generation and the third generation. They also created with unanimous 
agreement the mandate of the foundation. The family was a pioneer in the trend to give back during 
the donors’ lifetimes and at young ages. The endowment is in the form of dividend-paying company 
shares, which means that the foundation would be sustainable if the company prospered, and is 
independent from the family’s financial annual decisions regarding profit distribution from the 
holding company. 
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Both the foundation and the business are acknowledged for being professionally and 
independently managed and governed. “The foundation acts as a business organization but with the 
difference that it has an impact and it works in the social sector”. The Foundation has an Advisory 
Committee of experts, to strengthen and complement the board. The foundation has also been 
forward-thinking in evaluating the impact of its four programs and it has created different alliances 
with local universities and international institutions to be in the loop of the best practices in the field. 
This expertise is the “asset of the foundation” and today they benchmark with other families who are 
entering into the philanthropy arena for the first time.  
The family and Family Council are responsible for making decisions regarding the mission 
and governance of the foundation. The method they use to decide on the family branch representatives 
is cooption in eternum. This is a method based on the vote of the current family director, who elects 
his/her successor. The family feels that this guarantees that the legacy and mandate of the foundation 
is respected over the years (“we look for the best stewards”). The same method is applied for the 
election of Family Council members. The Family Council elects the independent directors of the 
foundation, making sure they share their same vision and values. The family influences the 
philanthropy as governors, at the Family Council and the Board of the Foundation level, not as 
managers. 
As for the direct giving activity of the branches, each branch internally organizes to make the 
decisions on their giving. All the branches were informal in their giving and committed to different 
institutions that focused on causes related to the “family philanthropy Dream”. Finally, the businesses 
engaged in different grant-making activities, some are pursued in the holding and others are carried 
out in the operating businesses. Although there is no grant-making policy, there are some guidelines 
ascertained by the holding board. Besides the guidance, the holding board oversees the practice. 
Based on the guidelines established by the holding, the boards of the operating businesses and/or the 
CEOs (with some limits that can be different in each of the business units) decide on the grant-
making. The philanthropy in this case respects the philanthropic mission of the family – family 
philanthropy Dream, but adapts to the needs of the communities in which the businesses operate. In 
addition, there is the understanding that the company has its own corporate social responsibility 
   104 
 
programs that focus on the company’s collaborators, so the focus of the giving is the responsibility 
towards the community where they operate. 
Case 2: The Beta Family 
I interviewed 12 members from the Beta Case, 10 family members and two non-family ones. 
The family participants were 2 members from the 2nd generation, the Chairman of the Owner’s 
Council and Holding Company, and one Owner’s Council member, and 8 members from the 3rd 
generation. Third generation members had different roles in the family enterprise: the Chairman of the 
Family Council; the Secretary of the Owner’s Council; a director of the Board of the foundation, two 
Owner’s Council members that also hold positions as directors in boards of the businesses, and two 
family members not involved in governance at that moment, but interested and educated in field. As 
for the non-family members, one was the CEO of the family foundation and the other a director of the 
family foundation board. I used the same interview guide as in the Alfa Case (See Appendix 2.1 in 
page 151). 
The Beta Family is working on adapting the governance structures to a new strategy for the 
holding company and to complete the transition to the third generation in the governance of the family 
enterprise. This work has generated the need to rethink the philanthropy and its governance in the 
overall family enterprise, as some members of the third generation were becoming increasingly 
disengaged from the family philanthropy. As the Alfa case, the Beta family enterprise is an important 
actor in its industry (in this case, the food industry), and in its community. The Beta Family Enterprise 
was founded in 1937 by Giorgio and his wife Elena, and produces homemade pasta for 
commercialization in the region of Verona, Northern Italy. From a small business they fast grew to a 
significant producer in Italy and Europe. In 1958, three of Giorgio’s five children joined the business, 
expanding its strategy to new products, not juts traditional Italian food but complementary goods, and 
multiplying its international presence. The Beta Family Firm has always been acknowledged for its 
innovation in products but also in publicity and merchandizing. Giorgio had always been very 
involved in cultural initiatives in the region, in diverse expressions of his homeland culture, such as 
the arts -- including music, theater and literature. Giorgio was a hard worker, a visionary and a true 
entrepreneur, “he loved the creation of new ventures, he loved that part of the business, once the 
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project was created and developed, he passed it to others for their management and he turned his 
efforts into a new venture”, and he also was an innovator. The values instilled by Giorgio are reflected 
in the family and the business. These are commitment to the family roots, hard work, innovation, 
entrepreneurship, independence and courage. These values are embedded in all the initiatives the 
founder promoted, in the business and philanthropy arena, and are also present today. 
The Beta Company was admired for being one of the first Italian companies to introduce new 
managerial techniques, innovative marketing practices, and strategic approaches in their different 
businesses. The company diversified and internationalized. In 1962, the holding company was created 
and non-family executives were introduced in relevant positions. The Beta Holding is today the 
second largest Italian company in terms of international presence, with operations sizable market 
share in five continents. In 1971, at the age of 67, still young compared with his peers in the industry, 
Giorgio passed the baton to the three sons and one second generation in-law who were already 
working in the company with him. From then, he devoted himself to philanthropy.  
The second generation continued the professionalization of the governance of the group to 
today. The governance of the family enterprise is a multi-level governance structure. There is one 
board for each of the three business units and beyond them a holding board. The four members of the 
second generation previously involved in the business are now holding different governance positions 
in the board of the holding company and in the owner’s council. The holding board focuses on 
ownership issues such as the mission and vision of the holding, group strategy, portfolio management 
and main business indicators at the group level (i.e. risk, debt-maturity, liquidity and financial ratios, 
and ownership ratios, among others), and the business boards focused on the “business”.  
In 1990 the Family Council was created with participation of all five branches of the family 
and members from the second and the third generation. They also agreed on several policies to 
oversee the involvement of the third generation in the family firm, deciding that the current and next 
generations would not be involved in management of the firm, but would be involved in its 
governance. The family believes that the success of the business contributes to the well-being and 
unity of the family. Therefore, they decided that it was crucial that the governance of the business was 
efficient and effective. They needed the best family governors to participate in the governance of the 
   106 
 
group so they could attract the best independent directors at the holding and business boards. In 2006, 
the family initiated a process based on meritocracy criteria (and not branch representation) to select 
the third generation members that would participate in governance. This process resulted in 2008 in 
the election of three members from the third generation who participate in diverse governance 
committees at the business board level and are directors of the Beta Holding Board.  
Some family members were not comfortable with the decision on the Holding Board not 
having equal branch participation. The meritocracy criteria were not understood and accepted to the 
same extent by all branches. In response to the concerns of this group of family owners, the Beta 
Family established in 2010 the Owners’ Council. This is the main authority on ownership issues and 
concerns, and is composed of members from the second and third generation that represent all family 
branches. The interviewees agreed that the Owner’s Council enhanced ownership communications, 
trust, harmony, improving the efficiency of decisions at the shareholder’s level.  
As the company grew, the philanthropic endeavors of the family, and the budget devoted to it, 
also became more significant over the years, focusing on the culture of the Verona region. The 
“family philanthropy Dream” was defined by the interviewers as “the preservation and development 
of the cultural identity of our region while fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and excellence in 
our community by example of our own practice”. All interviewers agreed that this “Dream” was still 
the “founder’s dream” and that they weren’t sure all family members share it with the same intensity.  
Philanthropy was first pursued in the family system, through direct giving to institutions and 
projects related to Giorgio’s concerns and interests. The giving was substantial, and all decisions on 
giving were made by Giorgio and his wife. In 1973 the first generation created the Family 
Foundation, coinciding with Giorgio’s retirement from the business. With the Foundation the family 
initiated their own philanthropic initiative (i.e. scholarships, literature competitions, educational 
programs for schools, and editorial business, all under the same umbrella). Along with the Beta 
Family Foundation, the first generation continued supporting different cultural projects and 
institutions in the region. The philanthropy remained a first generation project mainly until the 
founder passed away in 1989. At that time the second generation took the lead in the philanthropy 
area. One of the two siblings not involved in the holding became the Chairman of the board of the 
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Foundation, and the other the representative of the family in relevant social and cultural projects that 
were part of the patronage activities of the family. The appointment of these two positions was a 
decision of the second generation. Since 1989, the foundation has been governed by the board, with 
very little involvement of the Family Council or the Holding Board. Every year the second generation 
ratifies the budget for the Foundation and for the rest of the patronage activities at the family level. 
The second generation does not have a formal process in place to do so.  
The second generation carries on the projects founded by their father, respecting the legacy, 
but with a little more professionalization. Rigor and professionalization were values of the founder 
that have been integrated in the management of the foundation. The Board of the Foundation was 
complemented with independent directors, and in 2005 the board appointed a new CEO. This CEO 
had a mandate to modernize the programs the foundation was offering. Also, the Family Council 
began to engage in some of the patronage activities supported by the family, and it began to regularly 
inform the extended family about the philanthropic activity. In 2010, along with establishing the 
Owner’s Council, the second generation decided to create a Third Generation Committee for the 
Foundation to get their insight. The three members of the committee where appointed by the second-
generation siblings with the lead of the Chairman of the Foundation without a formal process in place.  
At the business level, a business foundation was established in 1983 in one of the business 
units. After almost no activity, except for some grant-making, the business foundation started to gain 
importance in 2002 when the foundation developed its own programs focused on research in the food 
industry and education on healthy eating habits. The foundation has the name of the business unit and 
its governance was once defined by the holding board, who also set the guidelines for the governance, 
mission and funding of the foundation and the patronage activities at the business level. With the 
holding’s directions, the board of the business unit decides on the composition of the board of the 
foundation. One board member at the business level, one board member at the holding level, the CEO 
of the business and one independent director and an expert in the field focus of the foundation 
conformed the Board of the Foundation. The Board of the business oversees the management and 
grant-making of the foundation. Furthermore, the Beta Group supports patronage activities from the 
businesses. These initiatives are related to the businesses strategies and are decided and supervised by 
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both the CEOs of the Businesses and their boards, with certain limits for the CEOs and both following 
the Holding Board instructions. Finally, the Holding Board supports other social causes when the 
request arrives to the corporation. In this case, the application, which is not always formalized, is 
addressed by the board of the Holding, by the Chairman of the Holding Board, and/or by the Owner’s 
Council, depending on the institution that does the request, the area and the amount. There is no grant-
making policy for this process.  
At the time of the study, the family was entering into a succession process. The process was 
supported by external advisors and formulated under the principles and rigor and meritocracy. The 
scope of the succession process included the corporation and with it, both the holding and the 
business governance. But quickly the succession process expanded to include the philanthropy, 
integrating the third generation’s vision of philanthropy into the “family philanthropy Dream”. This 
highlighted the interconnection of the family and business philanthropy. As part of this process a 
Philanthropy Committee was created. The Committee included the Chairman of the Family Council, 
one member of the Owner’s Council, a family director from the Family Foundation, a Director from 
the board of the Business Foundation, and a director from the Holding Board. Their responsibilities 
include having complete understanding of the entrepreneurial family philanthropic activities, 
integrating the concerns and interest of family, family owners and businesses into the strategy for the 
philanthropy that respects the “family philanthropy Dream”, and aligning the philanthropic business 
and family initiatives with the philanthropic dream. The Philanthropy Committee is a delegate 
structure of the Owner’s Council, which decides on both the strategy and the funding to implement it. 
Analysis of Cases 
Following TPC as the theoretical framework for this study, I focused my observations on the 
interrelationship between the “family philanthropy Dream”, the funding, and the philanthropic 
vehicles with the governance structures and processes of the philanthropy. 
As observed in the cases, the philanthropic project for each family has different 
configurations and fulfills different functions (Carter & Ram, 2003). These arrangements can be 
related to the “family philanthropy Dream”. Depending on the social aspirations that the family aims 
to accomplish through their philanthropy, the activity will require a certain structure. In the case of the 
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Alfa Family, the philanthropy is centered in the family. There is a strong communion among family 
members from different branches and generations, about the purpose of the philanthropy, about the 
Dream, and the values that they aim to convey through the practice. To accomplish their goals it 
required a formal structure that allows for the preservation of their legacy and for a rigorous 
management of the activity. Both of these are accomplished through the decision to use the 
foundation as a vehicle to pursue the philanthropy. 
The foundation, as a formal organization permits a prearranged governance design, and 
predefined family participation. The use of a foundation enables the family to elect their foundation 
representatives, which strengthens and preserves the family culture and values. The foundation 
structure also facilitates professionalized and rigorous management as it provides the tools to 
implement good governance. Additionally, the shared philanthropic practices (i.e. family and business 
grant-making, family foundation, business foundation) foster the emotional ownership (EO)2 of the 
overall family enterprise project by the family (Björnberg & Nicholson, 2012). Similarly, the 
foundation structure enables the family to channel their philanthropic activities in a way that helps to 
have an impact in the community and its members.  
The Beta Family connects the family and the business over philanthropy, and is strategic in 
the sense that their “philanthropy Dream” outlines a desired outcome for the philanthropy. The Beta 
Family has a holistic vision for the philanthropy. Their aim is for their philanthropic effort to be 
productive and have an impact on the society first, but also on the family. The impact on the family 
should help foster family unity, cohesion, and connectedness. For the business, the philanthropic 
Dream should help enhance its visibility and reputation. The vehicles chosen for the entrepreneurial 
family to carry on its Dream are one business and one family foundation, and patronage in both 
realms. As the Alfa Family, the foundations support their aspirations to control the projects, focus and 
effectiveness in the philanthropic activities.  
2 Emotional Ownership refers to a phenomenon defined by Björnberg and Nicholson as a sense of 
ownership that is a matter of sentiment, associated with belongingness and attachment beyond the 
monetary significance of the ownership bond (with the Family Enterprise), in which the family has a 
central role (2012, 381). 
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In the Beta Family, the patronage helps the family complement their support of the causes 
included in the Dream, and it is sometimes driven to comply with the stakeholder’s expectations on 
the family regarding philanthropy. The final authority in philanthropy lies in the Owner’s Council, 
supported to accomplish its role by the Philanthropy Committee. This system approach to the 
governance of philanthropy facilitates a holistic perspective of the activity, an integrative vision, the 
alignment of philanthropy management and governance principles between family and business 
systems with the causes, and more productive impact of the funds devoted to the Dream. Furthermore, 
in both cases, the Dream incorporates the aspiration for social change and social performance.  
Based on my observations, the “family philanthropy Dream” informs the role of the family 
within the philanthropy projects. First, both cases show that the families aim to excel in their 
philanthropic efforts. Therefore, professionals and experts in the field manage these activities, and the 
role of the family is at the governance level. This also connects with the values that underline the 
Dream and the family enterprise culture enhancing “good work”, innovative management practices, 
rigor, and efficient organizations. Gersick and colleagues (2004) stated that one of the essential 
ingredients for family foundations to work is to have skilled and self-aware executive directors that 
can both lead the foundation’s internal work and navigate the family dynamics. The Alfa Foundation 
has these characteristics (i.e., a trusted CEO of the foundation with long tenure). The Beta Family 
Foundation also showed the importance of this characteristic when the second generation drove 
reforms in the foundation to strengthen its programs and to appoint a new CEO. Additionally, the 
family entrepreneurship culture was depicted in their practices, which shows the family as a driving 
force of behavior (Michael-Tsabari et al., 2014), as well as the shared family culture regarding the 
management and governance standards. These activities also show that the family drives the 
entrepreneurial activity, and that there is commitment from the founders and succeeding generations 
to the sustainability of philanthropic projects. 
Both families have a clear, agreed-upon, and communicated process for family involvement 
in governance. The Alfa Family uses a cooption in eternum method, and the Beta Family uses an 
external-led meritocracy process for the business system, and committee selection for the family 
system. It is worth noting that both families are aware of the importance of next generation 
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involvement in philanthropic governance and also of the selection process so that it enhances the next 
generation bonding as well as good governance. Björnberg and Nicholson (2012) in their study on EO 
identified trust as closely linked with EO and related to the practice of fair process for the integration 
of the next generation into governance. According to these authors, achieving a high standard of 
family governance along with a large involvement from the following generation, will increase the 
likelihood that the next generation will have a clear sense of belonging to the family business. 
Further observing the governance configuration and the family involvement in it, it is 
valuable to note that in both cases the governance includes independent and expert directors along 
with family directors. In the Alfa Family, the extended family is considered for both family and 
family philanthropy governance. While in the Beta Family, independent directors and family owners 
both belong to governance bodies in the philanthropy, ownership and business structures. This leads 
to my next observation, it being that funding is relevant and has important implications for the 
governance and the type of philanthropy that families pursue. The permanent endowment of the Alfa 
Family Foundation allows for a pure family orientation, for the family sovereignty of the project, and 
for an impact focused and long-term philanthropic effort. However, the Beta Family philanthropy is 
funded through the dividends of the holding company. Because of this, the owners have a dominant 
voice in the main decision body regarding this practice. Funding can also have an impact on the 
philanthropic vehicle chosen. If resources are not guaranteed in the long-term, families may decide in 
favor of a grant-making foundation not involved in developing its own projects (Gersick et al. 2004). 
As a consequence, the chances to achieve the desired impact are limited. 
The situation is very different in the Beta Case. The Beta Family has been fully committed to 
philanthropy since the establishment of the Family Foundation, even when the business went through 
challenging moments. The second generation has always agreed on the financial support of the 
philanthropic activities. This may change as the family enterprise system evolves and the third 
generation is alone in the governance of the family enterprise (Gersick et al. 1997). As Lansberg 
(1999) explained, the Dream may undergo subtle alterations and may have to be revisited to 
accommodate to the new situation, the shared experience and understanding of one another’s 
interests, and the attitudes of the siblings that may or may not be present in the third generation. Being 
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aware of the Dream and how it evolves becomes very relevant in philanthropy. Both families 
mentioned that there is an appropriate moment for a family to decide on entering into philanthropy 
together. For this to occur there must be a common spirit that can be very difficult to reach in later 
generations of a family, where diversity among family members increases. 
It is also noteworthy that both of the cases presented have implemented clear architectural 
governance designs with clear boundaries and responsibilities among the different structures and the 
different areas of the family enterprise. This allows the system to create synergies and to have 
autonomous and independent areas in the family, the business and the philanthropy to focus on.  
A final observation from my analysis is that the outcomes of philanthropy have an impact on 
the organization, the community receiving the gift, the family and the business. These effects may be 
desired or unanticipated outcomes. From a family firm system perspective, the following impacts 
should be noted. First, the impact that philanthropy has on reputation. The “good work,” as the Alfa 
family mentioned, is acknowledged and spread. Both families and their businesses benefit from the 
appreciation of the contributions of the foundation. Reputation and visibility are enhanced as well as 
the relationship with national and international stakeholders. Following the reputation theme, the fact 
that both foundations share the family name promotes rigor, ethical standards and good work within 
foundations activities. Both families consider their family name “ the most important asset” that they 
own. Thus, they will try to protect it through actions that are seen positively by others (Cennamo et 
al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014) Second, management and governance practices and expertise are 
transferred between the business and the philanthropic organizations. As Danco and Ward (1990) 
presented, this transfer may first be from the company to the foundation, due to the fact that in most 
cases, the foundation founders were businessmen. Third, philanthropic activities that involve family 
nurture family cohesion, stewardship, and a sense of belonging (Breeze, 2009; Schwass & Leif, 
2008). All of these factors play an important role in the non-economic value that families obtain from 
their relationship with the family enterprise (Cruz et al., 2014). 
The TCP framework holds that effective organizational change and evolution requires 
alignment among the technical, the political and the cultural components of an organization. Indeed 
the concept of the philanthropic Dream itself reflects all three elements of the framework and the 
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analysis of the cases from the perspective of TPC theory yields a number of interesting insights. For 
instance, the philanthropic aspirations of a family often reflect the values and traditions of the family, 
which are in turn rooted in its ethnicity and historical experience across generations. Similarly, 
adherence to certain elements of the philanthropy (like the original intent of the donor who funded the 
family’s foundation) is often used to justify the personal agendas of certain individuals in the family 
and find expression on the way influence is exerted. The “family philanthropy Dream” also underlies 
many of the design assumptions determining the technical elements of the way philanthropy is 
organized and practiced. For example, the Dream guides the degree to which family members are 
directly involved with philanthropy or whether they delegate many of the tasks involved to non-
family professionals. The Dream also frames the degree of organizational rigor that gets applied to the 
process of grant making and the tracking of a family foundation’s effectiveness in accomplishing the 
desired impact in target communities3. 
In the analysis of the Alfa Case, it is evident that the cultural and political dynamics affected 
the governance of the philanthropy by the selection of the cooption in eternum mechanism as the 
method for appointing family directors for the philanthropic project. It is also patent the impact of the 
political dynamics of the Beta Family on the governance design of its philanthropy. Based on 
observations from the case, in the second generation the governance configuration was a balance. All 
family branches had equal power. Each sibling from the second generation held a relevant position in 
the governance of the family firm various organizations. The analysis of the interviews showed that 
the rationale to decide on this precise governance arrangement aimed to balance the participation and 
influence among the siblings. As Lansberg (1990) notes, this is especially important in sibling’s 
partnerships and cousin’s consortiums. Politically, this choice was heavily influenced by the need to 
keep a balance of power among the branches of the family, more than by the pursuit of organizational 
efficiency or meritocracy. As Gersick and colleagues (1997) have observed, the fact that philanthropic 
organizations are more immune to the competitive forces of the markets, makes them inherently more 
3 An interesting illustration of this idea is the way in which the Gates foundation embodies the 
dedication of the founders to organizational rigor and the systematic tracking of the foundation’s 
objectives. In this case the Dream reflects Bill Gates’ conviction that the application of scientific 
management methods to philanthropy is integral to the very mission of the organization. (see 
interview with Bill Gates New York Times Magazine (Ross Sorkin, 2014) 
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malleable organizationally than operating business. Compromising on efficiency and meritocracy for 
the sake of balancing political influences across branches of the family brought a more sustainable 
alignment to the Beta family’s philanthropic efforts while preserving the underlying cultural values 
integral to the family’s philanthropy Dream –in keeping with Tichy’s TCP formulation (Tichy, 1982, 
1983). Interestingly, at that time, the decision was justified by the second generation as essential for 
promoting family harmony and well-being. Hence the Foundation’s technical system (the composition 
of its board, the selection, prioritizing and tracking of grant initiatives as well as the choice not to hire 
professional managers but to instead encourage family member to perform most administrative task) 
evolved into a much more familial organization which stood in sharp contrast to the family’s 
operating business, were efficiency, meritocracy, organizational rigor and performance were deeply 
embraced. 
Over the last ten years, the Beta family’s business has grown significantly as has their 
Foundation. With the rise and engagement of the third generation, all of whom have been brought up 
to embrace professionalism and merit, the original alignment among the political, technical and 
cultural forces in the system has begun to change increasing the levels of stress and conflict. As the 
third generation cousins have come of age, they have risen to positions of increasing authority and 
influence in the governance of the business and of the Foundation. The gradual retirement of the 
siblings has now led to a majority of cousins on the board of the company. In addition, the distribution 
of cousins with topnotch educations and a track records of professional excellence is not evenly 
spread among the branches. The technical compromises that the second generation was willing to 
make to the sake of harmonizing the political and cultural forces in the family seem increasingly 
problematic for to the cousins (particularly to those with more meritorious backgrounds). Eager to 
embrace more rigorous organizational systems in the foundation the cousins appear much more 
willing to compromise the egalitarian ethos of the second generation in an effort to enhance the 
performance of the Foundation. As the transition unfolds, the Beta cousins have engaged in 
renegotiating the balance of power across generations and among the branches as it pertains to the 
governance of Foundation. Naturally, the process is still evolving and whether the second (and some 
of the third) generation will accept a more professionally governed foundation in which there might 
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not be representation of all the original branches is still to be seen. It is evident, however, that the 
political the technical and the cultural forces that had been in equilibrium in the past are misaligning 
as the transition unfolds.  
While the family was much more willing to adapt to the requirements of the technical system 
in the business, in the philanthropic realm the change has induced more tension. Gordon and 
Nicholson (2008) suggested that where there is emotional attachment, there is a greater chance for 
struggles in the control among family branches and between potential successors. In this case, the 
second generation Chairman of the Foundation wanted to decide on the succession in the foundation 
on his own, without the participation of either the Owner’s Council (dominated by third generation 
cousins) nor his siblings, and without considering any formal process that implied meritocracy. This 
member was attempting to compensate the decrease in the involvement of his branch in the 
governance of the business with opportunities in the foundation. As the observation shows, although 
the technical and cultural systems were aligned, the political one was not, causing uncertainty and a 
delay in the succession in the board of the foundation until the family could manage the political 
dynamics of the system and the dilemma between meritocracy and branch participation could be 
addressed. 
In contrast, the Alfa family established a much more clear differentiation of the Foundation 
from the enterprise from the start. The family’s objective was to establish a lasting institution and 
hence applying organizational rigor was viewed as imperative. With the family’s blessing, the 
Foundation was quick to hire top-notch professionals and to define a clear and engaging mission and 
adopt advanced organizational practices. The cultural and political elements were managed through 
the composition of the Foundation’s board. Given the strong Roman Catholic roots, the family invited 
the archbishop of the city to join the board, included a number of senior family members who were 
carefully selected because of their commitment to the family’s values and philanthropy Dream.  
The emphasis on technical excellence has paid off and the Alfa family’s Foundation is widely 
recognized as one of the most effective philanthropic organizations in Latin America. It has also 
contributed to enhancing the goodwill of the family in the community. So much so, that at the height 
of the political turmoil in Chile one of the Alfa cousins was kidnaped and promptly returned 
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unharmed in great measure because the local community spontaneously took to protest on the streets 
demanding that the cousin be handed back. Indeed, the Alfa’s are one of the few prominent Chilean 
families who drove around with out bodyguards and bulletproofed cars at the height of the social 
unrest in the late 70’s and early 80’s. In their case, the technical excellence serves to reinforce the 
cultural and political components of the system. 
The recognition and stature that the family derives through its philanthropy fosters a notable 
sense of pride and enhances the Alfas commitment to their enterprise, their Foundation and each 
other. Cousins interested in participating on the Foundation’s board are carefully vetted on their 
professional accomplishments and, especially, on the their commitment to stewardship. In this case 
the cultural and political elements are subordinated to the constraints dictated by the pursuit of 
technical excellence. The cultural norms in the family have evolved to discourage anyone with lesser 
credential from applying to the board of the Foundation. Similarly, cousins serving on the board, 
serve along side dignitaries and top ranking professionals from Chilean society. Even those who are 
most ambitious, must tamper their influence for the sake of the institution.  
As of late, an interesting new dilemma has emerged. The Alfa’s operating company’s 
performance has been seriously affected by the Chilean recession and dividends available to the 
Foundation have fallen. So far the Foundation has been able to tap its savings to close the shortfall 
and programs have been unaffected. Rather than cutting back philanthropic programs and risking a 
potential loss of face vis-à-vis the community, the political forces in the family have begun to gather 
and many Alfa cousins are insisting that the turnaround of the company be expedited. This in turn has 
increased the political will in the family to tackle challenges in the business. For example, for the first 
time in its history the Alfa Company Board selected a non-family CEO. As an early step, the Board 
encouraged the new CEO to carefully review the performance of the senior management team and to 
ensure he had the team necessary for implementing the strategic chances necessary to improve 
performance. Following the review, several Alfa cousins in senior management were put on notice –
something the prior family CEO had been very reluctant to do.  
Both of these cases heighten the importance of organizational interdependence across the 
philanthropic and the for-profit activities of enterprising families.  Neither the organizational behavior 
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of family foundations nor of family businesses can be fully understood in isolation. The traditions, 
values and political dynamics of the owning family, the configuration of governance (how direction, 
accountability and control are set) as well as the architecture of the portfolio of activities that make up 
the sum-total of a complex family enterprise system are interdependent and multi-causal. The TCP 
framework helps us unravel how the sub-systems interact with the whole. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study represents an important milestone for enterprising families who are thinking about 
their engagement in philanthropy, by taking into account an integrative approach that considers both 
the family and the business system. The case studies offer interesting and novel insights about the 
interrelation of the political, technical and cultural systems with the governance configuration of the 
philanthropic practices in entrepreneurial families. The cases also highlight the impact of funding on 
the philanthropic activity of entrepreneurial families and on its governance.  
The purpose of this paper was to further understand the decision-making process regarding 
the governance of philanthropy by the in-depth study of two different entrepreneurial families. The 
case studies show that entrepreneurial families engage in philanthropy through a diversity of vehicles 
in both the family and the business. The cases suggest that there is not a single way in which 
entrepreneurial families approach philanthropy. There are families like the Alfa, that engage in 
philanthropy at different levels and in different systems -- family and business, with no organizational 
or governance connection between the two. From a system perspective, this can imply different 
philanthropic missions in the family arena and in the business arena, with the family more focused on 
family-oriented motives and the business on business and dual motives (Feliu& Botero, forthcoming). 
Other families take a holistic approach to philanthropy and develop philanthropic initiatives in both 
the family and the business system under an overall “Philanthropy Dream”, which includes family 
and dual motives (Feliu& Botero, forthcoming). In this case, the governance of philanthropy is multi-
layered, with a board-of-boards deciding on the strategy of philanthropy and the governance 
principles that will guide the overall practices, and a second layer of governance for each of the 
philanthropic vehicle. This second-layer body oversees the development of the strategy, set 
operational goals, and oversees the management and operations of the organization that does the 
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philanthropy (i.e. family foundation, a business foundation, a patronage committee, a social business) 
while enhancing accountability and assessing the social performance.  
Second, the study aimed to shed light on how decisions about governance of philanthropy are 
made by entrepreneurial family enterprises. The analysis of the cases illustrates that these families 
govern and make decisions regarding philanthropy mainly in formal and professionalized structures 
with family involvement complemented with independent experts in the field, in particular in the 
foundations. As far as grant-making in the family arena is concerned, although informal procedures 
are more prevalent, both cases studied, point out that families are currently working on redefining 
these processes in order to institutionalize them. The study also shows that entrepreneurial families 
are innovative in their management procedures in the foundations, with the aim of having a larger and 
measurable social impact. 
The analysis of the cases shows that as the literature in family enterprise illustrates, 
foundations are still a relevant vehicle for families who want to formalize their giving in both the 
family and the business systems. In the Beta case the Family has also institutionalized the patronage 
activity and created a governance system for the overall family philanthropy: The Philanthropy 
Committee. This philanthropy committee is a delegate body of the Owner’s Council and is 
responsible for overseeing the philanthropy of the overall family and business systems. On the other 
hand, the Alpha case shows that some families decide not to integrate the philanthropy of the overall 
family business system and therefore establish independent governance bodies for the family 
philanthropy and for the business philanthropy.  
This study contributes to the exiting work on philanthropy and on family foundations (Danco 
& Ward, 1990; Gersick et al., 1990; Lungeanu, R & Ward, J.L., 2012) with an integrated approach to 
the governance of the overall philanthropic activities pursued by the entrepreneurial family. 
An important theoretical contribution of the study is the use of TPC theory in the context of 
Family Firms. TPC suggests that for organizations to be effective in pursuing their strategic goals and 
changes, the cultural, political and technical systems have to be aligned. When applied in the context 
of philanthropy in family firms, this theory is useful to understand multi-generational and complex 
entrepreneurial family firms with diverse business and philanthropy activities in place. Throughout 
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the cases presented, TPC theory provides insights in how the political or cultural systems can hinder 
the changes in governance and management required in transitions. In this regard, the Beta Case 
shows that when the alignment is missing among the systems (in this case, the political one) it causes 
uncertainty and a delay in the succession in the board of the foundation. As for the Alfa Family, the 
three systems are lined up, with the technical excellence reinforcing the cultural and political 
components of the system. As such, this study contributes to the family business literature by offering 
TPC as a framework that can also be applied to other family firm endeavors.  
The observations of the study could also be useful in discussing in greater depth issues 
relating to the role of the Dream when a complex multi-generational family involves itself in 
philanthropy for the first time. More specifically, the cases suggest that time is important, and the 
convergence in values, aspirations and vision for the future in the philanthropy arena to try to reach 
agreement on a shared “family philanthropy Dream” becomes more challenging as generations pass. 
The cases also indicates that philanthropic families must perform a carefully balancing act: engage the 
personal interest and aspirations into a shared Dream, while working together as a family, so that 
increasing family complexity over generations does not affect the performance of philanthropic 
endeavors (Gimeno et al., 2006). Family dynamics, as shown in the Beta Case, can affect the 
philanthropy, even if families strike to become more strategic, professional or more business-like in 
their practice. 
Another important insight from the study is that professionalization is a key element for 
complex and multi-generational entrepreneurial families. The cases show that those vested with 
ultimate decision-making authority are not the same people who hold the substantive knowledge 
necessary to make good judgments about social needs and how to meet them. As a result the families 
in these cases invest in professional and expert management. A learning from this insight is that 
families have to be aware of the need to complement family talent with external talent to meet the 
philanthropic goals. 
A final conclusion of the study is the concern that entrepreneurial families show regarding 
impact and performance measures. As the cases illustrate, performance in philanthropy has not been 
monitored enough like in business, and multi-generational entrepreneurial families are beginning to 
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develop, and populate, their governance structures so that they can meet set strategies based on value 
creation and focused activities, all expressed in clear goals against which performance can be 
measured. The cases also illustrate that the philanthropic vehicles develop tools and techniques but 
also borrow them from the family business to carry on their philanthropic endeavor in a 
professionalized and accountable way. These findings suggest that if the field develops in this 
direction it will probably encourage more entrepreneurial families to support social goals, as they will 
see them using their assets in an effective and efficient initiative, as they do with their businesses. 
Implications for Practice 
The practical implications of this study are twofold. First, it provides a lens (i.e., TPC Theory) 
for family business and philanthropy practitioners to understand the dynamics in the family enterprise 
that are relevant during transitions and changes in governance configurations. This article applied this 
framework to philanthropy, but this framework can also be applied to dilemmas faced in other family 
firms’ systems or contexts. When there is resistance to change, it is important to have instruments that 
help practitioners identify subtle forces like political dynamics that can jeopardizes the change 
process (Tichy, 1982). 
Second, as family enterprises are increasingly engaging in philanthropic efforts, this study 
provides better understanding of how to build a governance system that supports the different 
philanthropic initiatives in line with the particular characteristics of these organizations. As shown in 
the analysis of the Beta case, the family decided on the governance structure that better 
accommodated the philanthropic goals, while navigating the family political dynamics that came into 
play. The family had to postpone changes in the governance of the foundation due to the transition 
process from the second generation to the third to address some family tensions around the principles 
and process that guided the involvement of third generation members in governance. This informs the 
need of governance structures to have the real, and legal, authority and power to make the decisions 
they are supposed and designed to make.  
Limitations and Future Research 
As with all research, this study has some limitations and provides opportunities for future 
research. First, this is a descriptive study in nature. The aim of this project was to further our 
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understanding of the governance of philanthropy, and to provide insights for future research. The 
selection of the cases can be a limitation because these organizations already had organized their 
philanthropic participation and do not provide insights into how families can start to develop their 
governance structure. The sample chose while being convenient in nature, may not provide all of the 
characteristics that a random selection of cases could offer. With this in mind, it would be useful if 
future research could explore different samples of entrepreneurial families to better understand how 
they govern their philanthropic activity. 
The use of case studies is also limiting with regards to the generalizability of the results. 
Giving the descriptive nature of the case study approach, the purpose was not to generalize, but to 
understand and describe what entrepreneurial families do in their philanthropic endeavors. With this 
in mind, future research could use other methodological approaches to find out information about the 
governance of philanthropy by entrepreneurial families. These approaches could include surveys or 
the analysis of archival data. These other forms could aide in the generalization of results to a broader 
sample. 
Likewise, the TPC theory framework applied offers only one lens through which to examine 
how entrepreneurial families make decisions about philanthropy. Qualitative data from case studies 
can often be explained from different perspectives and the use of other theoretical frames to examine 
the same or similar data would offer more theoretical insights. One of the theoretical lenses that could 
be applied in this context is Institutional Theory. There is an increasing institutionalization of the 
family enterprise (Melin & Nordqvist, 2007). Parada and colleagues’ study on the effects of 
institutionalization processes on the governance of family enterprises noted that there is an 
institutional-driven change process of governance practices and values led by family business 
professional associations. (Parada et al., 2010); thus, future studies may delve into the role of societal 
pressures, originated by professional associations and other benchmarking initiatives, on the practice 
and governance of philanthropy by family enterprises. 
Another limitation is that although the study includes entrepreneurial families from two 
different national cultures, there was not enough information to conduct a cross-cultural analysis of 
philanthropic behavior. Feliu & Botero (forthcoming) suggest that country can be a moderator 
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variable for how motives influence the vehicle of choice for the practice of philanthropy. Although 
the legal and tax regulations regarding foundations and other social initiatives can motivate and 
influence the philanthropic endeavors in entrepreneurial families, neither of the two case studies 
indicated that tax advantages or legal issues motivated them to engage in philanthropy. Thus, future 
research should continue to explore whether there are cross-cultural differences in the motivation for 
entrepreneurial families to engage in philanthropy and in the way they choose to practice their 
philanthropy. 
Unlike previous studies in philanthropy (e.g. Campopiano et al, 2014; Danco & Ward, 1990; 
Gersick et al, 1990; Lungeanu & Ward, 2012) this research is focused on entrepreneurial families and 
their firms. Therefore, it is possible that themes illustrated by the cases can only be attributed to this 
particular type of family enterprise, with diverse business units and various philanthropic endeavors. 
Based on this, future research should continue to expand to other types of entrepreneurial families and 
explore how they engage in the practice of philanthropy. Likewise, it would be interesting to study the 
relationship between this practice and entrepreneurial orientation (EO), defined as the attitudes and 
mind-sets of families to engage in entrepreneurial activity (Zellweger et al., 2012). In particular to 
delve into the role of philanthropy in nurturing EO, if there is any, and also to explore the impact of 
EO in philanthropy engagement and in the way this is practiced. 
Other interesting areas for future research include understanding the application of the Three-
Circle Model to family philanthropic ventures. Similarly, national differences, such as in culture, laws 
in relation to philanthropy vehicles such us foundations, and generational wealth transmission or 
patronage, would add value to the field and enable further understanding of how these variables 
impact the “family philanthropy Dream”. Another interesting topic for future research is how to foster 
respect for the governance structures in the family and family owners. Respect has been highlighted in 
these cases as a family value that supports the whole architecture and enhances the efficiency of the 
whole entrepreneurial family Enterprise. It would be interesting to study whether the education and 
development of family and family owners affects the existence of respect and /or the efficiency of 
competence of the governance of the family enterprise as a whole. As Lansberg and Gersick (2015) 
suggest, ownership education for the understanding of the governance system is fundamental to 
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respect it and participate in it. Finally, we should note that the family system, the business system, and 
the philanthropic efforts endure and change over time regarding their interdependence. This results in 
a complex configuration of the family enterprise system over time; therefore future research must 
consider how the family system and all its dynamics affect the philanthropic activity.  
Conclusion 
In closing, I hope this study encourages further work at the crossroads of entrepreneurial 
family, philanthropy and governance, and encourages new research ideas using empirical methods 
that can further asses the insights provided by the cases presented. 
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Chapter 5: Concluding Chapter 
General Discussion 
This dissertation started out with two broad research questions:  
• What is the role of philanthropy in family enterprise?  
• How do entrepreneurial families and family enterprises practice and govern their 
philanthropic efforts?  
To help answer these questions, the study offers an up-to-date analysis of philanthropy in the context of 
family enterprises. It also contributes with a comprehensive exploration of family enterprise governance. 
A complete perspective of both areas was required before presenting the third part, a study of the 
governance of philanthropy by entrepreneurial families through a descriptive case study methodology and 
using TPC Theory as a framework. The TPC Theory is applied as overarching theoretical lens in the 
analysis of the cases and it provides insights to further comprehend the impact of family and ownership 
dynamics in the governance of philanthropy in family enterprises.  
In summary, findings from this dissertation suggest that, first, entrepreneurial families are the 
drivers of significant philanthropic behavior. Second, that entrepreneurial families are heterogeneous in 
their engagement in philanthropy, and therefore, in the vehicles they use and the governance they put in 
place to oversees and make decisions regarding these efforts. And third, that family dynamics affect the 
governance configuration of their philanthropic practice. 
This dissertation contributes to the existing family enterprise philanthropy literature in several 
ways (e.g. Danco & Ward, 1990; Gersick et al, 1990; Lungeanu & Ward, 2012). First, it presents a 
holistic approach to the governance of the overall philanthropic activities pursued by entrepreneurial 
families that goes beyond the traditional focus on foundations. Furthermore, it contributes to the existing 
entrepreneurial literature on family business (e.g. Michael-Tsabary et al., 2014; Rosenblatt, et al., 1985; 
Zellweger et al., 2012) by studying the entrepreneurial behavior of family firms in relation to the 
philanthropy arena. Previous studies in this area have focused on the firm as the unit of analysis and on 
the business as the entrepreneurial pursuit. In addition, the study increases the awareness that there is not 
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necessarily just one vehicle to express the family Philanthropic Dream. Recognizing the various 
philanthropic initiatives at different levels of the firm that can be the result of entrepreneurial family 
philanthropic interests require further conceptualization and investigation.  
Adding the family’s perspective has revealed the critical role played by the family system in the 
configuration and evolution of family enterprise philanthropy and its governance over time. By showing 
that the philanthropic activity is often driven by the family, this dissertation emphasizes the need to 
include the family system in the study of family firm philanthropy, and also that the analysis of the 
evolution of philanthropy and its governance configuration over time has to be conducted at the family 
level. Therefore, adding the family’s perspective on philanthropic behavior over time not only better 
describes reality but also enriches the understanding of the family firm’s complexity (Litz & Stewart, 
2000). 
From a practical perspective, the findings suggest that there is a case for proactive involvement 
from both younger and older generations in philanthropy. This research suggests that entrepreneurial 
families need to look to two primary areas principally if they are to engage in philanthropy: the chances of 
having impact with the practice and the governance of the overall philanthropic projects. Both cases 
studied illustrate that that impact matters, and it is a relevant part of the “family philanthropy Dream”. 
From a governance perspective, the study suggest that entrepreneurial families want decision-making 
structures that are inclusive, complemented with external talent, and built with clear processes to 
participate. Therefore, taking the step of creating a robust family governance system is a good investment 
for any family business that aims to engage in philanthropy, particularly those families who want to 
involve the next generation. 
General Limitations 
As with every research, it is important to discuss the limitations of this dissertation in order to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the contributions. Below I highlight the theoretical and 
methodological considerations. 
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Theoretical Considerations: TPC theory is newly applied in the family business domain, and, 
although it offers several benefits in the analysis of the influence of family dynamics in philanthropic 
behavior and its governance in entrepreneurial families, it also poses important challenges. First, the 
cultural and especially the political systems of family-driven organizations are not always clear-cut. 
Furthermore, the three systems, technical, political and cultural, are evolving over time and sometimes 
informally (in particular the cultural and political ones) (Tichy, 1982). Therefore it is challenging to grasp 
the complexity of the interplay between family dynamics and the practice and governance of philanthropy 
through a case study methodology when those dynamics are not always clearly and explicitly outline. The 
case study approach cannot completely describe the full scope of complexity of a growing entrepreneurial 
family and the effects of their evolving dynamics over time.  
Methodological Considerations: Further research effort is warranted to examine a broader set of 
observations or national contexts, and apply other methodological approaches that allow for 
generalization of results to a broader sample. This dissertation is a relevant first step to the phenomenon, 
giving the descriptive nature of the case study approach applied.   
Avenues for Future Research 
The observations in the case studies and the theoretical considerations of the three academic 
papers offer suggestions and new perspective on family enterprises. There might be several interesting 
avenues for future research in regard to the role of philanthropy in family enterprises and the governance 
of these efforts. I would like to highlight four of these opportunities that seem especially relevant for both 
academic and practical purposes. 
First, this dissertation mentions but could not delve deeply into the role of ownership as a 
separate system from the family regarding philanthropy. The literature on philanthropy in family 
enterprises is approached from two of the Three-Circle perspectives, the family and business/businesses. 
But while in the first generation, there is typically an overlap of family and ownership, this overlap 
diminishes in succeeding generations (Gersick et al, 1997). The inclusion of philanthropic efforts with the 
family’s operating businesses challenges the Three-Circle Mode. The analysis of the cases highlights 
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blurred lines between family and ownership when considering philanthropy in the context of family 
enterprise. As pointed out in the fourth chapter, the analysis of the Beta Case shows that although family 
is a driving force for philanthropy it turns out to be only an influencer and not the “owner” of the activity. 
Furthermore, even if the family owners invest in the activity and fund it, the conceptualization of them as 
“owners” is not accurate and it leads to disorientation when studying the decision-making and power 
dynamics in these systems. Thus, this is a relevant theme for future analysis.  
Second, two constructs studied in the literature, family entrepreneurial orientation (FEO), defined 
as the attitudes and mind- sets of families to engage in entrepreneurial activity (Zellweger et al., 2012), 
and Emotional Ownership, as the “sense of ownership that is a matter of sentiment, associated with 
belongingness and attachment beyond the monetary significance of the ownership bond” (Björnberg & 
Nicholson, 2012, p.381), emerged in the analysis of the cases. Future research opportunities may study 
the interplay between FEO and the philanthropic behavior of entrepreneurial families, and the one 
between philanthropy engagement and EO in the context of family enterprises.  
Third, some literature in the Family Business field points out the particular role that women can 
play in the family business system. In 1998, Nelton wrote about the need to study whether the rise of 
women in family business could affect its practices and processes such as governance, leadership and 
succession. However, in the literature revised for the literature review paper (Second Chapter of the 
dissertation) we didn’t find a single study that addresses this concern within the philanthropy practice by 
family enterprises. Therefore, this opens an opportunity for future research in this field. Several questions 
arise when thinking about women participation in philanthropy. For instance, do women show different 
giving patterns than men? Do family enterprise philanthropy in women-run family business differ from 
such ventures in family firms run by men? Are foundations an opportunity for women that are excluded 
from meaningful executives roles in the business? (Gersick et al.,1990). 
Fourth, the cases analyzed presented two entrepreneurial families who believed that responsible 
and professional practices in both their philanthropic endeavors and their businesses could affect social 
change and improve the quality of life of their communities. Both families had the resources – time, 
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talent, and treasure -- to invest in philanthropy. Further research efforts may examine a broader set of 
cases to see if the themes highlighted in this dissertation remain in force in other entrepreneurial families 
in different cultural contexts. Also, future studies could apply other methodological approaches that allow 
for generalization of results to a broader sample. Further understanding of how both researchers and 
practitioners can support these families in their social practice is socially relevant in today’s world where 
family firms are ubiquitous and account for a substantial share of economic activity in most countries 
(Aldrich & Cliff, 2003) and where there are many social needs uncovered.  
Conclusions 
Entrepreneurial family enterprises were the research context chosen to study the philanthropic 
efforts of family firms and their governance configuration, due to their complexity that allowed for a 
holistic study of the phenomenon. The findings of this dissertation suggest that entrepreneurial families 
may be important actors in the philanthropy sector as they have the drivers – The Family Philanthropy 
Dream, the culture, the resources and the knowledge -- needed to engage in the practice of philanthropy in 
a focused, strategic, professionalized and productive way. Furthermore, the cases analysis offers insights 
in the important role of family dynamics when entrepreneurial families make decisions regarding how to 
practice and govern their philanthropic efforts.  
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Tables 
Table 1.1 Sample Definitions of Philanthropy 




Sample Definitions “Commitment to the Common Good” Approach 
2000 Litz & Stewart Philanthropy involves giving of time and money with a 




Altruistic activities intended to serve others. This 
includes: the act of donating money, goods and services 
to support a socially beneficial or humanitarian cause.  
 x 
2008 Pharoah Philanthropy is the voluntary giving and serving of 
individuals and communities beyond one’s family 
x  
Sample Definitions “Community Investment” Approach 
1988 Atkinson & 
Galaskiewicz 
Donation to charity that is tax deductible and serve the 
public good and may or may not benefit the 
organization. 
 x 
2006 Robinson Philanthropy has a long-term focus and its purpose is to 
establish long-term capital funding with financial capital 
creating and supporting programs for one or more 
initiatives. In contrast charitable giving is short-term 
focus involving a one-time donation for a specific 
purpose. 
x  
Sample Definitions of Blended Approaches 
“Commitment to the Common Good” and “Community Investment”  
2006 Madden et al. One of the activities through which a company engages 
with its community. Philanthropy is defined as the 
voluntary giving of money, time or in-kind goods by a 
business without any direct commercial benefit and with 
the purpose of benefiting the community welfare. 
x  
2012 Rey-Garcia Corporate actions that are a response to societal 
expectations that businesses should be good citizens. It 
is one of the four components of corporate social 
responsibility. And, it is discretionary. 
 x 
2014 Dou et al.* Charitable donations with discretionary responsibility of 
where and how much to donate despite the society’s 
expectations.  
 x 
“Community Investment” and “Marketing” 
1995 File & Prince These authors equate philanthropy with cause related 
marketing. Cause related marketing are joint ventures 
between non-profits and businesses that include giving 
to the community and expecting a return.  
 x 
Note. The “*” next to the author’s name indicates that this article was published in a family business 
journal.
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Table 1.2 
Motives for Philanthropic Efforts in Family Enterprises  
Family-Oriented Motives 
Family identity  Reflects that philanthropy is important to the family, part of its culture and 
identity, and describes important values. 
Legacy  Highlights the family’s concern in creation, preservation and transfer of its 
legacy. 
Wealth benefits  Suggest that families are motivated to do philanthropy because it can serve 
as a way to transfer and manage their wealth 
Business-Oriented Motives 
Strategic  Highlights that philanthropy is important to the family enterprise/business 
because it can help the bottom line of the business in the long-term. 
Political  Guided by a desire to gain political goodwill in the community.  
Expectation  Based on the desire to fulfill the expectations of relevant others like 
competitors or similar organizations. 
Dual Motives 
Reputational  Guided by the desire to develop and preserve positive perceptions of the 
family and the family business from external and internal non-family 
stakeholders.  
Moral  Emerge from the good intentions of the family and the business to 
contribute to the welfare of others and achieve social change. It is tied to the 
belief that “with great wealth comes great responsibility”. 
Educational  Based on the concern to educate family members about business, family and 
personal skills. The belief is that philanthropy can serve to this process. 
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Table 1.3  
Theoretical Approaches Used to Explain Motivations for Philanthropy 
Theory Explanation  References  Motives 
Agency  In "Owner-controlled firms” 
philanthropy is not seen as an 
agency cost because owners 
may not exclusively focus on 
stockholders. 
Atkinson & Galaskiewicz (1988), 
Zhang et al. (2012) 





Socially responsible actions 
by a firm will be reciprocated 
over time by support from 
loyal customers, employees, 
suppliers and other 
stakeholders.  




Engaging in socially 
responsible actions is part of 
the identity that firms want to 
project to others. 
Bingham et al. (2010); Cruz et al. 




Social Capital  Philanthropy helps develop 
ties between the business and 
the community that can be 
valuable.  
Campopiano et al., 2014); Harvey 
et al. (2011); Lähdesmäki & 








enhances different dimensions 
of SEW that are important for 
family businesses identity. 








Organizations engage in 
philanthropy because these 
actions are consistent with 
how the business wants 
certain stakeholders to view 
the firm.  
Bingham et al. (2010) Moral 
Reputation 
Stakeholder  Family firms engage in 
philanthropy to meet the 
demands of relevant 
stakeholders.  
Bingham et al. (2010); Cruz et al. 
(2014); Fernando & Almeida 
(2012); Zhang et al., (2012); 
Zellweger & Nason (2008) 
Expectation 
Stewardship  Practicing philanthropy helps 
the family firm act as good 
steward in the community 
where they work. 






Philanthropy enhances the 
interaction between the firm 
and the community, which is 
essential for the sustainability 
of the firm. 
Fitzgerald et al. (2010) Legacy 
Expectation 
  








Check book Philanthropy Giving because someone asks. 
Formative philanthropy Giving back to organizations that are important to the person. 
Cause philanthropy Supporting causes that are important for the individual. 
Family Practices 
Collaborative giving Working with a group of family members to create a pool of funds used for 
philanthropy. 
Donor advised funds A fund set by a private donor (individual, family or corporation) within one 
public foundation.  
Family foundations Practicing philanthropy through an entity in which a family or some of its 
members endow and play a significant role in its governance and /or 
management. 
Planned donations  Donations that are planned and done as a group. 
Corporate Practices 
Foundations Supporting philanthropic causes through a separate and independently 
governed legal entity from the parent company but maintaining close ties 
with it (i.e. contributions to maintain its giving or reflecting the parent’s 
interests). 
Endowments Exercising philanthropy by a donation of money or assets to a non-profit 
organization for the on going support of that organization.  
Multiple Levels 
Charitable trusts A trust settled for both charitable purposes and public benefit.  
Giving circles A collective way of practicing philanthropy, in which donors come 
together, formally or informally, to combine their resources for a cause. 
Public community 
foundations 
Engaging in philanthropy by irrevocably giving funds to a chosen 
community foundation. 
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Table 3.1. Case Demographic data at the year of the study  
Case Case 1: Alfa Family Case 2: Beta Family 
Country Chile Italy 
Generation of family 6th Generation 4th Generation 
Number of Family Members 280 88 
Number of Family Owners 210 25 
Date of business foundation 1904 1937 
Annual Revenue $1.7B $1,5B 
International presence YES1 YES2 
Number of business units/companies 7 3 
Main/Core Industry Printing Services, paper 
products and office supplies. 
Food Industry 
Philanthropy Practice YES YES 
Family Foundation YES YES 
Corporate Foundation NO YES (Business Level) 
Other (Patronage3) Grant-making at the business 
level 
Patronage 
Existing Owner’s Council NO YES 
Existing Family Council YES YES 
Existing Holding Board YES YES 
Existing Business Boards in each 
business unit 
YES YES 
Existing Foundation Board YES YES 
Family participating in Governance:  YES YES 
Owner’s Council Not apply 7 
At the Holding Level 4 from 9 4 of 7 
At the Business Level Yes, with a majority of 
independent directors. 
Yes, with majority of 
independent directors 
At the Foundation  4 of 7 
Family participating in Management:  28 family members NO 
At the Holding Level The Chairman is a Family 
Member 
The Chairman is a Family 
Member 
At the Business Level 28 0 
At the Foundation 0 0 
Level of professionalization at the 




1 International presence of Alfa Company: Offices in 16 countries, manufacturing plants in 9 of the 16 and 
serves 60 countries among the 5 continents. 
2 International presence of Beta Company: Presence in all 5 continents. Offices in 18 countries and 
manufacturing plants in 8 of them. 
3 Patronage: giving support, mainly with money to an organization or to events aligned with the “family 
philanthropic dream”. 
   141 
                                                     
 






Family Identity: “It’s part of the Alfa’s DNA: we need to share our luck with our 
collaborators and the community”; Family Values: social responsibility, solidarity, self-
improvement, personal development, integrity; respect, trust and modestly. Values are 
transmitted by example. “The values that are the grounds of the philanthropic activity remain 
the same over the years and the generations, what it changes are the mechanisms to fulfill 
them” 
Moral Motives: Christian believes. “To give back to the community what the community has 
given us with the prosperity of the company”; “The Foundation is the tool that allows the 
family to payback to God, to give God his dividend”. 
Legacy Motives: Believes on individuals and community development. The family respect the 
legacy: “The principles never change, there are adapted to the circumstances” 
Family Philanthropic Dream:  
“To give back to the vulnerable community by supporting them and their individuals to 
develop so that they can prosper” 
Structures At the individual an branch level: Direct Giving and Community Foundations (15 per cent 
of the family does philanthropy individually) 
At the Family collective level: they began with direct giving evolving to an operating family 
foundation because they aimed to run their own projects and have an impact the community: 
The Alfa Foundation. 
Company/Business level: Grant-making to the communities where they do business at both 





















At the Family Level:  
The Family Council decides on the principals and governance design of the Family 
Foundation. 
The Family Protocol: defines the mandate (confirming the By-laws of the Foundation) 
and guidelines for the Foundation.  
 
The Alfa Foundation –  
The Board of the Foundation:  
The board is strategic and provides oversight. It meets every two months to define and 
supervise the guidelines, strategy and budget, and supervision of the executive team. 
- Board Composition: 13 Directors elected by the Family. 9 family directors 2 for each 
4 branches and 1 extra director for the branch that is larger. 5 principal directors and 4 
acting directors, who have to be approved by the principal directors. The branches 
decide on their representatives by cooption in eternum1. The Family directors are 
stewards of the legacy. 4 non – family directors elected by the Family Council that 
contribute with expert know-how in philanthropy and in the programs the foundation 
runs he Family Council. 
- The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Foundation are elected by the Family 
Council and so far are Family Directors.  
- Decisions are made by unanimity. 
- The Board appoints the CEO, a non-family executives that attends the Boards 
meetings with voice but not vote. Below the CEO, the management team is recruited 
based on expertise and talent criteria.  
Advisory Committee of the Board: Advice the Board with the strategic planning. The 
Committee meets every three months.  
Bylaws of the Foundation: the mandate of the foundation has to be respected, the focus 
and the mechanisms to achieve the mandate can be adapted but the mandate is unmovable.  
 
At the business level:  
Grant-making activities in the Business are decided by the Board of the Business and/or the 
Business CEO. There is no formal grant-making policy. Grant-making activities in the holding 
are decided by the Holding Board. 
 
1 Cooption in eternum: a method based on the vote of the current family director, a method that guarantees that 
the legacy and mandate of the foundation is respected over the years (“we look for the best stewards”). 
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Funding At the Alfa Family Foundation level:  
The Foundation owns the 23 percent of the Family Business. This is a permanent 
endowment. The Foundation receives dividends from the Company every year. 
 
Partner/Alliances with other public and private institutions, national and 
international. This contributes to the funding of different programs. “For each peso that 
the foundation receives from dividends, the partners contribute with four extra ones so 
they can organize programs for 5 pesos” 
“We’ve become social businessmen” 
 
At the Business Level:  
The Holding Board decides on the Grant-making. There is no budget agreed annually for 
these activities.  
Outcomes Family Dynamics and Relationships: Family Unity and Cohesion: “What keeps the family 
together”.  
 
Legacy Creation and Transfer: Stewardship: “the project where we all feel included and 
identified with”. Transfer of values over generations.  
 
Reputation: Although unlooked for, the Foundation has provided the family with a positive 
image in the community and prestige for the management of the foundation, which impacts the 
business  positively.  
 
Change in the Community: The funding mechanism allows for a sustainable foundation that 
can commit to a vision and a strategy. Independent from the welfare of the family and 
increasingly from the financial success of the business. 
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Family Identity: “We live the family values and the legacy of the founders through the 
philanthropy”; “The philanthropy will become the shared project of the family, a place where 
we all agree and feel proud of”; Family Values: generosity, entrepreneurship, meritocracy, 
innovation, commitment with the cultural roots/origins of the family and the community. 
Family Legacy: “To preserve the legacy of our grandfather, he was fully committed with 
protecting and enhancing the cultural identity of our region” 
Reputational Motives: “Through the philanthropy we build reputational capital for the family 
and the business”  
Family Philanthropic Dream:  
“To work together as a family preserving the legacy of our grandparents, the cultural identity 
of our community and supporting entrepreneurship in innovation areas, while fostering the 
reputation of the family business” 
Structures At the individual an branch level: Direct Giving (mainly done by the 5 members of the 2nd 
Generation) 
At the Family collective level:  
- Family Foundation that have the name of the Grandfather 
- Diverse patronage activities. 
Company/Business level:  
- One Business Foundation in one of the business units 





















At the Family Philanthropy Level:  
The Family Council gathers the philanthropic concerns and interests of the family and 
keeps the family informed and educated on the topic.  
 
The Owner’s Council: “the final decision-making body”. It revises the mandate of the 
Foundation, appoints the Board of the Foundation and decides on the annual funds that 
shareholders will contribute to the foundation. It also decides on patronage activities.  
 
The Beta Family Foundation-  
The Board of the Foundation:  
Role of the board: strategic and informative, with a limited overseeing role. The 
Board appoints the CEO of the Foundation. It meets quarterly. Recently, and due to a 
succession of the Chairman of the Board of the Foundation, the Board has 
incorporated the 3rd non-family director and appointed a non-family director as 
Chairman. The mission and strategy of the Foundation was being revisited, based on a 
workshop on the 3rd Generation Philanthropic Vision.  
Board Composition: 7 Directors elected by the Owners Council; 4 family directors, 1- 
2G member and 3 – 3G members that provides the family philanthropic vision and 
values to the Board; 3 non-family directors that contribute with expert know-how in 
philanthropy and in the programs the foundation runs; selected based on meritocracy; 
decisions are made by unanimity first, and when unanimity cannot be reached by 
simple majority  
Bylaws of the Foundation: The Owner’s Council has recently revised the Bylaws of the 
foundation to adapt them to the new configuration of the Board.  
The Family is working on a redefinition of the mandate of the Foundation building on the 3G 
Vision on Philanthropy. 
At the business level:  
The Holding Board offers some guidelines to the businesses regarding the Foundation’s 
Board composition, activity and budget/ funds. The guidelines also include the patronage 
activities.  
Foundation – The Board of the Business decides on the mission of the Foundation, which is 
related to the Healthy Innovation on the Food Industry. It also elects the Board of the 
Foundation, composed integrated by board members at the business level, one board member 
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at the holding level and the CEO of the business. The Board of the Business decides on the 
funds to assign to the Foundation, and oversees the management and grant-making of the 
foundation. The Holding Board  
Patronage activities:  
- The businesses are engaged in diverse patronage initiatives related to their strategy. Both the 
CEOs of the Businesses and their Board have the authority to decide on these practices, with 
certain limits for the CEOs. 
- Patronage activities at the Holding level are decided by the Chairman of the Holding Board 
and/or by the Owner’s Council. There is no grant-making policy.  
System Level:  
The Owners’ Council, through a Philanthropy Committee, oversees the overall philanthropic 
activity and translates the “Family Philanthropic Dream” into a mission for the family system 
philanthropy, which is convey to the Family Foundation, Family Council and to the Holding 
Board. The Council decides on the funding and gives guidelines on governance principles and 
funding.  
Funding At the Family Level- The Beta-Family Foundation level and patronage initiatives:  
The Owner’s Council decides on the amount devoted to Family Philanthropy. The funding 
source is the Holding profits.  
At the Business Level:  
The funding sources are the business units. 
Outcomes Legacy Creation and Transfer: Family Stewardship: “a shared project through which we 
preserve the family legacy and identity and makes as feel united and part of a big thing”. 
Transfer of values: “Makes the family feel responsible for managing the business well so that 
they can support the Foundation”. 
Reputation: “Although not Through the philanthropic and patronage activities our family and 
our companies are positively perceived and more visible for our stakeholders” 
Improvement and change in the community: Significant and sustainable social impact. 
The revision of the philanthropic project and its governance structures aim to improve the 
focus of the foundation so that it can be more efficient in achieving social impact.  
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Appendix 1.1. List of Sources Included in the Review 
            
Year Author Academic Practice Family Business Outside US RQ1 CSR RQ2 Theory RQ3 Foundation RQ4 
1988 Atkinson & 
Galaskiewicz 
x   x  x  x x    
1990 Brody & Strauch  x x       x x  
1990 Danco & Ward x  x     x  x x  
1990 Gersick et al.  x x     x  x x  
1990 Hansen  x x     x  x x  
1990 Hayes & Adams  x x     x  x x  
1990 Von Lossberg  x x       x x  
1990 Ylsvisaker  x x       x x  
1993 Prince et al. x   x    x     
1995 File & Prince x   x  x x x  x   
1998 File & Prince x   x  x x x    x 
2000 Litz & Stewart x   x  x  x  x   
2004 Hersch  x x x  x  x     
2004 Uhlander et al. x   x x x x x     
2005 Deniz & Cabrera x   x x x x x  x   
2006 Dyer & Whetten x   x  x x x x    
2006 Gersick et al   x x     x   x  
2006 Madden et al. x   x x x  x  x   
2006 Robinson  x x   x  x     
2007 Gallo  x x     x     
2008 Gray  x x x    x     
2008 Niehm et al. x   x  x x x x   x 
2008 Ottinger  x x     x  x x  
2008 Pharoah  x x  x x  x   x x 
2008 Schwass & Lief  x x x  x  x     
2008 Snowden-Blanchard  x x     x  x x  
2008 Zellweger & Nason x  x x  x  x x    
2009 Breeze  x  x x x  x  x  x 
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Year Author Academic Practice Family Business Outside US RQ1 CSR RQ2 Theory RQ3 Foundation RQ4 
2009 Bronfman  x x     x  x   
2009 Chenier   x x       x   
2009 Ward  x x     x     
2010 Bingham et al.,  x   x  x x x x x   
2010 Credit Suiss   x x  x   x  x   
2010 Fitzgerald et al. x   x  x x x x x   
2010 Rey & Puig x  x  x x  x  x x  
2011 Eichenberger & 
Johnson 
 x x   x  x     
2011 Harvey et al.,  x   x  x  x x    
2011 Lerner  x x   x  x  x x  
2011 Moody et al.,   x x     x   x  
2011 Pharoah, C. et al.  x  x x x  x   x x 
2012 Fernando & Almeida x   x x x x x x   x 
2012 Kranenburg& Zoet-
Wissink 
x   x x x x x     
2012 Lähdesmäki & Takala x   x x x x x x x   
2012 Lungeanu & Ward x  x     x  x x  
2012 Rey-Garcia x   x x x x x  x x  
2012 Winer  x x x    x  x   
2012 Zhang et al x   x x   x x   x 
2013 Eichenberger & 
Johnson 
 x x   x  x     
2013 Rey Garcia & Puig 
Raposo 
x  x  x x  x  x x  
2013 U.S. Trust   x x     x  x  x 
2014 Campopiano et al  x   x x x  x x    
2014 Cruz et al x   x x x x x x    
2014 Dou et al x   x x x x x x    
2014 Du x   x x x x x     
2014 Hoy & Rosplock x  x x  x x x     
 Totals 28 27 31 30 18 33 16 50 13 27 18 8 
 
   149 
 
Note. “X” indicates that a publication was coded under the characteristics described in the header. 
The four research questions explored were: 
RQ1- how is philanthropy conceptualized?  
RQ2 - what are the motivations for philanthropy?  
RQ3 - how is philanthropy practiced?  
RQ4 - what are the outcomes associated with philanthropy? 
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Appendix 2.1. Interview Guide 
 
1. Information about the interview 
a. Name of the Interviewee 
b. Date and location of the interview 
c. What is the relationship with the philanthropy project?  
 
2. History 
a. Context of the Family’s philanthropic activities:  
i. Context in which the family began its philanthropic activities 
1. Personal Intentions 
2. Family Values 
3. Values of the Company (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) 
4. Social Context 
5. Legal Context 
ii. Who was involved and what roles did they play 
iii. Relationship between these people (family branch to which they belong, generation, 
relationship with the family company) 
 
b. Context of the enterprise at the time philanthropic activities were initiated 
i. Family business or Family Offices at the time of initiating social action. 
ii. Current businesses (currently operational), indicating which members of the family are 
currently active in the business. 
iii. Context of the donation (where the initial funds originated from) (Note all the different 
philanthropic actions that they are engaged as a family, their goals and how they are each 
funded).  
iv. Initial intention of the people who began the philanthropic activities:  
1. Original mission or mission statement 
2. The intent was communicated formally, informally, or deduced by the members 
of the family 
 
3. Declaration of purpose, mission and criteria for the selection of projects. 
a. Is there an articulated mission? (For the family philanthropy as a whole and for each specific 
project, such as Foundation, Philanthropy Fund, Patronage Policy,….) 
b. Are there restrictions or requirements on the type of action, place, etc. to be considered a 
beneficiary? 
c. Who was in charge of defining the mission? And in charge of revising it when needed? 
d. Who approved the mission? 
e. How much unanimity was there in relation to the mission? 
i. Between family branches 
ii. Between generations 
iii. Between people in leadership (leadership group) and other advisors (trustees) 
iv. Between directors and support staff? 
f. Challenges or problems encountered (obtain information or details of the story or history) 
 
4. Development of the Philanthropy (retrospective review of the history of the development of the 
philanthropic actions) 
 
a. How is philanthropy carried out:  
i. Using a Foundation:  
1. Foundation of the company/corporation 
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2. Family Foundation 
3. Individual Foundations by different members of the family 
ii. Support of certain causes, individuals or foundations of third parties such as community 
foundations.  
iii. Social Enterprise/Entrepreneurship  
iv. What is the trigger or determining factor that leads to the selection of a certain practice or 
philanthropic vehicle. 
 
5. How philanthropy is governed? 
a. Is there a formal decision-making body that set strategic goals, maintain key relationships, 
safeguard the health of the philanthropic project, keep it accountable and control and recognize 
achievement and performance of the philanthropic project?  
b. Are there different levels of governance? (For example, one body that oversees the philanthropy  
projects overall the family enterprise system assuring that the philanthropic intentions of the 
family are pursue and respected. And then, boards or decision-making bodies for each Foundation 
or philanthropic project that exist (such as a family Foundation, a Business Foundation, a 
Philanthropy Committee for specific donations,…)) 
c. Who is responsible for appointing members to the decision-making body? To whom it 
depends/To whom it depends? To whom it is delegated? (de quién depende? A quien responde?) 
d. How is the board or decision-making group composed? What criteria govern its selection? 
1. Specifically: 
a. Family members 
b. External people/Independent professionals 
2. How were they chosen? 
3. Who were the leaders? 
4. Were the decisions participatory and shared by the people involved (or the 
Board), and at what level? 
5. Who was not included? 
e. What is the contribution of the board or decision-making body? 
f. Roles:  
i. Is there a formal description of the position of Director? 
ii. Is there a formal description of the position of Secretary or Chairman of the Committees 
iii. Is there a formal description of the position of Chairman of the Board of the 
Foundation/Philanthropic Action Leader? Must it be a member of the family?  
iv. Is there a succession plan in place for Chairman of the Board or Philanthropic action 
leader? 
1. Is it a position that will always be filled by a family member? 
2. Is it based on hierarchy? 
3. Family branches? 
4. Can it be a non-family member? 
5. Or a spouse? 
 
v. Who defines this process? Who is responsible for its implementation? 
 
g. Are there governance committees and what are they? 
i. How are the directors assigned to the committees? 
ii. What roles do the committees hold in the process of making donations? 
 
6. Integration of Governance 
a. What connections, if any, do the different philanthropic entities or projects have with:  
i. The Family:  
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1. Is the family invited to participate (visit, learn and be informed) 
2. Is the family involved in the decision making process (does their opinion carry 
weight in decisions regarding grants, governance and management of the social 
action) 
3. What does the family contribute to the social action? 
4. What does the social action bring to the family? 
 
ii. The Family Business Operations: 
1. Of the various levels of the philanthropic activity, does a relationship with the 
family philanthropy exist with:  
a. Philanthropy of the Corporation 
b. CSR of the operational business 
 
2. Level of Relationship:  
a. Impact on the Mission (donations) 
b. Information 
c. Strategic Value 
d. Identifying family - company 
 
iii. Family Office 
iv. Other Family Foundations 
v. Other Foundations outside the family 
vi. Family Council 
vii. The Government or other Public Institutions 
viii. Other family structures (Family Assembly) 
 
7. Continuity Planning (part of Governance) 
a. How are the members/younger generations becoming involved in philanthropic projects 
i. What steps are carried out in the education and/or socialization of future Directors or 
persons in charge of the project? 
ii. Do they first participate in junior Board or Committees? 
iii. Are they sent to professional meetings, seminars or conferences? 
b. What steps are taken to anticipate the transition? 
i. Is there a mandatory age of retirement or other limiting requirements? 
ii. Is the new generation involved in the decision making process? To what extent? 
c. Does the involvement of the new generation lead to:   
i. Change in the philanthropy model 
ii. Change in the mission and philanthropic purposes 
 
8. How philanthropy is managed? (Stewart and Hitt, 2012: Delegation to professionals  ; R ational, 
analytical  , Innovative  , Form alized, com m and and control) 
 
a. Is there a formal description of the position of the person in charge of the Foundation, Social 
Enterprise, or other philanthropic vehicle? 
b. Who is responsible for appointing the CEO o General Director? 
c. Does a family member occupy this position? 
i. Are there different employment criteria for members of the family? 
ii. Is the process of evaluation different? 
iii. Is the compensation different? 
d. Are there professional support staff  (not family employed)? 
i. How was the decision to hire them made? 
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ii. What qualifications were sought for these support staff? 
iii. Who oversees staff? 
iv. Are there formal evaluations and procedures of feedback for support staff? 
v. Are the support staff positions occupied by members of the family? 
1. Are there different employment criteria for members of the family? 
2. Is the evaluation process different? 
3. Is compensation different? 
vi. What role do the support staff play in the management of the participation of the 
philanthropic project? 
e. Does management apply rational, analytical and innovative work procedures? 
f. Is there a formalized command and control? 
g. Are there consultants? 
i. What type, with what training and experience?  
ii. With what purpose? 
h. Are there assessments of the impact of the philanthropy in place?  
i. Which ones and how often? 
ii. Who is in charge of them? 
iii. To whom are communicated? 
iv. In the event of a negative evaluation, what decisions are made to this regard? Who is 
ultimately responsible?  
 
9. How is the philanthropic activity funded? Who has the ultimate decision in that front? 
a. Are there different sub-categories of funds? 
b. Are there discretionary funds? 
 
10. Family Dynamics 
a. Structure  
i. Who are considered to be members of the Philanthropic project? Who can participate in 
the project, in the management or as the entrepreneur? 
ii. Is the distinction between blood family members and spouses important to the family? 
 
b. Leadership 
i. Who are the leaders? 
ii. How much authority do they exercise and where do they come from? 
1. Formal Leadership position 
2. Age or generational hierarchy 
3. Family branch or other “political” front 
iii. How are leaders from future generations identified? 
iv. How are leaders from future generations prepared and selected? 
1. The current leader chooses the new leader 
2. Branch decision 
3. Collective decision (from the Family or Shareholder Assembly) 
4. Hierarchy 
5. Family Council decision 
6. Board of Directors of the Corporation decision 
7. Board of the Foundation decision (Family Foundation model) 
 
c. Communication 
i. Is the family communication open and honest? 
 
11. Impact of philanthropic activity (collateral impacts) 
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a. What is the impact of philanthropic activity in:  
i. Family? 
ii. New generations? 
iii. Ownership? 
iv. Enterprise? 
v. Family Office? 
 
b. What benefits would you highlight that would not have been achieved any other way? 
i. Do you believe the family is aware of the benefits?  
ii. Do you believe that the ownership is aware of the benefits?  
iii. How about the top executives of the company (and the Board of Directors)?  
 
12. Closing Questions 
a. Is there anything else that has not been asked that would help in understanding the development 
of Philanthropy over time? 
b. Based on your experience, could you suggest a topic of governance, troubleshooting or planning, 
that could benefit other families and their philanthropic initiatives? 
c. Would you recommend that we interview someone else? (If the person you recommend is not 
part of our list, could you explain why you recommend them?) 
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